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This thesis examines the emergence and early history of venture capitalism in the 
US as a project of capitalization. As theorized in recent literatures on valuation 
studies and the “new” history of capitalism, capitalization is a collective activity, 
simultaneously cognitive and socio-technical, of “turning things into assets.” As 
such, it requires the capitalizing subject to “think as an investor.” The history of 
capitalism can be reconstructed as a history of successive “regimes of investment,” 
differing in terms of which assets get capitalized and under what terms. Before 
stabilizing as a “regime,” however, capitalization begins as a project that is logically 
and historically anterior to the institutions and technologies that will later hold it 
together. Rather, projects of capitalization emerge as ways of imagining certain 
objects as investments, or capital assets. In the early history of venture capital in the 
US, this imagination was targeted at young, small, technology-based firms. 
Prospective investors — who eventually became early venture capitalists — 
deployed a set of informal heuristics adopting some of the categories from the 
classifications used by the applied financial and managerial disciplines. This thesis 
follows the sequence of episodes through which these heuristics increasingly 
became centered on “people,” eventually helping create a novel action under a 
description and, to put it in Ian Hacking’s terms, a corresponding human kind — 
technical entrepreneurs. Accordingly, the analytical approach is nominalist: no 
claim is made as to whether the heuristics deployed by the actors featuring on the 
pages to follow could serve as a substitute for probabilistic calculation or any other 
formal calculative device. Yet however “effective” these heuristics might have been, 
they did have certain dynamic effects, applying and creating new classifications of 
investment opportunities, companies, and, eventually, people. As a result, in the 
early 1970s, venture capitalists defined themselves as being engaged in the “people 
business.” Rather than effectively “turning engineers into entrepreneurs” through 
coercive or performative effects, they created the category of “technical 
entrepreneurs” as a human kind, that is, as an open possibility for being a certain 
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This thesis examines the emergence and early history of venture capitalism in the 
US as a project of capitalization. 
Venture capital (VC) today is a generic term covering long-term, equity or 
equity-like investments, institutional or otherwise, in early-stage emerging growth 
companies, often but not always engaged in advanced technology fields.1 Assuming 
the role of an active, “hands-on” investor, venture capitalists (VCs) “raise capital to 
support the growth of technology-based companies” and “realize liquidity for their 
founding investors,” including VCs themselves, “by managing public offerings of 
their shares and by merging them into much larger companies.”2 In the imagination 
of the policy-makers and the public alike, its most visible success was the VC-backed 
growth of information and communication (ICT) and biotechnology industries 
between the 1970s and the 2000s, in the San Francisco Bay Area, since then also 
known as Silicon Valley. By 2000, the toponym turned into a metaphor, coming to 
exemplify “a Holy Grail of economic development,”3 with venture capital, along with 
flexible labor markets, the inflow of highly skilled migrants, close industry-
university ties, and network forms of organization, constituting an exportable model 
of regional economic development and innovation-based growth more generally.4 
The literature on venture capital and its history spans several scholarly 
disciplines. However, by way of a broad summary, two major interpretations are 
discernible. On the one hand, venture capital can be thought of as a form of 
 
1-See, for a sample of comparable definitions, Patrick R. Liles, Sustaining the Venture Capital 
Firm (Cambridge, MA: Management Analysis Center, Inc, 1977); Richard Florida and Martin Kenney, 
“Venture Capital and High Technology Entrepreneurship,” Journal of Business Venturing 3, no. 4 
(1988): 301–19; Richard Coopey, “The First Venture Capitalist: Financing Development in Britain 
after 1945: The Case of ICFC/3i,” Business and Economic History 23, no. 1, Fall (1994): 262–71; Martin 
Kenney and Richard Florida, “Venture Capital in Silicon Valley: Fueling New Firm Formation,” in 
Understanding Silicon Valley: The Anatomy of an Entrepreneurial Region, ed. Martin Kenney (Stanford, 
Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2000), 98–123; Paul A. Gompers and Joshua Lerner, The Venture 
Capital Cycle (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2004). 
2-William H. Janeway, “Doing Capitalism: Notes on the Practice of Venture Capitalism,” 
Journal of Economic Issues 20, no. 2 (1986): 431. 
3-Timothy J. Sturgeon, “How Silicon Valley Came to Be,” in Understanding Silicon Valley: 
Anatomy of an Entrepreneurial Region, ed. Martin Kenney (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 
2000), 15. 
4-On Silicon Valley economy, historical and contemporary roles of VCs, and its “modular” 
character, see AnnaLee Saxenian, Regional Advantage: Culture and Competition in Silicon Valley and 
Route 128 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1996); Martin Kenney, ed., Understanding 
Silicon Valley: Anatomy of an Entrepreneurial Region (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 
2000); Lee et al., The Silicon Valley Edge: A Habitat for Innovation and Entrepreneurship (Stanford, 
Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2000); Bruce Kogut, The Global Internet Economy (Cambridge, Mass.: 
MIT Press, 2003); Ronald J. Gilson, “Engineering a Venture Capital Market: Lessons from the 
American Experience,” Stanford Law Review 55, no. 4 (2003): 1067–1103; Lécuyer, Making Silicon 
Valley: Innovation and the Growth of High Tech, 1930–1970 (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press); Josh 
Lerner, Boulevard of Broken Dreams: Why Public Efforts to Boost Entrepreneurship and Venture Capital 
Have Failed–and What to Do About It (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009); Michel Ferrary 
and Mark Granovetter, “The Role of Venture Capital Firms in Silicon Valley’s Complex Innovation 
Network,” Economy and Society 38, no. 2 (2009): 326–59; Leslie Berlin, Troublemakers: Silicon 
Valley’s Coming of Age (New York: Simon and Shuster, 2017); Robyn Klingler-Vidra, The Venture 
Capital State: The Silicon Valley Model in East Asia (Cornell Studies in Political Economy) (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 2018). On the origins of the term, see Turo Uskali and David Nordfors, “The 
Role of Journalism in Creating the Metaphor of Silicon Valley,” IJ-4 The Fourth Conference on 




entrepreneurial finance or “risk-capital” in general. In this sense, proto-forms of 
venture investing have existed throughout much of the history of commerce, 
beginning with the “risk communities” of medieval merchants engaged in long-
distance trading and colonial ventures of early modern European empires, if not 
earlier.5 On the other hand, VC can be treated as a form of financing technological 
innovation or research and development activities (R&D) more broadly conceived.6 
Accordingly, the earliest precedents of proto-venture capital can be found in the 
period of English industrialization and, more prominently, during the Second 
Industrial Revolution.7 In this perspective, capitalist development is punctuated 
with the periodic emergence of clusters of entrepreneurial talent and pools of 
financial capital willing to take risks with new technologies, deployed through 
informal networks of affluent individuals, insider lending, universal banking, as well 
as public securities markets.8 For the US case, possible candidates would include the 
burgeoning New England textile industry in the 1820s, Cleveland and Pittsburgh 
electric light, chemical, oil, and steel industries between the 1870s and the 1910s, 
 
 5-On merchant “risk communities,” see Max Weber, General Economic History, trans. Frank 
H. Knight (1927; Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1950); Fernand Braudel, Civilization and Capitalism 
15th-18th Century–Volume II: The Wheels of Commerce (1979; New York: Harper & Row, 1983); 
Jonathan Levy, Freaks of Fortune: The Emerging World of Capitalism and Risk in America (Cambridge, 
MA; London, U.K.: Harvard University Press, 2012). For a set of more distant historical examples, see 
David S. Landes, Joel Mokyr, and William J. Baumol, The Invention of Enterprise: Entrepreneurship 
from Ancient Mesopotamia to Modern Times (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2012); Ronald 
C. Michie, “Options, Concessions, Syndicates, and the Provision of Venture Capital, 1880–1913,” 
Business History 23, no. 2 (1981): 147–64; Ronald C. Michie, “The Finance of Innovation in Late 
Victorian and Edwardian Britain: Possibilities and Constraints,” Journal of European Economic 
History 17, no. 3 (1988): 491–530. 
6-Cristiano Antonelli and Morris Teubal, “Knowledge-Intensive Property Rights and the 
Evolution of Venture Capitalism,” Journal of Institutional Economics 4, no. 2 (2008): 163–82; David C. 
Mowery, “Plus ca Change: Industrial R&D in the ‘Third Industrial Revolution,’” Industrial and 
Corporate Change 18, no. 1 (2009): 1–50; Gerben Bakker, “Money for Nothing: How Firms Have 
Financed R&D-Projects since the Industrial Revolution,” Research Policy 42, no. 10 (2013): 1793–
1814. 
7-Joel Mokyr, The Gifts of Athena: Historical Origins of the Knowledge Economy (Princeton, 
[NJ]: Princeton University Press, 2002); Carlota Perez, “Finance and Technical Change: A Long-Term 
View,” in Elgar Companion to Neo-Schumpeterian Economics, ed. Horst Hanusch and Andreas Pyka 
(Cheltenham, UK; Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar, 2007), 775–99; Robert C. Allen, The British 
Industrial Revolution in Global Perspective (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 
2009).  
8-See Naomi R. Lamoreaux, Insider Lending: Banks, Personal Connections, and Economic 
Development in Industrial New England (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994); Liam Brunt, 
“Rediscovering Risk: Country Banks as Venture Capital Firms in the First Industrial Revolution,” 
Journal of Economic History 66, no. 1 (2006): 74–102. The idea of banks as venture capitalists goes 
back to Joseph Schumpeter, who theorized “wildcat banking” as the provision of loans regardless of 
the borrower’s ability to repay, treating it as the primary means of entrepreneurial finance. He was 
likely generalizing from the experience of the German and Austro-Hungarian universal banking, 
although the term emerged in the context of “free” banking in the U.S. between the 1830s and the 
1860s. See Joseph A. Schumpeter, Business Cycles: A Theoretical, Historical and Statistical Analysis of 
the Capitalist Process (New York and London: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc, 1939); Gerald P. 
Dwyer, “Wildcat Banking, Banking Panics, and Free Banking in the United States,” Economic Review 
(Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta) December, no. 3–6 (1996): 1–20; Richard Tilly, “Universal Banking 
in Historical Perspective,” Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics - JITE 154, no. 1 (1998): 
1–7; Caroline Fohlin, Mobilizing Money: How the World’s Richest Nations Financed Industrial Growth 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012); Michael Peneder and Andreas Resch, “Schumpeter 
and Venture Finance: Radical Theorist, Broke Investor, and Enigmatic Teacher,” Industrial and 




and Detroit automobile industry in the 1920s.9 Silicon Valley would thus appear a 
thoroughly familiar example of a technological cluster, whose perhaps unusual 
potency can be explained by a long history of heavy infusions with public money and 
a host of other favorable contingencies.10 
Nevertheless, as an “organized” and professionally managed business 
practice, venture capital emerged in the US after World War II, and it was Silicon 
Valley where its business model was “repeatedly verified.”11 The period of its 
emergence, and thus also the relevant “event window” this thesis is concerned with, 
covers the late 1940s, when the first specialized venture capital organizations have 
been established, and the late 1970s, when it evolved into a quantitatively visible 
industry — in terms of the number of firms, the size of funds under management, 
the scale of operation, and the public recognition. In 1957, the American Research 
and Development Corporation (ARD), the first venture capital company to mobilize 
institutional funds, established in Boston in 1946, invested $70,000 in Digital 
Equipment Corporation (DEC), a minicomputer startup, in exchange for a 70% 
equity stake. In August 1966, DEC went public on New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), 
making an offering of 375,000 common shares at $22 per share, which was quickly 
sold out and soon traded at a three-point premium.12 The initial success was 
multiplied in the long-term, with the value of the ARD’s initial investment increasing 
by a factor of 500 in nine years, offsetting the losses or mediocre performance of the 
rest of its portfolio companies.13 
In the next decade, the pattern set by ARD became much more visible, if not 
assuredly reproducible. In 1971, the National Association of Securities Dealers 
launched the world’s first automated quotations system, NASDAQ, which also 
became the first public market specialized in high-technology stock trading. In that 
same year, Intel Corporation, a quintessential VC-backed startup, founded by two 
prominent engineers, but with little more than two years of history, became the first 
company to undertake an initial public offering (IPO) on NASDAQ, raising $6.8 
million at $23.50 per share — “providentially,” as Martin Kenney puts it, as it 
marked the emergence of a symbiotic relationship between venture capital, 
 
9-See Naomi R. Lamoreaux, Margaret Levenstein, and Kenneth L. Sokoloff, “Mobilizing 
Venture Capital during the Second Industrial Revolution: Cleveland, Ohio, 1870-1920,” Capitalism 
and Society 1, no. 3 (2006); Tom Nicholas, VC: An American History (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
University Press, 2019). For a longer-term perspective beyond the US, see Perez, “Finance and 
Technical Change: A Long-Term View”; Fohlin, Mobilizing Money: How the World’s Richest Nations 
Financed Industrial Growth; William H. Janeway, Doing Capitalism in the Innovation Economy: 
Markets, Speculation and the State (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012). 
10-Saxenian, Regional Advantage: Culture and Competition in Silicon Valley and Route 128; 
Stuart Leslie, “The Biggest" Angel" of Them All: The Military and the Making,” in Understanding Silicon 
Valley: The Anatomy of an Entrepreneurial Region, ed. Martin Kenney (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford 
University Press, 2000), 44–67; Lécuyer, Making Silicon Valley: Innovation and the Growth of High 
Tech, 1930–1970; Linda Weiss, America Inc.? Innovation and Enterprise in the National Security State 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2014). For an insider’s view, see William R. Hambrecht, “Venture 
Capital & the Growth of Silicon Valley,” California Management Review 26, no. 2 (1984): 74–82. 
11-Nicholas, VC: An American History, 7; John W. Wilson, The New Venturers: Inside the High-
Stakes World of Venture Capital (Boston, MA: Addison-Weseley, 1985). 
12-“DIGITAL EQUIPMENT MARKETS ITS SHARES,” New York Times, August 19, 1966, 42. 
13-Spencer E. Ante, Creative Capital: Georges Doriot and the Birth of Venture Capital (Boston, 
Mass.: Harvard Business Press, 2008), 195–96; David H. Hsu and Martin Kenney, “Organizing Venture 
Capital: The Rise and Demise of American Research & Development Corporation, 1946-1973,” 
Industrial and Corporate Change 14, no. 4 (2005): 579–616; Henry Etzkowitz, MIT and the Rise of 




technology-based companies, and specialized public markets, the financial engine 
behind the “new economy business model.”14 In 1973, the industry organized 
nationally, founding the National Venture Capital Association (NVCA), and 
successfully lobbied for tax and investment regulation reforms later in that decade. 
The reduction of capital gains tax from 49.5% to 28% by the 1978 Revenue Act and 
the 1979 clarification of the “prudent man” rule, codified in the Employee 
Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) of 1974, allowed pension funds and other 
institutions to invest in venture capital, effectively legitimizing it as an asset class.15 
With NASDAQ as a dedicated “exit” channel for VC investments and the supply side 
“boost” of institutional money, the industry began to grow explosively, setting on 
the path towards increasing competition and specialization. In January 1984, Arthur 
Rock, one of Intel’s founding investors who helped Robert Noyce and Gordon Moore 
raise the initial $2.5 million of capital, appeared on the cover of Time Magazine, 
featuring as a “venture capitalist.”16 Two years later, venture capital was included in 
the list of asset classes representing the “broad spectrum of primary wealth-
generating investments available to the institutional investor.”17  
In that same year, a reflective theorist-practitioner wondered whether 
venture capital represented a “novel extension of capitalism,”18 articulating a 
concern that resurfaced again in the aftermath of the dot-com bubble, in recognition 
of the impact of the VC-fueled “exit-capitalism” on the American “variety of 
capitalism,” and beyond.19 Neither the literature concerned with venture capital as 
a form of entrepreneurial finance nor the one treating it as a form of R & D finance 
fully addresses this question. The former focuses on the VC industry as a specialized 
segment of the capital market, providing finance to the businesses that would 
 
14-Martin Kenney, “How Venture Capital Became a Component of the US National System of 
Innovation,” Industrial and Corporate Change 20, no. 6 (2011): 1706. On the complementarity of 
venture capital and NASDAQ, see Nicholas, VC: An American History, 313–15; Bakker, “Money for 
Nothing: How Firms Have Financed R&D-Projects since the Industrial Revolution,” 1807–8; Antonelli 
and Teubal, “Knowledge-Intensive Property Rights and the Evolution of Venture Capitalism.” On the 
“new economy business model,” see William Lazonick, “Varieties of Capitalism and Innovative 
Enterprise,” Comparative Social Research 24 (2007): 21–69; William Lazonick, “Innovative Business 
Models and Varieties of Capitalism: Financialization of the U.S. Corporation,” Business History Review 
84, no. 4 (2010): 675–702; on Silicon Valley VC finance, see Martin Kenney and Urs Von Burg, 
“Institutions and Economies: Creating Silicon Valley,” in Understanding Silicon Valley: The Anatomy 
of an Entrepreneurial Region, ed. Martin Kenney (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2000), 
218–40; Stephen S. Cohen and Gary Fields, “Social Capital and Capital Gains in Silicon Valley,” in 
Understanding Silicon Valley: The Anatomy of an Entrepreneurial Region, ed. Martin Kenney 
(Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2000), 190–217. 
15-Paul Gompers and Josh Lerner, “The Venture Capital Revolution,” Journal of Economic 
Perspectives 15, no. 2 (2001): 145–68; Gompers and Lerner, The Venture Capital Cycle. The “prudent 
man” or “prudent person” rule requires fiduciaries to invest their trusts’ assets the way a “prudent 
person” would, undertaking careful due diligence and avoiding speculative or excessively risky 
outlets by judging each investment on its own merits. It dates back to the Massachusetts court 
precedent Harvard College v Amory (1830) 26 Mass (9 Pick) 446. See Bevis Longstreth, Modern 
Investment Management and the Prudent Man Rule (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1988). 
16-Michael Moritz, “Arthur Rock: The Best Long-Ball Hitter Around,” Time 123, no. 4 (1984): 
55. 
17-Gary P. Brinson, Jeffrey J. Diermeier, and Gary G. Schlarbaum, “A Composite Portfolio 
Benchmark for Pension Plans,” Financial Analysts Journal 42, no. 2 (1986): 15–24. 
18-Janeway, “Doing Capitalism: Notes on the Practice of Venture Capitalism.” 
19-Stefan Kühl, “Konturen Des Exit-Kapitalismus,” Leviathan 30, no. 2 (2002): 195–219; 




otherwise be denied it due to their small size, newness, or both, and emphasizes 
formal and informal mechanisms of risk-management deployed by the VCs.20 The 
latter treats VC firms as a part of the infrastructure for “knowledge capitalization” 
or “national system of innovation” and emphasizes their ability to overcome the 
limited tradability of “knowledge-intensive” goods through expertise and 
experience that help achieve economies of scope in transaction costs, or through 
“embedding” the founders into local business networks, thereby helping them 
socialize and get access to specialized business services and legitimacy.21 Both 
perspectives ultimately depend on a functionalist, market-failure type of argument: 
VCs are said to overcome either the failure of the incipient market for technological 
knowledge or the failure of the small business finance market.22 However, since 
functional claims do not necessarily amount to historical explanation, it is worth 
recalling, following Fernand Braudel’s famous distinction, that markets are not 
 
20-Joseph E. Stiglitz and Andrew Weiss, “Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect 
Information,” The American Economic Review 71, no. 3 (1981): 393–410; David Kirsch, Brent 
Goldfarb, and Azi Gera, “Form or Substance: The Role of Business Plans in Venture Capital Decision 
Making,” Strategic Management Journal 30, no. 5 (2009): 487–515. 
21-On knowledge capitalization and national systems of innovation, see Riccardo Viale and 
Henry Etzkowitz, The Capitalization of Knowledge: A Triple Helix of University-Industry-Government, 
The Capitalization of Knowledge: A Triple Helix of University-Industry-Government (Cheltenham, UK; 
Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar, 2010); Kenney, “How Venture Capital Became a Component of the 
US National System of Innovation.” On the economies of scope in transaction costs, see Antonelli and 
Teubal, “Knowledge-Intensive Property Rights and the Evolution of Venture Capitalism”; Cristiano 
Antonelli and Morris Teubal, “Venture Capitalism as a Mechanism for Knowledge Governance,” in The 
Capitalization of Knowledge: A Triple Helix of University-Industry-Government, ed. Henry Etzkowitz 
and Riccardo Viale (Cheltenham, UK; Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar, 2010), 98–120; Cathryn 
Carson, “Knowledge Economies: Toward a New Technological Age,” in The Cambridge History of the 
Second World War: Volume 3: Total War: Economy, Society and Culture, ed. Michael Geyer and Adam  
Tooze (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 196–219. On “embedding,” see Ferrary and 
Granovetter, “The Role of Venture Capital Firms in Silicon Valley’s Complex Innovation Network”; 
Emilio J. Castilla et al., “Social Networks in Silicon Valley,” in The Silicon Valley Edge, ed. William F. 
Miller, Marguerite Gong Hancock, and Henry S. Rowen (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2000), 
218–47. 
22-See George A. Akerlof, “The Market for ‘Lemons’: Quality Uncertainty and the Market 
Mechanism,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics 84, no. 3 (1970): 488–500; Kenneth J. Arrow, 
“Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention,” in The Rate and Direction of 
Inventive Activity, ed. Richard R. Nelson (Princeton: Princeton University Press for NBER, 1962), 609–
26. The first perspective is most comprehensively developed by Antonelli and Teubal, who invoke 
venture capital industry to explain a negative outcome, the non-occurrence of the market failure in 
“knowledge-intensive” goods after the emergence of a “knowledge-based economy” in the post-war 
U.S. Similarly, Bakker focuses on “market imperfections” from the point of view of the firm, offering 
a long-term perspective on the challenges of R&D financing. See Antonelli and Teubal, “Knowledge-
Intensive Property Rights and the Evolution of Venture Capitalism”; Bakker, “Money for Nothing: 
How Firms Have Financed R&D-Projects since the Industrial Revolution.” The second perspective is 
prevalent in the literature on VC; in historically-oriented accounts, it is driven, at least implicitly, by 
the same argument, i.e., the emergence of specialized venture capital organizations helps to 
overcome the “funding gap” developed after the Great Depression and the two world wars. For a 
pioneering exposition, see Liles, Sustaining the Venture Capital Firm; Martha Louise Reiner, “The 
Transformation of Venture Capital: A History of Venture Capital Organizations in the United States” 




identical to capitalism.23 In fact, for much of modern history, just the opposite is 
true.24 
Indeed, in the longue durée of capitalism, VCs would appear as the latest 
instantiation of Braudel’s pristine capitalist-arbitrageur who, acting as a 
“middleman,” earns exceptionally high, if irregular, profits, by bringing into contact 
supply and demand that would otherwise be “in complete ignorance of each other,” 
separated by a long geographical distance.25 Likewise, venture capitalists hope to 
extract abnormal gains from connecting markets that are distant, although not 
spatially, but temporally: actual capital markets and the “markets-on-paper” for the 
future products of the proposed venture, as of yet residing in “existential twilight.”26 
In other words, VCs are engaged in an activity that can be more aptly described not 
as intermediation but as capitalization, that is, “making capital as capital.”27 Two 
recent literatures, drawing in different ways on the Pragmatist tradition, have 
pointed to capitalization as a fruitful site for studying finance and capitalism.28 As 
different from economics and much of economic sociology, a focus on capitalization 
allows to disentangle markets from capitalism, thus remaining faithful to Braudel’s 
historical insight. Markets imply arm’s-length transactions involving standardized 
commodities exchanged at their spot values, and as such, are historically and 
conceptually distinct from the “upper-case economy” of capital assets that 
appreciate over time, thus being involved in a different mode of temporalization.29 
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Encompassing its narrower technical meanings, most generally, 
capitalization can be defined as a process, collective or individual, of “turning things 
into assets” by “recognizing in the objects of valuation (whatever these may be) the 
qualities of an “asset,” that is, its potentials to produce earnings.”30 On the one hand, 
to capitalize, one must be “thinking like an investor”31; hence capitalization involves 
cognition and knowledge, even if imperfect, of the prospective objects of valuation, 
as well as the instruments that help constitute them as such.32 More generally, 
capitalization takes place within a historical “investment regime” that determines 
“which assets get capitalized and under what terms.”33 On the other hand, 
capitalization always occurs under conditions of uncertainty about the future: it is a 
“particular way of rendering the future available in the present.”34 From a 
sociological point of view, this means that capitalization depends on the actors’ 
capabilities of “scoping out” the future through collective imagination, but also 
through socio-technical devices that facilitate it and make it accessible to others.35 
Accounting technologies play an especially important role in this process.36 As 
scholars of accounting have long argued, accounting inscriptions can be constitutive 
of the very sphere of the “economic.”37 In the context of capitalization, it is primarily 
accounting that allows to continuously reconstitute capital qua capital, as opposed 
to wealth, thus making possible what Max Weber called “permanent capitalistic 
enterprise,” irreducible to a collection of “purely occasional ventures” and 
“individual transactions.”38 
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Finally, capitalization is prospective, but not teleological, beginning as a 
forward-looking, contingent project of imagining certain things as assets — that is, 
valuing them in view of their capacity to produce income in the future — and 
eventually settling down as a habit. Thus, it is possible to analyze specific historical 
projects of capitalization, “tracing the necessary prospective conditions, and the 
slow, sometimes stunted, emergence of the capital process, in many incipient 
capitalisms,” rather than “pinning down the moment of exact transition.”39 
Ultimately, this thesis attempts to offer such a prospective history of venture capital 
as a project of capitalization, focusing on the forms of imagination, knowledge, and 
technologies of valuation that made it possible, rather than on individuals and 
institutions per se. Covering the period from the mid-1940s through the early 1970s, 
it reconstructs historically how “venture capital” evolved from a “patrician” 
business of wealthy families into what Weber called “capitalistic enterprise,” or, in 
other words, how it became an investment, rather than a speculative gamble or a 
non-pecuniary expenditure akin to philanthropy. Put differently, “venture capital 
investing,” as an action under a description, did not emerge full-blown with the 
creation of the first VC organizations.40 Rather, it evolved gradually, first appearing 
as investing in “special situations,” each unique and thus non-generalizable, moving 
on to the idea of a “scientific company” run by “creative people,” until the latter 
category was finally converted into “technical entrepreneurs.” In other words, 
venture capital investing as an economic action was constituted reciprocally with 
the objects and people to which it applied, in turn defining venture capital as a 
distinct line of business. This history is traced in the pages to follow. 
Elements of Theory 
The analysis presented below, while largely historical and descriptive, is 
informed by the following theoretical considerations. Firstly, following the 
“formation stories” approach, the mode of inquiry is historical rather than 
definitional.41 Thus, instead of defining venture capital in terms of its functions, the 
narrative starts with the first organizations that explicitly designated themselves as 
specializing in “venture capital” investing or were described and perceived as such 
(Chapter II), proceeding to the practices and categories that preceded “venture 
capital” genealogically (Chapters III and IV), and concluding with the category that 
helped stabilize the meaning of “venture capital” by the start of the 1970s — 
“technical entrepreneurship” (Chapter V). Put differently, this thesis follows the 
Foucauldian approach of “eventalization” and “causal multiplication,” seeking to 
identify historically the “surfaces of emergence” of the elements of venture 
capitalism when they did not (yet) cohere.42 Each chapter focuses on specific 
individuals while attempting to pursue a “middle-range contextualization” by 
attending to the immediately relevant contexts in which the primary characters 
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were embedded.43 Chapter II focuses on the intellectual history of Georges F. Doriot 
in the context of his teaching career at Harvard Business School; Chapter III narrates 
the histories of several early venture capitalists while grounding them in the 
relevant social history of the period; Chapter IV focuses on the categories and 
practices of security analysis profession, and in this context traces some important 
contributions to this “immature science” provided by several prominent 
practitioners; finally, Chapter V follows a group of early venture capitalists in their 
attempts to generalize from their experience of working with “creative technical 
people” in the early 1960s, while positioning their rhetoric and heuristics in the 
context of contemporaneous developments within another “immature” discipline, 
research administration.44 
Secondly, drawing on the capitalization perspective described above, this 
thesis emphasizes its cognitive — or heuristic — aspects. The possibility of 
imagining things like assets is inscribed in a specific modality of knowing. Over the 
past two decades, a family of approaches addressing this issue has been developed 
within economic sociology and the adjacent disciplines. Doing major injustice to 
their diversity, three broad streams of research can be discerned. On the one hand, 
sociologists of finance, drawing on the “embeddedness paradigm,” stressed the 
“epistemic embeddedness” of economic transactions: economic markets and 
organizations are sites of ongoing “epistemic work” that is “inscribed in and 
constitutive of economic objects as relevant to the practical activities of economic 
agents.”45 Being primarily focused on finance, rather than economic life at large, and 
on the applied, non-academic forms of expertise, this approach emphasized the 
necessity of practical economic knowledge for intersubjective coordination 
occurring in markets and organizations. 
On the other hand, Michel Callon and his followers, drawing on the 
Pragmatist reading of actor-network theory (ANT), attempted to turn the notion of 
“embeddedness” on its head by arguing that if “the economy as a thing” is 
“embedded” in anything, it is first and foremost in economics, “the economy as a 
discipline.” Accordingly, the objective of “economization” research programme was 
formulated as the exploration of “the diversity of calculative agencies, forms and 
distributions, and hence of organized markets” qua “many-sided, diversified, 
evolving device[s] which the social sciences, as well as the actors themselves, 
contribute to reconfigure,” as part of the “formatting” activity performed by a wider 
network of human and non-human actants.46 The key theoretical idiom in this 
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approach is that of “performation” — a historical process of mutual adjustments of 
“statements and their associated world.”47 The “statements” include not only verbal 
expressions but also mathematical formulae and scientific theories produced by 
“economics at large,” including academic economic theory, marketing, accounting, 
finance, and other disciplines that perform “the economy.”48 On the other hand, 
“performation” also depends on the processes of practical rearrangement of the 
“world” associated with the statements, accomplished with the help of socio-
technical devices.49 Simplifying a bit, for Callon and his followers, it is science and 
technology — economics “at large” — that are primarily responsible for the 
constitution of the “economic” in the processes of “economization,” “marketization” 
and, most recently, “valuation.”50 
The third major theoretical idiom addressing this problematic is more 
explicitly indebted to Foucault and developed primarily by accounting scholars.51 
Instead of looking for the cases of the performative effects of economics, it adopts a 
broader perspective of “governing economic life.”52 Extending Foucault’s analyses 
of governmentality and technologies of the self, accounting scholars attended to the 
ways in which calculative practices allow “economization” processes to take place 
and to the diverse modes of the constitution of economic subjects across 
organizations and markets.53 As Peter Miller puts it, somewhat paradoxically, 
accounting is “more personal than economics because accounting is better equipped 
to act on the actions of individuals”: e.g., by setting (quantitative) standards of 
performance of which the individuals are aware and to which they react by 
modifying their courses of action, even though no direct intervention takes place.54 
In Ian Hacking’s terms, if sociology of finance was stronger on “ideas,” 
performativity of economics — on “things” broadly conceived, then Foucauldian 
accounting scholarship is arguably distinguished by its analysis of “people” and of 
the constitution of the “economic” by accounting technologies’ ability to act on the 
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actions of people and “govern at a distance.”55 Acknowledging the permeability of 
accounting to a variety of external influences, from adjacent disciplines of 
engineering and management to political-economic ideas, accounting scholars 
adopted a more open view on the processes of economizing as occurring across the 
levels of explicitly articulated “political rationalities” that are in turn translated into 
the “programmes of government” and enacted through “technologies” that act on 
the selves and actions of people.56 As different from the performativity of economics 
argument, this view suggests that performative effects of economic metrics or 
financial models are not independent of “modalities of governing and forms of 
political power,”57 and “historically varying ideas or rationalities that require or 
inspire them.”58 Put differently, “if objects, ideas, and practices for governing 
economic relations fit each other, this is because they have been made to fit.”59 
The approach taken by this thesis sympathizes with these Foucauldian 
sensibilities, suggesting that the relevant kinds of knowledge involved in the 
processes of capitalization are more durable and sometimes more formalized than 
the situational “epistemic work” highlighted by the sociologists of finance. On the 
other hand, as different from the Pragmatist idiom endorsed by Callon that “refuses 
the distance between the object and the discourse about it,” it emphasizes distances 
between the “statements” and their “associated worlds.”60 As David Graeber puts it, 
the idea of “truth as success,” underpinning the notion of performativity, amounts 
to the suggestion that “no meaningful distinction could be made between the nature 
of reality (even scientific reality), the techniques of knowledge designed to analyze 
and interpret that reality, and the forms of institutional power within which 
knowledge is produced.”61 On the other hand, the Foucauldian approach preserves 
these distinctions, thereby allowing for wider varieties of “politics of truth” to take 
place. Put differently, where performativity-oriented research would look for the 
instances of mutual adjustment between the “statements and their associated 
world” so that the former become increasingly “truer” of the latter, Foucauldian 
approach would attend to the processes by which statements “taken as true” shape 
the possibilities for being and acting. 
Nevertheless, rather than relying on the distinction between “programmes” 
and “technologies” for “governing economic life,” this thesis follows Ian Hacking’s 
elaboration of Foucault’s historical ontology, captured under the heading of 
“dynamic nominalism.” By looking simultaneously at the discursive, as well as non-
discursive dimensions, but without making any commitments to either homogenous 
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(the “social”) or heterogenous (“assemblage”) ontology, it allows to attend to the 
dynamic relationships occurring between subjects and their “names,” including 
knowledge, classifications, and representations, without, however, necessarily 
implying any coherent, identifiable project of “governing” or “administering” human 
lives behind them.62 
From the point of view of dynamic nominalism, classification is more 
fundamental and more resilient than knowledge: “classifying always involves 
knowledge of, or belief in, regularities about items of a class.”63 However, as different 
from the sociology of classification in the Durkheimian idiom, this claim does not 
involve an ontological commitment to the primacy of the “social” as the ultimate 
source of every classification. Following Goodman’s skepticism towards the 
possibility of such reduction, Hacking suggests that the questions of ontology and 
semantics (that is, whether or not humanly-made classifications “correspond” to 
some natural kinds) are irrelevant; what matters from a dynamic nominalist point 
of view is dynamics — the interaction between classifications (and, a fortiori, 
knowledge), and the “thing classified,” occurring in historical time.64 Because 
classifications and knowledge are produced, developed, applied, and disseminated 
by organizations and institutions and are inscribed into their practices and rules, 
some of them tend to stick, so that the interaction between classifications and the 
“things classified” becomes durable. Put differently, for there to be any interaction 
between names and the named, the former must be able to stick, becoming 
temporarily stable: “All classifications that stick exist only within practices and 
institutions.”65 When such classifications pertain to people, they become capable of 
influencing some of these people’s actions. Following Anscombe’s argument that 
human action is intentional under some description, Hacking suggests that 
institutionalized classifications of people can provide new descriptions for these 
people’s intentional action, thereby also enlarging their possibilities for being 
certain kinds of persons.66 More specifically, people may purposefully identify with 
descriptions available to them, or, vice versa, attempt to avoid institutionally 
imposed classifications. 
Inspired by Foucault, much of Hacking’s argument is derived from the history 
of the human sciences in different stages of their “maturity,” where classifications 
produce knowledge that is not merely instrumental.67 Still, it could be extended 
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further: thus, as economic sociologists have recently shown, similar “dynamics of 
classification” occur in what is presumed to be much more instrumental contexts — 
namely, in economic markets.68 Further, if the history of capitalism can be 
reconstructed as a history of successive “regimes of investment,“ differing in terms 
of what assets get capitalized and under what terms, these “regimes” themselves can 
be analyzed in terms of classifications through which they operate.69 Certain 
“things” cannot be imagined as assets in certain historical periods, while certain 
other “things” can and are imagined as such. Moreover, while the long arc of 
capitalist development can be described as the process of dissemination of an all-
encompassing “investmentality,” shorter historical distances would likely be 
characterized by intensive “boundary work” aimed at distinguishing solid and 
durable “investments” from reckless “speculations,” “swindles,” and “gambles,” both 
as potential objects of investment, and as descriptions of corresponding actions.70 
For example, as Chapter IV of this thesis will attempt to demonstrate, precisely this 
difference was at stake during the electronics boom of the late 1950s, when 
American security analysts struggled to redraw the distinction between 
“investment” and “speculation,” fundamental for their craft, in relation to what was 
then called “scientific companies.” Conversely, it took more than a decade for the 
founders of the first venture capital organizations to be recognized as being in the 
investment business, rather than merely “gambling” or pursuing some philanthropic 
goals, and even longer for “venture capital” to be recognized as an asset class 
acceptable for institutional portfolios. 
These considerations bring in the issue of uncertainty. As a forward-looking 
process, capitalization of necessity occurs under conditions of uncertainty about the 
future.71 Following Frank H. Knight, economic sociologists conventionally contrast 
(incalculable) uncertainty with (calculable) risk, suggesting that to overcome it, 
economic actors rely on a variety of “social devices,” including imagination, social 
norms, and calculative instruments.72 In this perspective, the presence of 
uncertainty ultimately allows for introducing the properly sociological variables 
into the analysis of economic action, showing the limits of the “rational actor” theory 
and explaining why economic action is always embedded.73 Pat O’Malley 
conveniently described this approach as “academic,” pointing to the analytical, as 
opposed to the pragmatic, character of the distinction.74 Arguably, however, the 
“academic” approach as developed by economic sociologists is problematic in so far 
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as it is based on an asymmetrical interpretation of the Knightian distinction between 
risk and uncertainty. Firstly, as Mary Morgan shows, Knight introduced his 
distinction between risk and uncertainty at a specific point in a long history of the 
“model men” of economics, beginning with classical political economy.75 In this 
context, Knight completed the movement away from idealization, which implied the 
possibility of comparing “economic men” to the real people (through observation or 
introspection), and towards formalization, whereby the homo oeconomicus became 
“an artificial character created by economists.”76 Thus, Morgan points out the 
difference of procedures employed by Knight and his immediate predecessor 
Jevons: the latter abstracted away uncertainty, while the former, in addition to that, 
endowed his “model man” with perfect foresight.77 In this sense, neither uncertainty 
nor risk belongs to the “model world” explored by Knight, but both are present in 
the “actual world” where economic actors can’t foresee the future perfectly. Thus, 
arguably, the distinction between risk and uncertainty is not equivalent to the one 
between “rational action” and “embeddedness.” Rather, both can be treated as 
mutually non-exclusive ways of rendering the future knowable, whereby “risk” 
denotes a situation in which the imperfection of this knowledge can be expressed 
numerically.78 Indeed, Knight himself seems to allow for such a reading: although he 
distinguishes between such “probability situations” as a priori probabilities, 
statistical probabilities, and “estimates” based on judgment and opinion, he argues 
that for “the student of business,“ the former two are subsumed into the latter.79  
David Graeber makes a similar point, arguing that the very idea “of 
quantifying, in a precise way, the degree to which the future is unknown,” and thus 
the distinction between risk and uncertainty as construed around the axis of 
calculability and/or measurability, is culturally specific, being a contingent outcome 
of the long historical process of “taming of chance.”80 From an anthropological point 
of view, the contemporary notion of “risk” is analogous to some of the concepts, 
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“such as mana, baraka, or s’akti, regularly employed in other parts of the world to 
put a name on the play of chance or to explain otherwise inexplicable conjunctures 
or events.”81 Significantly, this observation pertains to the Knightian analysis of 
profit as “unimputable” residual income resulting from the capacity for superior 
judgment, which, however, in the final analysis, cannot be clearly differentiated from 
blunt luck: “in an individual case there is no way of telling good judgment from good 
luck, and a succession of cases sufficient to evaluate the judgment or determine its 
probable value transforms the profit into a wage.”82 
Moreover, Knightian emphasis on the singularity of “individual cases” and 
the lack of the basis for classification as the root cause of uncertainty can be 
interpreted along the lines suggested by Hacking. If “uncertainty” denotes a 
situation in which “instances” cannot be assigned to “classes,“ the possibility of 
calculating becomes secondary to the possibility of grouping or “sorting” the cases.83 
From this point of view, the introduction of sociological variables like interpersonal 
trust does not rule out the problem of uncertainty in so far as the people involved 
remain “individual cases,” unique persons.84 What is at stake, in other words, is not 
the opposition between numerical calculus and undifferentiated “people-
knowledge,” but, rather, the difference between two ways of attaining regularity: 
through numerical calculus, or through knowledge of the kinds of people that is 
generalizable beyond particular persons one knows and trusts.85 
Two broad conclusions seem to follow from this. First, as Miller puts it, while 
calculability may be a “congenitally “failing” operation,” “the “failure” of one way of 
calculating… tends to promote new calculative regimes rather than abandonment of 
calculability.”86 Interpreted more broadly, this suggests that, even with uncertainty 
present, actors will likely stick to their accepted “technologies of the future.”87 
Second, as Power notes, uncertainty does not “exist sui generis but must of necessity 
be organized, ordered, rendered thinkable, and made amenable to processes and 
practices of intervention.”88 Hence, the real question is not whether the actors will 
attempt to calculate or rely on some set of “social devices,” but which “technologies 
for knowing the future [will] come to be regarded at specific times and places as 
more reliable and acceptable than others.”89 Moreover, while uncertainty is never 
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given as such, it is also hardly imaginable as a practical category of action. Indeed, 
“acting on uncertainty” as a description of intentional human action arguably 
belongs to the same class as “to gamble” or “to bet on one’s luck.” 
So far, it has been argued that capitalization implies knowledge of the 
“things” to be imagined as, or “turned” into, assets; that the attainment of such 
knowledge proceeds through the activity of classification; that such classification 
can be productive of new descriptions of intentional human action and hence 
possibly also of new human kinds; that capitalization occurs under uncertainty 
which is, however, never given as such, but only apprehended through some 
combination of “technologies of the future,” not necessarily based on the calculus of 
risk. In this sense, specific historical “investment regimes” would be characterized 
not only by how they distinguish between “capitalizable” and “non-capitalizable” 
objects but also by the technologies on which they rely to make uncertainty 
organized. Finally, these two “elements” are not necessarily synchronous in time: a 
project of capitalization can be seen as logically and historically anterior to the 
actual instruments of “turning things into assets,” entering the stage as a “spirit” or 
“imaginary” that prefigures specific practices, technologies, and institutions.90 
From this point of view, the history of venture capitalism as a project of 
capitalization comes down to the emergence of “venture capital investing” as a 
description of certain kinds of economic action, involving both people who invest, 
as well as the “things” to be turned into capital assets.91 However, new descriptions 
of economic actions do not arise in an empty space. Rather, they emerge through the 
overlaps of, or in the interstices between, existing classifications. Such processes — 
or events — of emergence can be identified historically. Accordingly, this thesis 
traces a series of historical episodes in the emergence of venture capitalism as a 
project of capitalization by looking at how early venture capitalists deployed 
informal “heuristics,” and how these heuristics interacted with established bodies 
of knowledge and classifications — in particular, with security analysis and research 
management. This thesis then attempts to show how these heuristics were 
increasingly becoming centered on “people,” eventually creating a novel action 
under a description and a corresponding human kind — “technical 
entrepreneurs.”92 In accordance with dynamic nominalism, no claim is made as to 
whether heuristics deployed by the actors featuring on the pages to follow could 
have served as a substitute for probabilistic calculation or any other formal 
calculative device. Yet however “effective” these heuristics might have been, they 
did have certain dynamic effects, creating new classifications of investment 
opportunities, companies, and, eventually, people. As a result, in the early 1970s, 
venture capitalists defined themselves as engaged in the “people business.” Rather 
than effectively “turning engineers into entrepreneurs” through coercive or 
performative effects, they created the category of “technical entrepreneurs” as a 
human kind, that is, as an open possibility for being a certain kind of person, without 
necessarily becoming one. 
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This thesis relies on a range of published and archival sources that are used 
in several chapters. The most important body of historical evidence that is used 
throughout all chapters comes from the two extensive collections of oral history 
interviews with the pioneers of venture capital investing in America. “Venture 
Capitalists Oral History Project,” directed and conducted by Sally Smith Hughes, 
available from the Regional Oral History Office of the Bancroft Library at the 
University of California, Berkeley, contains 19 interviews with leading first-
generation Californian venture capitalists, investment bankers, and attorneys.93 
“Venture Capital Oral History Project” of the US National Venture Capital 
Association, Arlington, Virginia, conducted by Carole Kolker and Mauree Jane Perry, 
provides access to another 17 interviews with early American venture capitalists, 
made available through Computer History Museum in Mountain View, California.94 
Both collections are available online and open for research. In addition to these 
collections, two further oral history transcripts were obtained remotely from the 
Chemical Heritage Foundation, Science History Institute, Philadelphia, 
Pennsylvania.95 Finally, selected oral history interviews with early venture 
capitalists not included in either of the above were consulted through the HBS 
Entrepreneurs Collection at Baker Library, Harvard Business School,96 and the 
online collections Computer History Museum,97 Babbage Institute of the University 
of Minnesota,98 and Engineering and Technology History Wiki (ETHW).99 All oral 
histories are referenced in the footnotes, and their complete list is available in the 
Primary Sources section. The second major source of historical materials used in 
this thesis is archival. It includes six archival collections related to some influential 
actors in the early history of venture capitalism: Georges F. Doriot, Peter O. Crisp, 
and William Elfers Papers were consulted at Baker Library, Harvard Business School 
in the fall term 2018; selected documents from John Hay Whitney and Betsey 
Cushing Whitney Family Papers were obtained remotely from Yale University 
Archives. Finally, published primary sources appearing in Chapters III-V come from 
the digital archive of The Analysts Journal available through JSTOR, published 
volumes of Research Management (RM) consulted at the British Library, as well as 
selected historical titles consulted at Baker Library Special Collections and Thomas 
P. O’Neil Library at Boston College. A detailed list of the primary sources is available 
in the References. 
Overview of the Chapters 
Chapter II,  
Frames of Life, focuses on one of the East Coast pioneers of venture capital 
investing, the president and co-founder of American Research & Development 
Corporation, Georges F. Doriot. Doriot is credited as the “father” of organized 
venture capital, but, as this chapter argues, his most significant influence on the 
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nascent industry was through his teaching career at Harvard Business School, 
attended by many of the characters of the previous chapter. Drawing on the 
extensive archival record of Doriot’s teaching at Harvard, this chapter argues that 
Doriot’s teaching philosophy and pedagogical practice primarily were the media of 
what might be tentatively called “the spirit of venture capitalism.” By grounding 
Doriot’s teaching career in the historical sociology of business education, this 
chapter further argues that Harvard Business School proved to be a particularly 
favorable environment for the dissemination of such philosophy of business, given 
its initial emphasis on the broadly conceived “science of administration” based on 
experiential learning, and its institutional resilience during the post-war 
mathematization of business education in the US. 
Chapter III, Foot Soldiers of Capitalism, reconstructs the collective biography 
of some pioneering American venture capitalists. Drawing on the collection of oral 
histories from the UC Berkeley’s Bancroft Library, Computer History Museum, and 
National Venture Capital Association, it traces their social backgrounds, professional 
trajectories, and entry points into the venture capital business. It describes the two 
parallel “lineages” of venture capital in post-war America: as a “patrician” business 
of some long-established wealthy families and military-industrial elites in New York 
and Boston, and as an interstitially emerging practice of the “careerist” investment 
professionals in both the East and the West. It argues further that during the 1950s 
and the early 1960s, these “careerists,” having discovered the opportunity for 
intermediation between the emerging technologies and pools of financial capital 
across the country, played an important role in legitimizing venture capital 
investing. 
Chapter IV, Financial Singularities, studies the field of security analysis in 
post-war America on whose rich inheritance drew the first venture capitalists. Like 
Harvard Business School, in the late 1950s and early 1960s, the security analysis 
profession, dating back to the Great Depression, proved remarkably resilient to the 
rise of quantitative finance. Contrary to the emerging consensus, exemplified by the 
Efficient Market Hypothesis, that it is in principle impossible to “beat the market” 
since the stock prices immediately convey all available information, security 
analysts insisted on the irrelevance of high theory for their long-established craft of 
finding out the “intrinsic value” of traded companies. During the electronics boom 
of the late 1950s, however, security analysts’ practice and the epistemology that 
underpinned it faced a major challenge. New companies exploiting the electronics 
technology, called “science companies,” “glamour companies,” “new ventures,” or 
“special situations” by the contemporaries, defied the established categories of 
security analysis. The profession reacted by paying increasingly more attention to 
the “people” in charge of these companies, having been agnostic about the qualities 
of the management ever since the codification of security analysis by Benjamin 
Graham and David Dodd. The eventual solution to the problem of these “financial 
singularities” was found in the heretical undercurrent of security analysis 
concerned with investing in “special situations.” This chapter focuses on the central 
proponent of this approach, Maurece Schiller, tracing his attempts to categorize the 
“science companies” during and after the electronics boom and against the 
background of the wider professional discussion. 
The final Chapter V, Turning Engineers into Entrepreneurs, focuses on how 




unlikely site — the field of research administration and management. Following the 
end of World War II, scientists who worked in governmental wartime research 
laboratories joined the cadre of administrators of corporate R&D to discuss the 
condition of research personnel — “creative people,” “technical men,” or 
“professional employees” — within private and public bureaucracies. From 1945 
through the late 1960s, research administrators tried to turn scientists and 
engineers into managers to overcome the problem of the “dual hierarchy” of 
scientific prestige and administrative rank, whose conflict appeared to be the most 
significant obstacle in the functioning of corporate research labs. By the beginning 
of the 1960s, increasingly attentive to the perceived crisis of R&D profitability, 
research administrators turned to social scientists for help. As a result, their input 
triggered the crucial shift in the discourse of research administration — the 
stunning recognition that although the “ideal scientist” cannot be turned into an 
administrator, he resembles the psychological profile of the “ideal entrepreneur.” 
This shift made it possible to recast the managerial problems of research 
administration in terms of small business finance, thereby creating a niche for 
venture capital as a “people business”: turning engineers into entrepreneurs. 
A Conclusion summarizes the arguments of the preceding chapters. Overall, 
this thesis reconstructs the institutional and intellectual history of venture 
capitalism — starting with the cadre of the pioneers of venture investing, moving on 
to Doriot’s pedagogy as an important articulation of the “spirit” that animated early 
venture capital, and then considering how financial markets — at the time still 
dominated by the qualitative expertise of the “immature science” of security 
analysis — accommodated the new kind of technological companies, or simply 
startups in today’s language. Finally, the last chapter shows how the shifting 
discourse of research management linked the figure of the “ideal scientist” — 
creative, individualist and unmanageable within a bureaucratic setting — and the 
figure of the “ideal entrepreneur,” thereby contributing to the creation of a new 
human kind, the “technical entrepreneur,” who became the focus of the early 






Chapter II. Frames of Life 
 
I believe that, for each period into which our economic history may be divided, there 
is a distinct and separate class of capitalists. In other words, the group of capitalists 
of a given epoch does not spring from the capitalist group of the preceding epoch. At 
every change in economic organization, we find a breach of continuity. 
Henri Pirenne, The Stages in the Social History of Capitalism 
 
Introduction 
In March 1954, Challenge magazine, a publication of New York University’s 
Institute of Economic Affairs aiming at the general public interested in economics 
and business, published an article entitled “Risk, Incorporated.” The caption to the 
article stated that “a new kind of enterprise, the venture capital company, guides the 
fortunes of infant industries and encourages investment by ‘betting’ its own money 
on risk situations.”1 
The spectacle of a handful of investment bankers, lawyers, engineers and 
economists cooly deciding how to put several hundred thousand dollars 
into a “risk situation” would make even the most hardened stock-market 
plunger grow a little light-headed. Yet, managing a “venture capital 
company” — risking money in a cautious way — is the business of these 
men. In looking for long shots, they are only conforming to that ideal of the 
conservative banking fraternity, the “reasonably prudent man.”2 
By the time the article was published, venture capital companies were indeed 
a “new kind of enterprise,” having emerged in the immediate aftermath of World 
War II. By 1954, “a handful” was an accurate estimate of the number of venture 
capital organizations, most of them established by the heirs of great family fortunes. 
In January 1946, the Rockefeller siblings formed a limited partnership with the 
purpose of “finding, investigating and financing new, productive and constructive 
businesses and projects” to make “permanent or long-term investments” and “to 
manage and supervise” them.3 Between 1946 and 1951, John Hay “Jock” Whitney, 
Joan Payson Whitney, William A.M. Burden, and the younger members of the Mellon 
family also pooled parts of their hereditary wealth into new organizations — 
corporations, partnerships and non-profit associations — created with similar 
purposes.4 Most of these people were born at the turn of the century when the 
American bourgeoisie had consolidated, turning itself from a class into a status 
group with a common identity in addition to shared economic interests.5 
Notwithstanding the individual motives, from the desire to prove that inherited 
wealth can be used “constructively” and thus does not deserve to be excessively 
taxed to the fascination with aviation and other emerging technologies, their turn to 
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venture capital in the mid-1940s was inscribed in the “typical path of 
transformation in the social patterns of a wealthy family dynasty, from great 
entrepreneur to economic consolidator to patron of the arts, and eventually these 
days to a decadent roué or hedonistic-idealistic dropout,” or a wealthy patron of 
inventors and entrepreneurs.6 Testifying to this pattern, the Challenge article 
quoted Whitney saying: “I believe that the entrepreneur, no matter what the source 
of his money, can be a valuable member of society.”7 
In conclusion to their broadly sympathetic review of the family-based 
venture capital organizations, the editors of Challenge singled out one exception 
from the overall pattern, focusing on American Research and Development 
Corporation (ARD), “unique among venture companies” as “the only publicly owned 
corporation in the field.”8 Like most of the family-based organizations, ARD was 
established in 1946. With $3.75 million of capital, however, it had a much clearer 
focus, summarized in its name and noted by the magazine editors: “More than any 
other venture company, it has risked its money — close to five million dollars a year 
ago — on highly technical products and processes.”9 Unrelated to familial wealth, 
ARD represented a breach of continuity between “organized” venture capital and 
the tradition of informal patronage of inventors and entrepreneurs by the wealthy 
family dynasties.10 Even though by modern standards, its venture capital career can 
hardly be characterized as successful, and its legal form of a closed-end investment 
fund is conventionally described as deficient, ARD left a lasting legacy on what could 
be described as the “spirit” of venture capitalism, mainly thanks to its co-founder 
and president, Georges F. Doriot, who is often referred to as the “father” of organized 
venture capital as such.11 
Doriot came to the US from France in 1921 to study engineering at MIT but 
ended up being a professor of industrial management at Harvard Business School, a 
Brigadier General of the US Army, and a much-admired business visionary. In 1946, 
he co-founded the American Research and Development Corporation and served as 
its president for more than twenty-five years. Thanks to the article from Challenge, 
Doriot’s venture capital career gained some publicity, making him “very visible in 
the community” by the end of the 1950s.12 This visibility was dramatically amplified 
in 1966, when ARD’s 1957 investment in Digital Equipment Corporation (DEC), a 
minicomputer startup company founded by two MIT engineers, yielded a return in 
excess of 100%. As summarized by Giraudeau, today, much of the literature on 
Doriot remains largely hagiographical, portraying him as a far-sighted member of 
the East Coast civic-minded elites, eventually becoming the “first venture capitalist” 
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and the “prophet of startups”; or else attends to the actual performance record of 
ARD and its struggles with the legal and regulatory environment of the time.13 Thus, 
Hsu and Kenney have argued that the corporation “ultimately failed,” being unfit for 
the existing market conditions and incapable of providing adequate compensation 
for its staff, in part due to its legal form of a publicly-traded company.14 
While Doriot deserves the credentials of a pioneer in organized venture 
capital, the more significant channel of his influence on this field was arguably his 
teaching career, which, by and large, did not receive comparable scholarly 
attention.15 This chapter attempts to offer a synoptic, long-term view of Doriot’s 
teaching at Harvard, relying on the archival records of Doriot’s teaching notes from 
the 1950s and 1960s. In so doing, it pursues a “middle-range contextualization,” 
linking Doriot’s intellectual development to the broader intellectual and 
institutional contexts, such as the evolution of US business education.16 The 
interpretation of Doriot’s teaching offered below is to a very large extent based on 
Giraudeau’s reconstruction of Doriot’s intellectual background and operational 
philosophy, which this chapter extends to his teaching career.17 
The Harvard Graduate School of Business Administration (HGSBA) itself 
constitutes an important institutional topos for this story. During the formative 
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period of American business education, when the fledging business schools tried to 
build their social and cultural profile by deriving legitimacy from their association 
with science and the professions, the HGSBA adopted the paradigm of professional 
education that emphasized “general management and social responsibility,” 
positioning business administration as a “high profession,” analogous to medicine 
and law.18 After World War II, its credentials as a pioneering and most influential 
institution in this field, financial autonomy from the rest of the university, and 
corporate connections protected its distinctive “clinical approach” to business 
education from the competitive pressures that affected the larger organizational 
field of the business schools in the post-war period.19 In particular, the relative 
insularity of the School made it an exception to the larger post-war trend towards 
positivist scientism and mathematical formalization of business education, best 
exemplified intellectually by the rise of the management science and institutionally 
by the trajectory of the Carnegie-Mellon Graduate School of Industrial 
Administration (GSIA). The latter “in many ways… organized itself as an anti-
Harvard” and later became home for some of the most elaborate versions of 
rationalist economic thinking, such as the Miller-Modigliani proof of the irrelevance 
of capital structure to the market value of corporations and the rational expectations 
hypothesis.20 All this allowed the HGSBA to reinforce its commitment to general 
management education, focused on the notion of “administration” as the practice of 
setting the broad strategic goals and policies of organizations, as opposed to 
“management” (associated with the Taylorist “scientific management”), meaning 
the process of their implementation.21 In this way, the HGSBA was also able to resist 
the trend towards managerialization of strategy and governance spurred by the 
dissemination of operations research (OR) and systems analysis techniques 
developed at RAND Corporation after the war. This trend, again exemplified by the 
Carnegie-Mellon GSIA, amounted to 
[…] a wager that optimization could be more than a technique for finding 
the best way to achieve a specific objective. It could be made into a 
framework for defining what should be the objective in the first place. This 
meant turning the conduct of strategy — traditionally associated with top 
levels of an organization and often conceived as an art or as intangibles, 
such as leadership — into a technical matter more akin to the managerial 
and applied practices previously associated with lower orders of the 
organization.22 
By contrast, the intellectual and institutional features of Harvard’s distinct 
position allowed it to preserve the emphasis on the intangible qualities of 
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leadership, exemplifying a broader pattern of professional resistance to 
quantification and systematization.23 
First, this chapter briefly discusses Doriot’s education and early career in the 
context of several formative intellectual influences — above all, the philosophy of 
case-based teaching at Harvard Business School. It then advances an argument that 
Doriot should be seen as an important actor in the historical formation of venture 
capitalism not only because of his own experiments in this field of business 
endeavor but above all because he offered a pioneering articulation of what may be 
called a “spirit” or an “imaginary” of venture capitalism, as well as for having 
developed an influential teaching philosophy that turned on the notion of self-
improvement, operationalized through a series of techniques of the self.24 In this 
sense, Doriot may have been to venture capital(ism) what Peter Drucker was to 
modern management thought more generally — a prophet-like charismatic teacher, 
envisioning and legitimizing new practices avant la lettre, before the instruments 
for implementing them became available.25 
A Fordist Career 
Georges Doriot was born in 1899 to a family whose history bore witness to 
the Second Industrial Revolution and the opportunities for social advancement it 
brought about, coming of age amid the troubled beginnings of the “short twentieth 
century.”26 His grandfather was a farmer-turned-foreman at the local Peugeot 
factory in his native Valentigney, a Protestant region near the French-Swiss border; 
his father August also started there, working his way through to become a director 
of Peugeot’s Paris facility, promoting the firm’s brand as a car racer and Peugeot 
evangelist, and eventually starting his own car manufacturing business. Spending 
time at his father’s factory as a child, Doriot read American engineering magazines 
and eventually became a “decent mechanic and draftsman,” as well as a distant 
witness to the rise of Fordism and the booming car industry in the US.27 This was 
soon followed by three years of “a very educational” period of service in one of the 
most technologically advanced units of the French Army during World War I, 
exposing him to modern technological warfare and its managerial problems.28 
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Having demobilized, Doriot settled on a quintessentially Fordist career, 
following his father’s suggestion to leave France to study manufacturing at MIT 
However, Doriot’s only connection in the US, obtained via a friend of his father’s, 
pointed to an entirely different social (if not geographical) location — namely, to the 
Boston brahmin Abbott Lawrence Lowell, then-President of Harvard University and 
a visible member of the lobbying coalition behind the establishment of the HGSBA29 
Established as a land-grant polytechnic college on the eve of the Civil War, by the 
early 1920s MIT was somewhat remote from Harvard, both socially and 
intellectually, catering primarily to middle-class students, and still embodied some 
elements of its foundational vision that stressed practically-oriented laboratory 
instruction and emphasized engineering over pure science.30 This view of technical 
education dated back to the ideology of the Boston “mechanics,” or skilled 
craftsmen, that faded away after the 1860s, having been defeated by the rival, 
bourgeois, hegemonic project which enforced strict symbolic borders between 
intellectual and manual labor.31 Having introduced Doriot to the School’s Dean 
Wallace Brett Donham, Lowell convinced him to enroll in the HGSBA instead of MIT 
In Spring 1921, Doriot became the first Frenchman to attend the recently 
established institution where he went through the basic core curriculum that was 
supposed to prepare the class for the vibrant business world of the Roaring 
Twenties. Towards the end of that year, Doriot was offered a job at the New York & 
Foreign Development Corporation, an affiliate of Jewish family investment bank 
Kuhn, Loeb & Company (founded in 1867), enlarging his network from New 
England’s business establishment to New York City’s financial community. In the 
absence of specialized venture capital institutions, investment banks’ scope of 
attention included technological ventures.32 During the next four years, interrupted 
by the occasional lectures at his alma mater, Doriot was exposed to the practices of 
evaluating new technologies and investment opportunities, from new production 
processes to overseas natural resource exploration ventures. However, when in 
1925, Donham offered him an Assistant Dean position at the HGSBA, Doriot left New 
York City for Cambridge.33 
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Acting in this capacity, in the 1925/1926 academic year, following student 
complaints, Doriot suggested to Donham that the second-year course “Factory 
Problems and the Taylor System” was “not effective,” to which Donham responded 
by telling him to replace the teacher. Having been appointed Associate Professor of 
Industrial Management in 1926, he started with the course on the Taylor system. 
Unsure whether he was up to the job, Doriot studied the subject “very hard,” taking 
a further course in factory systems.34 The following year Doriot began to teach 
Manufacturing, which became his full-year elective course offered to second-year 
students. In addition to that, in 1927/1928, he also taught a half-year Manufacturing 
Research course that involved no classes but consisted of personal tutoring with 
students who “had a special reason” to work with Doriot. Devoting increasingly 
more time to teaching, in 1929, Doriot was promoted to full professorship, stepping 
down from his position as Assistant Dean in 1931, and focused on teaching after 
that, embarking on a thirty-year long professorial career. Except for the academic 
year 1937-1938, when he taught Industrial Management “as an edition of 
Manufacturing,” and the 1941-1947 service in the US Army, Doriot’s teaching of 
Manufacturing as a full year second-year elective remained practically 
uninterrupted until 1966.35 
Business Schools and the Rise of Fordism 
The rise of Fordism in the US that Doriot witnessed — first from France, by 
reading American engineering magazines in his father’s factory, and then on the 
ground, moving from New England to New York and back — was far from innocuous. 
In the decades immediately following the Great Merger Movement, America 
experienced a major exacerbation and intensification of industrial conflict that 
reinforced the lack of legitimacy of the emerging corporate form of capitalism.36 The 
large corporation that arose out of the late nineteenth century’s merger wave and 
divided ownership and control — arguably the most important organizational 
innovation of the American cycle of world-systemic hegemony — was subject to 
multiple competing claims.37 Three interlinked developments are notable in this 
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respect as the building blocks of the intellectual and institutional environment in 
which Doriot assumed his university career: the rise of the new corporate 
occupations, their struggle for professionalization, and the business schools’ role in 
furthering this project. 
The rise of corporate capitalism in the US was linked to the rise of new 
professions that served the new institution — engineering, financial analysis, 
accounting, and management.38 According to Khurana, as distinct from the 
traditional “free” professions like medicine and law, the route to professionalization 
of these new “foot soldiers of capitalism,” most of all management, foreclosed the 
aspiration to achieve market control, due to the absence of markets for their 
professional services.39 With professional autonomy resulting from monopoly 
control over the market for their services unattainable, the aspiring profession of 
management focused on the search for and assertion of its social status and became 
tied to the contested legitimacy of the large corporation. 
Consequently, the new strata of corporate professionals adopted a form of 
normativity that was relatively independent of, if not at times downright hostile to, 
competitive market coordination — what Boltanski and Chiapello labeled “the 
second spirit of capitalism.”40 Bracketing the national differences in the 
development of management as an occupation and an aspiring profession, this 
broad generalization seems warranted, and indeed, the threat posed by the large 
corporation and its cadres to “private capitalism” preoccupied some of the major 
contemporary thinkers, including Max Weber and Joseph Schumpeter, in Europe 
and America alike. In other words, the managers’ “collective mobility project” can 
be seen in the context of a more extended genealogy of radical critiques of 
capitalism, aiming at the abolition of private property-based domination and 
installing an alternative regime, where social domination derives from the 
specialized expertise of the “new classes.”41 In the interwar period, engineering and 
management, the latter inheriting much of the former’s cognitive tools, were among 
the obvious candidates for this subversive “new class.”42 Perhaps most eloquently, 
this view was articulated by Thorsten Veblen in his book Engineers and the Price 
System (1921), in which he argued that educated engineers, and not the workers, 
will bring socialism to the US.43 The attempt to professionalize management through 
graduate education with an emphasis on ethics was thus a notable example of 
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institutional entrepreneurship and innovation and a response to the emerging 
threats to the capitalist economic order.44 
Notably, Veblen was one of the most outspoken critics of the very idea of 
business education and the business school as an institutional project. Responding 
to these critiques, the intellectual avant-garde behind the business education 
movement sought to draw on the legitimacy of some of the most cherished 
institutions of the Progressive era, the research university and the professions, 
positioning management as potentially both a science and a profession, and thus 
worthy of a place within the university.45 In line with the late nineteenth-century 
perceptions of science, management qua science could be construed as a 
disinterested, rational, and inherently moral pursuit capable of resolving violent 
industrial conflict. With the purpose of maximizing the efficiency of the labor 
process as a means to increase the total amount of spoils to be divided between 
workers and managers, the latter presented themselves as coordinators, rather than 
masters of the former, appealing to the authority of Taylorist scientific management 
and industrial psychology. Even though in effect the implementation of scientific 
management was more conducive to managerial control over labor, skilled 
craftsmen, and the shop floor, rather than efficiency and productivity, scientific 
management and industrial psychology acquired widespread legitimacy in the early 
decades of the twentieth century and were put at the center of the business school 
curriculum, including the HGSBA.46 
Upon his return to Harvard, Doriot found himself in the middle of the 
Business School’s struggle to structure its teaching, which was another measure to 
achieve legitimacy through imposing some cognitive order on business education 
and thereby responding to the charges of anti-intellectualism.47 In his capacity as 
Assistant Dean, Doriot took charge of organizing the “educational process”: 
systematizing the curriculum and the contents of classroom instruction as the 
HGSBA was gradually changing its model of business education, which initially 
followed the functional divisions of a typical business enterprise, divided into 
“departments” (industrial management, marketing, finance, accounting, plus 
statistics as a general-purpose analytic method).48 Effectively, however, the teaching 
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at HGSBA, like in many other business schools of the time, was centered on “factory 
problems” and the Taylor system. Doriot found such division “artificial” and 
“arbitrary,” and thus was likely to support the shift from the “functional” model 
toward the one emphasizing general business education. The latter model was 
pioneered at Dartmouth College and attempted to build the curriculum around a 
broad “science of administration,” rather than task-specific applied management.49 
A version of this approach also emerged independently at Harvard, being conceived 
in direct opposition to training for specific tasks and instead emphasizing general 
management and business’s social responsibility. 
The “Science of Administration” and the Case Method at Harvard in the 
1920s 
As early as 1915, it was argued that “the trades of business” — like 
bookkeeping or statistics — could be taught from textbooks, as opposed to the 
“profession of business” that required a different approach to teaching.50 The 
School’s first Dean, institutional economist Edwin B. Gay, also emphasized the 
ethical dimension of professionalism, which was then carried forward by his 
influential successor Wallace B. Donham, who occupied the position from 1919 to 
1942. In the very first issue of the Harvard Business Review, Donham made clear 
that his approach to the professionalization of management was inspired by 
medicine and law.51 Himself a lawyer, Donham argued that the contemporary 
“theoretical background for business” stood “somewhat where the law of England 
and France stood in the period from 1200-1300” and advocated a broad effort of 
accumulating and sharing the experience of “business precedents,” dispersed across 
numerous enterprises analogous to small territorial units where the law was being 
applied during the Middle Ages.52 Under the joint influence of his legal training and 
the process philosophy of Alfred North Whitehead, who joined Harvard in 1924, 
Donham developed the notion of a “science of administration,” emphasizing 
foresight, experience, and judgment as the necessary qualities of the “broad 
executive,” as well as the importance of “human relations” in administration.53 
Referring to the developments in the fields of accounting and scientific management, 
Donham argued that this “technical equipment,” coupled with the qualities of 
energy, creativity, and enthusiasm required of business leaders, had to be 
complemented by knowledge of the “broad underlying forces controlling business,” 
the only basis for “sound judgment.”54 Further refining his approach in the 1930s, 
Donham emphasized ethics and the social responsibility of business as concerns 
with its legitimacy exacerbated during the Great Depression, incorporating them 
into his definition of administration as “determination of policies.” Such an approach 
reinforced the opposition between general management, emphasized by Harvard, 
and specific task-based education: administration was non-technical, intangible, 
 
49-Khurana, From Higher Aims to Hired Hands, 158–59. 
50-Benjamin Baker, “Teaching the Profession of Business at Harvard,” Supplement to Official 
Register of Harvard University, vol. 12, no. 1, pt. 6 (February 27,1915): 9–10. Quoted in Khurana, 
From Higher Aims to Hired Hands, 114. 
51-Wallace B. Donham, “Essential Groundwork for a Broad Executive Theory,” Harvard 
Business Review 1, no. October (1922): 1–10. 
52-Donham, “Essential Groundwork for a Broad Executive Theory,” 5. 
53-See Giraudeau, “Processing the Future: Venture Project Evaluation at American Research 
and Development Corporation (1946-73)”; Khurana, From Higher Aims to Hired Hands, 266–67. 
54-Wallace B. Donham, “Business Teaching by the Case System,” The American Economic 




based on experiential learning, and primarily concerned with the goals of corporate 
policy, leaving implementation to the middle ranks of management.55 
With this vision in mind, Donham was also a major promoter of the case 
method of instruction as the central pedagogical device at the HGSBA, again drawing 
on his Law School’s experience, where the case method was introduced by Dean 
Langdell and linking it with similar instruments adopted by the established 
professions: the decisions of the courts in law, hospital cases and clinical records in 
medicine, and laboratory experiments in science.56 Moreover, the use of the case 
method exemplified a specific stance towards the pressing issue of business ethics. 
Reminiscent of the ancient practice of moral reasoning — casuistry — business 
cases were embedded in a specific type of “moral background” that emphasized an 
“ethics of doing,” as opposed to that of “being.”57 Stressing action, decision, and 
judgment, this moral problematic was not merely derivative of management’s 
struggle for professionalization, but, in so far as “business” emerged as an 
ontological category endowed with moral agency, the question of ethics permeated 
the entire effort to establish graduate schools of business in the US, reaching beyond 
the narrow discipline of “business ethics.” In turn, this effort implied a concern “with 
safeguarding the American way of life and institutions, and ultimately the capitalist 
system, which the profusion of unethical and irresponsible business practices 
seemed to undermine.”58 In this context, Harvard’s use of the case method appears 
to be a very concrete manifestation of this broader set of aspirations. However, since 
the cases had to represent actual business experiences, there was a need to collect 
data. Thus, the research effort emerged at the HGSBA as a corollary of case-based 
instruction. The business schools’ engagement in research and data collection was 
part of their broader effort to achieve legitimacy within the research-based 
universities; in this context, the case-based form of data aggregation and 
(re)presentation was analogous to other contemporary forms of “imagining the 
economy,” like the study of business cycles developed by Wesley Mitchell at the 
National Bureau of Economic Research.59 Under Donham, case-based teaching 
expanded into the School’s research activities in the form of industry studies carried 
out by faculty, the teaching of business ethics, and later human relations and other 
disciplines. More importantly, “the case method smuggled in with it a lens or prism 
through which business reality was apprehended,” reducing it to the “making of 
decisions.”60 
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Martin Giraudeau reconstructed the more immediate intellectual context in 
which Doriot began his teaching career. According to him, the likely influences on 
Doriot’s thinking and teaching included such prominent figures as Joseph 
Schumpeter, Lawrence Joseph Henderson, and Alfred North Whitehead, whose 
process philosophy was particularly important as an intellectual underpinning of 
Doriot’s approach to the management of ARD.61 Another possible influence was 
Elton Mayo, who, although formally affiliated with the School of Business 
Administration, distanced himself from its activities.62 Moreover, as a member of the 
Pragmatist movement in business education, Doriot endorsed the view of 
“knowledge as always incomplete and consequently advocated the need for 
constant observation and learning from events.”63 
On a more mundane level, Doriot participated in the Business School’s 
teaching and research activities. On Donham’s request, in 1928/1929 he taught 
Business Policy, a course mostly concerned with the “social aspects” of business, 
together with Melvin Copeland, a Professor of Marketing and a devoted advocate of 
the case method; during the late 1920s’ aviation boom, he participated in the 
School’s research effort, studying the aircraft industry together with the Finance 
Professor Cecil Eaton Fraser who authored one of the School’s first collections of 
teaching cases.64 Finally, although his Manufacturing course initially was “bent 
towards the factory matters,”  Doriot emphasized the fieldwork component from the 
outset, assigning his students to local plants in which they were supposed to spend 
one day per week in the second term, studying the managerial problems to develop 
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Harvard Business School produced a casebook on aviation based on research funded by the 
Guggenheim grant. One of Doriot’s students was Herbert Hoover, Jr., an engineering graduate of 
Stanford University, who took Doriot’s Manufacturing course and was among the few students who 
submitted theses devoted to the aviation industry. In 1928 Hoover, Jr. was hired by Western Air 
Express, where he quickly rose to the position of chief engineer, and later became the first President 
of Aeronautical Radio, Inc., making his way to the Time cover. Other theses included the studies of air 
traffic, aviation’s position within the larger transport industry, and a study of the production 
problems of the Curtis Aeroplane and Motor Company, Inc. See Herbert Hoover, Jr. Report on 
Commercial Aviation and the Airplane Industry, 1927; and Recent Theses on Aviation Submitted in 
Manufacturing Course. Georges F. Doriot aviation research, Feb.-March 1929. Box 1 Folder 2. Georges 




“constructive suggestions” for their solution.65 The exercise was supposed to train 
students in the application of the methods of management control to “a specific 
problem under a particular set of conditions.”66 Subsequently, Manufacturing 
became a platform in which Doriot could develop his ideas on business and, from 
1946 onwards, venture capital. Moreover, through Manufacturing, Doriot exerted 
his influence on several generations of American business leaders, including many 
of the pioneering venture capitalists. By the 1950s, the course structure and 
contents had stabilized, along with Doriot’s teaching routines, exhibiting many of 
the ideas he was exposed to during the 1920s and developing them further. 
Doriot’s Manufacturing Course 
Doriot’s Manufacturing course left a lasting legacy at the HGSBA and is 
remembered by his students as the only course that did not follow the case system.67 
Nevertheless, as shown by Giraudeau, Doriot was significantly influenced by 
Wallace B. Donham and other colleagues who advocated the case method of 
instruction as an educational vehicle embedded in a set of broader concerns about 
the proper place of business in society and the specificity of knowledge required for 
executive decision-making. As Giraudeau points out, 
Doriot… embraced the case method, to the point that he exported the 
method to France, by initiating the creation of the Centre de Préparation 
aux Affaires at the Paris Chamber of Commerce, and then INSEAD. Like 
Donham, Doriot believed in the merits of non-standardized approaches to 
specific business situations, and of broad analysis at the crossroads of 
numerous disciplines, rather than within the closed bounds of unique 
theories.68 
Thus, even though Doriot’s apparent deviance is vividly remembered by his 
former students, he appears to have conceived the Manufacturing course as an 
extension of the School’s case system. As stated repeatedly in his teaching notes, 
“total work of the course is a form of ‘case system’.”69 In June 1952, Curtis Tarr, 
leaving his position of a personal assistant to Doriot, left an elaborate instruction for 
his successor, explaining that: 
Manufacturing stands as a bulwark for the lecture system in the valley of 
preference for the case system. Though I never felt that I had to justify this 
difference, I did seek to understand it. Here at the School teachers started 
using cases long ago. The case probably became popular as a means of 
demonstration. It never found use here as it has in the Law School where 
court decisions become the framework for legal wisdom. We have never 
referred to previous cases with much vigor. In business the decision had to 
 
65-Interview with Doriot by Aulikki Olsen. 
66-Instructions for Field Work, Spring 1926. Factory Problems and The Taylor System. Half 
Course. First Half Year, 1925-1926. Georges F. Doriot papers, Mss:784 1921-1984 D698. Box 1 Folder 
3, Baker Library Special Collections, Harvard Business School. 
67-E.g., see: Peter O. Crisp, “Venture Capital Greats: A Conversation with Peter O. Crisp,” 
interviewed by Carole Kolker on October 21, 2008, in Mill Neck, New York (National Venture Capital 
Association, Arlington, Virginia, 2009), pp. 21–22. 
68-Giraudeau, “Processing the Future: Venture Project Evaluation at American Research and 
Development Corporation (1946-73),” 266. 
69-G.F. Doriot document “Re Manufacturing Class Notes,” May 1974, HBS Manufacturing Class 
Notes, Book B1, 1927-1964. Georges F. Doriot papers, Mss:784 1921-1984 D698. Box 2 Folder 7, 




stand on the facts of the current situation. Yet the real thinking behind the 
use of cases came later to this School.70 
By this “real thinking” Tarr referred to the educational philosophy of the 
HGSBA, explaining it as follows: since “all knowledge comes from experience,” “the 
decision which the student makes in handling the case becomes another experience 
which he can use when he faces the live situations in business.”71 Tarr attributed the 
general idea of this approach — that, despite the conventions of the English 
language, “knowledge by acquaintance” cannot substitute “knowledge by 
experience,” even though both are covered by the same term — to Elton Mayo.72 In 
his programmatic book, The Social Problems of Industrial Civilization (1945), Mayo 
endorsed this distinction as previously formulated by William James.73 Before 
coming to Harvard to earn his fame for the Hawthorne experiments analysis, Mayo 
pursued a career in philosophical logic, advocating the merits of the exercise of 
inductive judgment. In the paper titled “The Limits of Logical Validity” he defended 
the usefulness of deductive reasoning (“formal logic”) by arguing that it can only 
attain its validity within the limits of inductively generated classifications: thus, a 
syllogism is valid only if its terms are clearly defined within such classification.74 
More specifically, Mayo suggested that “the unit of knowledge and meaning is the 
judgment” that is decisively context-dependent; however, “since symbolic formulae 
are habitually employed to denote the various species of judgment, it is commonly 
assumed that the logical possibilities of, for instance, the formula S is P may be 
discussed without reference to any particular context.”75 Yet it was the context that 
mattered most in the business decisions, necessitating a training procedure that 
would stress the lived experience of “business situations” in class, educating 
students to classify them inductively by judging on the nature of the case at hand 
before proceeding with the methods of formal reasoning. Whether or not Doriot was 
aware of this argument, his approach could well be described in similar terms, as 
Tarr went on to suggest: 
The outline of the Manufacturing course does not mean that Professor 
Doriot disagrees with the advantages of the case system. It does mean that 
he believes another way exists to provide instruction for students. His 
comments are designed to help the listener readjust his views on situations 
he has faced in the past and to help the listener seek a frame of mind with 
which he can face the future. Certainly many speakers, teachers, and 
ministers have attempted to do the same thing.76 
 
70-Curtis Tarr to Ralph Barford. Memo re: Notes on the Duties of the Assistant to Professor 
Georges F. Doriot, June 1952. Georges F. Doriot papers, Mss:784 1921-1984 D698. Box 1 Folder 6, 
Baker Library Special Collections, Harvard Business School. 
71-Tarr to Barford. Memo re: Notes on the Duties of the Assistant to Professor Georges F. 
Doriot, p. 1. 
72-Tarr to Barford. Memo re: Notes on the Duties of the Assistant to Professor Georges F. 
Doriot, p. 1. 
73-Elton Mayo, The Social Problems of Industrial Civilization (Boston, Mass.: Graduate School 
of Business Administration, Harvard University, 1945), 15–16; William James, The Principles of 
Psychology, vol. 1 (London: MacMillan and Co., Ltd, 1890), 221. 
74-Elton Mayo, “The Limits of Logical Validity,” Mind XXIV, no. 1 (1915): 70–74. 
75-Mayo, “The Limits of Logical Validity,” 70. 
76-Tarr to Barford. Memo re: Notes on the Duties of the Assistant to Professor Georges F. 




As an attempt to achieve the purposes of the case teaching through lecturing, 
Doriot’s Manufacturing course was a peculiar hybrid. Despite the title, it was not “a 
course about making anything; it was a course about his ideas about business and 
his philosophies,” part of which some of the students perceived as “just plain 
baloney.”77 Even though the course did have a formal structure that stabilized by the 
end of the 1950s, it exhibited only a superficial similarity with the conventional 
structure of industrial management courses of the time. Thus, the classic handbook 
on the subject by Richard H. Lansburgh and William H. Spriegel, first published in 
1923, focused on such issues as management decisions, plant location, types of 
organizational structure and industrial relations, proceeding through a sequence of 
topics that began with the plant “as a tool of management,” the product, personnel 
relations and wages, culminating in the discussion of managerial control and 
operations.78 Doriot, on the other hand, divided his lectures into eight big topics with 
somewhat ambiguous headings such as (1) Framework; (2) Seeking Advice; (3) 
Research and Development; (4) Analyzing a Company; (5) Organization; (6) 
Purchasing, Engineering, Production and Sales; (7) Cost, Volume, Quality; (8) 
Studies of Various Industries.79 For example, under the rubric of “Framework,” 
Doriot would discuss such items as “definitions,” including “conception of a 
business,” “conception of how to manage” and “management problems,” “problems 
of information” and a variety of “frames” in which the conduct of business occurs — 
international, national, technical, social, and so forth. When talking about the 
“development of a management (operating) team,” he would address the “inside” 
and “outside” aspects thereof: first, the “problem of credit,” personal and business; 
second, what in today’s language might be called networking: “advice, guidance, 
help, services,” considered from the point of view of “giving — getting” or “seeking 
— using.” With “Manufacturing” serving as a “great big tent,”80 Doriot offered the 
students “his philosophy of life,”81 which was valued by the School’s administration 
and the student body.82 The students often referred to the course as simply “Doriot” 
 
77-In the words of Franklin P. Johnson. Johnson recalls that Doriot advised his students to 
never trust a man who wears a bow tie, or how one should read the New York Times in ten minutes, 
starting with obituaries, because only an accomplished person deserves to have an obituary (rather 
than a mere “me too” mention) and it is important to learn from the example of such individuals. The 
“art” of reading the New York Times was given much attention in Doriot’s classes, where he would 
skip the sports section as something “not important” and focus on the business affairs and 
international relations instead. See Franklin P. Johnson, “Bay Area Venture Capitalists: Shaping the 
Economic and Business Landscape” conducted by Sally Smith Hughes in 2008 (Regional Oral History 
Office, The Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley, 2009), p. 8. 
78-Richard H. Lansburgh and William R. Spriegel, Industrial Management (London: John 
Wiley & Sons, Inc.; Chapman & Hall, Limited, 1940). 
79-Curtis Tarr to Ralph Barford. Memo re: Notes on the Duties of the Assistant to Professor 
Georges F. Doriot, June 1952. Georges F. Doriot papers, Mss:784 1921-1984 D698. Box 1 Folder 6, 
Baker Library Special Collections, Harvard Business School, p. 2. 
80-Walter J. P. Curley, “Venture Capital Greats: A Conversation with Walter J. P. Curley,” 
interview by Carole Kolker, March 24, 2010 (National Venture Capital Association, Arlington, 
Virginia, 2009), pp. 28–29. 
81-William H. Draper III, “Venture Capital Greats: A Conversation with William H. Draper III,” 
interview conducted and edited by Mauree Jane Perry, October 2005 (National Venture Capital 
Association, Arlington, Virginia, 2009), p. 9. 
82-The School’s teaching surveys over the period from 1952 through 1963 consistently show 
that most of Doriot’s students considered the course to be of “general”, rather than “special” interest. 
This attitude to Doriot’s teaching is most evident in those years when the question included four 
answers (“special,” “mostly special,” “mostly general,” “general”): in 1957, 77% of the students 




or “free enterprise,” which was considered his “holy grail.”83 Harbus News, the 
HGSBA’s student newspaper, reported in 1952 that most of them thought of 
Manufacturing as “more a course in business philosophy and top management 
policies for effective company operation,” and “a must for all students regardless of 
their field of endeavor.”84 Even though he did not teach “any particular business 
school practice,” like accounting or investment management,85 it was thought that 
Doriot “tied together… much else that has been learned in other courses,” with the 
course being “not so much a course in production as a course in Professor Doriot’s 
experience, viewpoints and comments upon the business world.”86 Still, despite 
some controversy around Doriot’s abandonment of the case method and heavy 
workload, most students rated the course “excellent” and regarded it as valuable in, 
at least, three ways: 
First, General Doriot’s lectures give the student the benefit of a great deal of 
personal advice on how to operate a business and how to conduct himself 
in the business world. Second, the course provides experience in working 
as part of a seven- or eight-man group for a full year. Third, the course 
provides an opportunity to work closely with the managements of several 
companies in the Boston area, as well as an opportunity to investigate and 
write a group report on some special topic which may be of importance and 
interest in the future. “Operations Research,” “Automation” and “The 
Automobile Industry” are examples of topics that some of the groups chose 
this year.87 
Even though not universally popular, Doriot was able to impress those 
students who took Manufacturing with his charismatic style of lecturing and the 
heavy workload in the second part of the course that consisted in preparing a 
 
17% replied “mostly general” (77% and 19%, respectively, in 1958; 12% and 88% in 1959; 5% 
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company report, based on a field study of local companies, and a more speculative 
topic report that concerned long-range technological and economic forecasting. 
While the lecturing part was supposed to “give the student a good general 
background into the problems a manufacturer faces and a point of view for the 
manufacturer of the future to take,” covering seven “general topics,” in the eighth 
topic, “study of various industries,” the background thus acquired was put to the test 
by exposing students to “some actual situations.” As Tarr explained in his 
instructions, these situations “have the same effect on the student as would a case 
in another class,” provided that the student makes the required mental effort.88 
Doriot’s division of the course had a more complex structure that evolved 
over the 1950s and took its final form by the mid-1960s. Thus, in the outline of 1965, 
he divided Manufacturing into four parts and explicitly deemphasized the first one, 
consisting of class lectures. The literal content of the topics covered did not matter 
for Doriot; instead, he stressed its applications and extension — “not a matter of 
what is said but of what it means, of what it suggests.”89 Parts three and four were 
concerned, respectively, with the “company studies” and the “topic reports,” both of 
which embodied the key vocabulary of Doriot’s philosophy. According to Giraudeau, 
Doriot was opposed to the notion of ‘administration’ altogether —
regretting, for instance, that the term figured in the name of the Harvard 
school he taught at. But if Doriot rejected knowledge systems, and their 
application in business under the rubric of ‘administration’, he did like 
another term, ‘operations’. He considered that an approach focused on 
operations would have some purchase on the constant shifts and 
uncertainties that business actors were confronted with, especially in 
smaller, newer, and/or more innovative entities.90 
Thus, the purpose of the company studies was to help the students develop a 
“sense of operation” through a thorough exposure to the company’s “daily 
activities,” while the threefold aim of the topic reports stressed the nurturing of a 
“sense of the future,” and such capacities as “looking in the future” (“imagination”) 
and “fitting in” — socially, but also in the broader sense of adjusting to 
environmental changes broadly conceived. Sometimes Doriot also added the fifth 
part, consisting of “unexpected” group talks in class about the topic reports; this 
exercise was intended to train the students to “express themselves” and “to decide 
on worth-while topic and explain it in public” under time pressure.91 However, it 
was the second part of the course — “self-improvement and development” — that 
overwhelmingly dominated the rest and received most of Doriot’s attention when 
 
88-Curtis Tarr to Ralph Barford. Memo re: Notes on the Duties of the Assistant to Professor 
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planning the lectures. Indeed, the available evidence — administrative and planning 
documents by Doriot and his assistants, memoirs of the former students, and 
contemporary publications of the HGSBA — suggests that lecturing as such was of 
little importance both for Doriot and for his audience. As an academic teacher, 
Doriot hardly conformed to either a “subject master” or a “puzzler,” to utilize the 
distinction coined by F.A. Hayek; rather, as hinted by Tarr, he resembled a teacher 
in a less formal sense bordering ethical or religious teaching, a teacher of “life,” 
whose lectures conveyed an overarching ethos, rather than commented on specific 
topics.92 Accordingly, the in- and out-of-class exercises operationalized this ethos, 
constituting a set of what Michel Foucault has called “techniques of the self” — 
aimed at attaining neither purity nor immortality, but at cultivating the “alertness of 
the future” and, above all, the ability to “pass judgment.”93 
One of Doriot’s students and associates at ARD, Charles Waite, explicitly 
compared him to Peter Drucker, suggesting that many of the ideas attributed to the 
latter actually originated with the former.94 Indeed, it is no coincidence that Doriot 
is quite often compared to Drucker, perhaps the first management theorist to attain 
a “guru” status, a spiritual leader rather than a narrowly professionalized expert. In 
this sense, both can be counted as belonging to the “experiential tradition in 
business pedagogy” that stresses “the importance of vitalist, existential, 
constructivist, almost epic ideal of business reality.”95 However, as distinct from 
Drucker’s intellectual background of interwar European existentialist philosophy, 
Doriot was deeply influenced by a specific variety of vitalist thinking, emphasizing 
“the indeterminacy and ‘vitality’ of the business world.”96 Seen in this light, Doriot’s 
teaching is indeed best described as an “extension” of the case system. If the latter 
was intended to simulate the lived act of decision-making in the classroom, 
assuming that this kind of knowledge cannot be derived from “acquaintance” but 
only from the actual (lived) experience, Doriot effectively suggested that the 
interaction could go in the opposite direction: “business” feeding back into “life.” Put 
differently, in the Manufacturing course, “life” and “business” were continuous and 
 
92-On the distinction between “subject masters” and “puzzlers,” see Friedrich A. Hayek, “Two 
Types of Mind,” in F.A. Hayek, New Studies in Philosophy, Politics, Economics and the History of Ideas 
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1978), 52–53. 
93-Foucault, “Technologies of the Self.” 
94-See Charles P. Waite, “Oral History of Charles P. Waite,” conducted by Marguerite Gong 
Hancock, Ray Rothrock, February 16, 2017, San Francisco, CA (Computer History Museum, Mountain 
View, California, 2017). Ante suggests that Doriot might be even more deserving the “business guru” 
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important as Drucker’s, but Doriot was not a self-promoter… One major reason is that Doriot, unlike 
Drucker, never poured his ideas and visions into a book that could outlive him.” See Ante, “Forbes’s 
Robert Lenzner Gives Creative Capital 5 Stars!!!”; Ante, Creative Capital: Georges Doriot and the Birth 
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Giraudeau, “Processing the Future: Venture Project Evaluation at American Research and 
Development Corporation (1946-73)”; Giraudeau, “The Business of Continuity.” 
96-Giraudeau, “Processing the Future: Venture Project Evaluation at American Research and 
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coextensive, in accordance with the Whiteheadian vitalist philosophy underlying 
Doriot’s thinking.97 
For Doriot, self-improvement ultimately turned on the “main goal”: “to build 
men.”98  As the business “problems” and “situations” change over time, “men” will 
have to learn “the method” of dealing with these changes, rather than specific 
techniques applicable to specific problems — here Doriot appears to be rephrasing 
one of the formulations of the rationale behind the case method which stressed the 
experientially developing “administrative capacity,” evocative of Donham’s 
“administrative science,” or, in one of Doriot’s preferred phrases, “executive 
ability.”99 On the other hand, the future changes result from the same general 
evolutionary processes which pertain to people as much as to the surrounding 
“frames.” As shown by Giraudeau, having been influenced by Whitehead’s process 
philosophy, Doriot approached the problems of business from an evolutionary point 
of view: in managing ARD, for example, he relied on “a number of intellectual 
guidelines designed to help employees crystallize what their sense of a given project 
was,” which included: 
A number of ‘curves’ or ‘chains’ of ‘evolution’, which described the different 
paths that a human individual or a company could go through in their’ lives’. 
ARD employees were invited to reflect on what the latent curve of a given 
individual or company was (rising? flat? falling?), and at what place on that 
curve the person or firm was currently (at the time of evaluation)—all with 
the purpose of answering the fundamental question: ‘can individual and 
organization grow?’100  
As evidenced by his teaching notes, in the Manufacturing course, Doriot 
utilized the same approach, referring to the necessity to anticipate and prepare for 
the period of “aging” in accordance with one’s evolutionary curve.101 Here, again, the 
“method” becomes central as a means to cope with the inevitable process of “aging” 
through continuous learning and self-developing. The “method,” consisting of a 
series of techniques or “assignments” was geared to develop in the students a “sense 
of operation,” an “inner steering mechanism” in the present, as well as imagination, 
a “capacity of looking into the future,” in order to be able to “fit” into it — the latter 
expression connoting a clearly evolutionary meaning. 
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Looking into the Future 
Like for other members of his generation, the two World Wars and the Great 
Depression, which destroyed his father’s car business, were defining experiences of 
Doriot’s life. Throughout his teaching career, as evidenced by his lecture notes, he 
remained profoundly preoccupied with the problem of foresight — of seeing the 
future coming ahead of time, constantly returning to what he called “accelerated 
social evolution” (notably, dating the beginning of this acceleration back to 1914). 
Living in such an environment required a constant exercise of anticipation, coupled 
with a purposefully nurtured readiness to abandon obsolete habits. In 1950, Doriot 
wrote: 
Evolution since 1914. Differences 1914 — 1953. Accelerated rate of change 
— evolution. Can we see evolution of our frames — resistance to change. 
We went through two wars — expected no change. Through long 
depression — expected no change. Through important technical 
development — expected no change. Still, all of these precipitates, 
accelerate social evolution.102 
In his Manufacturing lectures, Doriot repeatedly warned the students about 
the “excessive belief” that “things in general will pretty much stay as they now are 
during their lifetime.”103 The problem posed thereby was not “so much to foresee 
the future in details but to recognize trends, their possibilities,” constructive or 
destructive character, in order to interpret and evaluate them. Here neither 
economic forecasting nor science more generally were helpful.104 What was needed, 
instead, was “a sense of operation,” another key term in Doriot’s philosophy, to be 
acquired by the company study, and an ability to “look into the future,” to be 
developed through the topic report, the rationale of which was explicitly tied to the 
problem of “accelerated social evolution.”105 
The purpose of the company report was twofold. On the one hand, it was 
designed to help students get first-hand experience with manufacturing processes 
in a more or less narrow sense. More importantly, however, the company report was 
aimed at developing in the students a “feeling for the business,” namely, a lived 
experience of competition from the point of view of an “operating unit” in a given 
industry which the report was supposed to convey “so alive that someone reading 
the report could enter the business with perspective.”106 The students, however, 
often struggled to understand this less tangible part of the exercise, although for 
Tarr, and likely also for Doriot himself, “this type of analysis” had “as much 
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importance in their preparation for business as any other kind of preparation the 
School can give. It gives them background to ask the all-important question of 
themselves: “What must I do to compete?”107 
This part of the coursework was to be done in small groups and meant to 
mobilize the students’ capacities of “analysis, imagination, creation, action.”108 More 
specifically, it was intended as a direct analog to the case-based instruction used in 
other classes, “testing the student’s background by posing for him some actual 
situations.”109 The company study aimed to develop “a sense of operation” through 
a field study of one of the local firms where the skills acquired in Manufacturing 
were supposed to find a point of application. As Giraudeau shows, Doriot disliked 
the word “administration,” associating it with the rigidity of management systems, 
and preferred “operation,” evoking a sense of self-generating organic movement. 
Developing “a sense of operation” and speeding up the students’ evolution “toward 
the role of the effective operator” was one of the purposes of his Manufacturing 
course.110 As he explained in his teaching notes, the goal was to “develop in men a 
sense of “operation” which has a dynamic connotation as opposed to 
“administration” which at the present time seems too often to convey a modern 
feeling of contemplation and button pushing.”111 Note the temporal qualifier — 
written in 1965, just a year before Doriot’s retirement from teaching and thus 
reflecting his teaching philosophy in its most developed formulation, the emphasis 
on the relative novelty of the prevalent semantics of administration was probably 
intended as a criticism of the post-war rise of “administrative science.”112 To make 
sense of Doriot’s reservations, the intellectual and institutional bifurcation of the 
post-war American business education must be recalled: as different from the 
“science of administration” promoted by Doriot’s mentor Donham, the post-war 
“administrative science” was associated with formal modeling of decision-making 
processes, pioneered during the war and further developed, among others, by 
Herbert A. Simon at Carnegie-Mellon GSIA. Contrary to Harvard’s endorsement of 
the separation between “administration” as policy determination based on 
experience and judgment, and Taylorist “scientific management,” the new 
“administrative science” of the post-war period reflected the more ambitious project 
of “managerialization” and “scientization” of the intangible sphere of leadership.113 
 
107-Tarr to Barford. Memo re: Notes on the Duties of the Assistant to Professor Georges F. 
Doriot, p. 4. 
108-G.F. Doriot document “Manufacturing 1 and 2. General Outline 63-64,” 1964. HBS 
Manufacturing Class Notes, Book B1, 1927-1964. Georges F. Doriot papers, Mss:784 1921-1984 
D698. Box 2 Folder 7, Baker Library Special Collections, Harvard Business School. 
109-Curtis Tarr to Ralph Barford. Memo re: Notes on the Duties of the Assistant to Professor 
Georges F. Doriot, June 1952. Georges F. Doriot papers, Mss:784 1921-1984 D698. Box 1 Folder 6, 
Baker Library Special Collections, Harvard Business School, p. 4. 
110-Harbus News, May 1, 1952. Harbus News ratings. Georges F. Doriot papers, Mss:784 1921-
1984 D698. Box 1 Folder 1, Baker Library Special Collections, Harvard Business School. 
111-G.F. Doriot document “Manufacturing Course-1965. Outline of course by method,” 1965. 
HBS Manufacturing Class Notes, Book B1, 1927-1964. Georges F. Doriot papers, Mss:784 1921-1984 
D698. Box 2 Folder 7, Baker Library Special Collections, Harvard Business School. Emphasis added. 
112-See Isaac, “The Human Sciences in Cold War America”; Ethan Schrum, “To ‘Administer 
the Present’: Clark Kerr and the Purpose of the Postwar American Research University,” Social 
Science History 36, no. 4 (2012): 499–523. 




It is likely that Doriot’s emphasis on “operation” reflected his critical stance towards 
these new developments, of which he was well aware.114 
One of the means to remain alert of the ongoing developments were the 
students’ topic reports, which constituted a significant part of the Manufacturing 
coursework. To develop “a sense of the future,” students formed groups of six to 
eight and analyzed the prospects of some industry or new technology for the next 
10 to 15 years: high vacuum, automation, nuclear power, steroid hormones, new 
materials, computers (“electronic business machines”) and even operations 
research in the 1950s. Doriot would give very little definition of the assignment and 
leaving his assistants to deal with the students’ questions and frustration: “Professor 
Doriot literally wants to be surprised with the work of his students. Because of this, 
his assignments have no boundaries.”115 In May 1953, Harbus News reported that 
“Professor Doriot pointed out that in the past industry leaders who have read the 
reports have been surprised by the great ability to see the future exhibited by the 
students.”116 The completed reports were then available for purchase from HBS 
Publication was not encouraged, however. The purpose of the reports was to 
encourage and stimulate imagination, and thus it was desirable to avoid the 
tendency towards factual conservatism that inevitably resulted from the 
responsibility attached to the printed word. However, “wild ideas” were equally 
unwelcome: 
Basically, the Professor asks for a ten-year report dated ahead because it 
makes a man do a more careful thinking and calculating than it would if you 
asked him for a ten-year forecast. The forecast would have plenty of wild 
ideas. The unrestricted kind of imagination does not develop a student of 
business. When he takes this other point of view, however, he is much more 
realistic in his approach.117 
The company and topic reports were Doriot’s techniques of teaching the case 
method without relying on the actual classroom cases. While appreciative of the idea 
of experiential learning, Doriot seems to have disliked the “playing it safe” approach 
in which the “business situations” were simulated in the classroom. Ideas and 
knowledge presented in class “are more organized than it will be in business,” 
having been prepared for the students in advance and presented in a form conducive 
for handling them: 
Even when using cases, the subjects are selected and presented to them. In 
business, they shall look and search. They will have to determine subjects 
of importance at the time. Determine sequence — emphasis. They will have 
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to look for what they should be thinking about beyond what they are told 
to.118 
The reports were thus intended to be more realistic than cases. However, 
their value was not merely instrumental: the sense of operation and the ability to 
see the future coming were intertwined with the more general concern of the 
Manufacturing course — self-improvement. Moreover, self-improvement tied 
together the “theoretical” and the “practical” parts of Manufacturing: the four parts 
of the course, as he wrote in the teaching notes, “must always be fitted together in 
their [the students’] minds. It is not really 4 independent parts, but a “whole” which 
is divided up for practical reasons... The same need for bringing such different parts 
or even forms of activity together will exist in life.”119 Finally, as conceived by Doriot, 
self-improvement was no less than a form of practical ethics — or a “technique of 
the self” concerned with preparing future businessmen for the daily exercise of 
freedom. 
Turning Selves into Assets 
As noted above, the sequence of topics covered in the lectures did not follow 
the convention adopted by thematically similar courses; according to one of Doriot’s 
former students, “he would discuss any one of a number of things. It seemed random 
— it probably wasn’t.”120 Thus, in his teaching notes Doriot himself stressed that the 
specific contents of the lectures did not matter, instead repeatedly and explicitly 
emphasizing the “method of work” over the subject of his course: 
Other subjects than the ones selected might have been picked. The time 
given to any particular subject is relatively unimportant and should vary 
according to epochs and students’ backgrounds. The subjects must be well 
selected enough so that the desired methods can be applied effectively. The 
subjects selected might be considered as samples. Indeed new subjects, 
difficult to foresee now, others which can be foreseen now but do not seem 
acceptable as yet, many more cannot even be foreseen now, will 
undoubtedly arise in their [students’] lifetime, and it is hoped that the 
method advised at this time will still apply.121 
In his teaching notes for Manufacturing, Doriot’s “outlines by subject” were 
always accompanied by the much more detailed “outlines by method,” characterized 
as “the most important”122 and elaborating on the “work to be done — (School and 
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life),” by which he invariably meant “self-improvement and development.”123 For 
example, in the 1958 outline, Doriot wrote that “these remarks do not merely apply 
to the course and their relationship to it — they apply to their lives as 
businessmen,”124 later elaborating on this as follows: 
Every action taken in the course must have a business meaning. It must a 
valid, constructive worthwhile experience. The method of work suggested in 
this “outline by method,” if properly understood and applied to the course, is 
equally adaptable to daily life. It is applicable to the home, family life, to the 
work in a company, and to the individual’s life as a useful citizen.125 
In 1965, he extended the “method’s” possible field of application even further 
stating that it “should apply to individuals — groups — companies — products — 
business methods — nations, etc.”126 The outline “by method,” centered around self-
improvement, was meant to be a universally applicable technology of conduct: 
“Really it is not an outline of a course, it is a possible conceptual scheme, a possible 
attitude, a possible method of conducting one’s life in the world of business. I cannot 
speak about worlds other than business but perhaps it might apply also.”127 
Addressing an imagined audience of students in his teaching notes, Doriot stated the 
following reasons for the need for self-improvement: “business is difficult — 
competitive; this is not the only School of Business; up to now their work has been 
guided, they have been measured — graded; next year — on their own — lonely,” 
facing the necessity of making ever more consequential decisions.128 For Doriot, 
decision-making was as central to business as to life in general: 
Studying business means studying: art and ability, the skill, of making 
correct — profitable and competitive decisions. Making decisions exists in 
every form of human — business activity. It is the power to choose. It goes 
with opportunity and freedom.129 
Developing the ability of “passing judgment” or making decisions was 
contingent on the possibility of choice and freedom of action, which, for Doriot, was 
identical with “free enterprise” and thus also competition.130 However, like 
happiness, freedom — material, moral, or freedom of choice — was to be “re-
deserved — regenerated every day.”131 Self-improvement towards a greater ability 
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to make correct decisions and exercising the “power to choose” was a continuous 
exercise, reaching beyond the field of business narrowly understood. As a 
technology of daily “regeneration of freedom,” it approached a technology of the self 
as defined by Foucault, permitting the students of business “to effect by their own 
means or with the help of others a certain number of operations on their own bodies 
and souls, thoughts, conduct, and way of being, so as to transform themselves” — in 
Doriot’s case, to achieve the state of freedom, contingent on the ability to “operate 
and direct.”132 At the start of the Manufacturing course, Doriot framed this issue 
around the “problem of information”: 
All information necessary or believed to be necessary is seldom available 
when one needs it — sometimes one cannot wait. Information one thinks is 
needed compared to what one wants or should want or can get. Ability — 
necessity to reach decision without all desirable or seemingly necessary 
information and with information of questionable value and accuracy.133 
The process of decision making began with information — or perception, 
which, once accumulated, translated into experience. Further, and in line with the 
case method philosophy, experience allowed one to pass judgment, but also imagine 
the future on this basis. The development of this ability further translated into the 
task of “building men”: the change of events will make specific methods of decision-
making and experiences obsolete; hence the ultimate task of self-improvement was 
to sustain the ability to learn from it, to “operate and direct” in an environment of 
accelerating evolution.134 
A member of the Pragmatist movement, Doriot relied heavily on the notion 
of habit. Part of the work of self-improvement was concerned with “acquiring good 
habits,” considered not as a matter of discipline, but as that of “respect for 
oneself.”135 However, like for his senior Pragmatist colleague Cecil E. Fraser, for 
Doriot, habit was mutable and changeable by conscious effort and exercise.136 He 
repeatedly stressed the need to improve “working and living” habits to ensure that 
there always is “a constant variation to the better from any daily required 
routine.”137 More importantly, however, a large part of business — and hence of life 
more generally — consisted, according to Doriot, in “acquiring good habits” 
throughout a life-long learning effort: 
Would like them not to feel that they are students. At least not in the 
accepted school sense of the word. In a way we are students during the 
 
132-G.F. Doriot document “Introduction to Class 14,” undated. See Foucault, “Technologies of 
the Self.” 
133-G.F. Doriot teaching note on “Methods – Attitude (Effect on one’s self and on others),” 
undated. HBS Manufacturing Class Notes, Book B1, 1927-1964. Georges F. Doriot papers, Mss:784 
1921-1984 D698. Box 2 Folder 9, Baker Library Special Collections, Harvard Business School. 
134-G.F. Doriot document “Class 22,” 5 May 1959. HBS Manufacturing Class Notes, Book B1, 
1927-1964. Georges F. Doriot papers, Mss:784 1921-1984 D698. Box 2 Folder 9, Baker Library 
Special Collections, Harvard Business School. 
135-G.F. Doriot document “Manufacturing Class #24,” 12 May 1959. HBS Manufacturing Class 
Notes, Book B1, 1927-1964. Georges F. Doriot papers, Mss:784 1921-1984 D698. Box 2 Folder 9, 
Baker Library Special Collections, Harvard Business School. On Doriot’s Pragmatism, see Giraudeau, 
“Processing the Future: Venture Project Evaluation at American Research and Development 
Corporation (1946-73).” 
136-On Fraser, see Muniesa, “Setting the Habit of Capitalization: The Pedagogy of Earning 
Power at the Harvard Business School, 1920-1940.” 




whole of our life. They should not feel that we are in class. We are at a 
business meeting, acquiring good business habits, discussing business and 
related subjects.138 
Acquiring good habits was a matter of “tidying up” the students’ “thinking 
and working habits, also their living habits” in order to “make their ordinary living 
and working easier, more logical, simpler, more effective” — for example, by 
learning “the art of taking notes,” but also writing, watching for and noticing 
opportunities, among other things.139 The general point of the exercise was to free 
up the mind towards the “difficult situations”: 
There must be: a constant tiring mental effort all the time [...] Watch the 
importance of so-called simple things — the things we believe we know but 
really do not. Good habits liberate our minds for difficult situations — make 
living easier — more efficient.140 
Again, acquiring habits was part of a total effort at self-improvement, within 
and beyond the classroom: in order to do well, one must have freedom of action, and 
acquiring good habits was a method of freeing oneself from the “untidy” ways of 
working and living that hinder action, as well as obsolete beliefs and habits that have 
become undesirable or inaccurate due to new knowledge or “the evolution of the 
person.”141 Doriot repeatedly stressed that 
We must acquire a pattern, to be improved as we go along, of course, but it 
is imperative that we have a pattern, or perhaps we may say “a set of habits” 
or a minimum code which is so much part of ourselves that operating under 
and within it more or less automatically gives us strength and frees our 
mind for forward thinking and action.142 
Following the Pragmatist idiom, Doriot’s self-improvement method was 
based on the recognition that people are creatures of habits. Therefore, an essential 
part of self-improvement was reflexive management of habits, or “pattern 
acquisition” process — getting rid of the “bad” habits, like believing that the future 
will always resemble the past and acquiring the “good” ones in order to detach the 
mental effort from the everyday matters and direct it towards the future. To this 
end, Doriot’s primary technique of the self was the so-called “notebook assignment.” 
The first technique for self-improvement to be conducted individually was 
the “notebook assignment.” Quite simply, starting with the very first classes, Doriot 
kept insisting that the students should exercise in the “art of taking notes,” keeping 
a notebook and writing down their thoughts — both in order to catch potentially 
valuable ideas, as well as to free up the mind for actionable thinking. Like with the 
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company studies and topic reports, the “notebook assignment” provoked mixed 
reactions from the students. Designed to give the students “some momentum when 
they enter the business world,” in the early 1950s it was received by most students 
“as a silly chore without a very good purpose behind it,” as Tarr explained in the 
1952 memorandum, calling for a better “marketing job” of promoting it.143 In 
November 1958, Doriot observed that some of them “still do not believe in the 
notebook self-improvement idea. In most cases it is due to conceit that ‘I am above 
that’ attitude. They should postpone conceit until they are old enough to learn that 
it is not worthwhile.”144 Nevertheless, the assignment stuck, appearing in Doriot’s 
course outlines up until his retirement.  
The notebook was supposed to “mirror their [students’] thinking — their 
curiosity,” “measure their intellectual and other progress,” especially relative to the 
goals of the practice of self-improvement — “developing sense of responsibility and 
pride in their work.”145 Part of it was to be devoted to keeping contacts of other 
“men” to seek help, advice, and guidance, spilling over to the second major part of 
self-improvement — “picking men” and learning to be “picked by good men.” Doriot 
conceived of self-improvement as both an individual and a group exercise. In one of 
his schemes, the individual was divided into two aspects: A, “as an individual,” and 
B, “as part of a group.” Accordingly, “self-improvement must apply to A as such and 
as part of B.”146 The notebook was a simple recording device to keep track of one’s 
progress in self-improvement and “making contribution to one’s self,” while verbal 
communication served as a medium of intergroup relationships. Students had to 
learn to “pick men” to work for and with them, make contributions and recognize 
and create opportunities through communication. 
A notable feature of Doriot’s techniques of the self was his reliance on the 
language of accounting. For example, the notebook assignment was conceived as an 
exercise of “making an inventory” which would not only put on record the students’ 
progress in self-improving but also reveal a pattern of evolution, on which it was 
then possible to act. As Doriot advised his students, “make an inventory as of today. 
Then watch it change. How and why. Then make a new one. Try to foresee. Get sense 
of evolution — direction. Guide your action accordingly. Prepare desirable 
inventory for the future.”147 While accounting has arguably become one of the 
currently privileged modes of “governing oneself and others,” Doriot used it perhaps 
in the broadest sense, often imbued with explicitly moral meaning.148 Thus, the 
second part of the work of self-improvement consisted in “understanding of assets 
and liabilities, credits and debits” — again, not in a narrowly technical sense, but as 
belonging to both financial and moral contexts simultaneously, reestablishing the 
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link between the moral and the economic successes and failures, severed at the turn 
of the century.149 First, not only companies but also people could be analyzed in 
accounting terms, as bundles of assets and liabilities; conversely, Doriot referred to 
the abstract accounting concepts as if they were living entities — speaking, for 
example, of “dead” and “living” assets. While the latter expression is not too distant 
a metaphor to convey the conventional meaning of these terms, Doriot seems to 
have had in mind a much more general approach: as he explained in 1960, 
“determination of assets and liabilities” pertained to: 
Men — Money — Ideas — Time — Timing. Assets and liabilities are relative 
— changing — shifting — hard to measure. What advantages and handicaps 
do they mean to us? What have we that others do not have? What have 
others that we do not have? To what extent? What can we do? Apply this 
thinking to individuals — groups — organizations — companies.150 
“Men,” or individuals, were likewise to be analyzed in terms of their “inherent 
and potential assets and liabilities,” as well as evolution and development thereof: 
thus, an “abnormal” man would be able to “make assets out of liabilities” out of the 
sheer “drive” to succeed.151 A similar kind of analysis also applied to one’s self. In 
the various “outlines by method” prepared in the early 1960s, Doriot referred to 
“positive determination of assets and liabilities (personal ones)” interchangeably 
with “understanding and respect for commitments,” playing with the polysemy of 
“commitment,” spanning the financial and the moral realms: 
They committed themselves to the course. I committed myself to them. 
Commitments to their family — school — companies — nation. Respect for 
time. Proper use of time. (At 65 years of age they will have been fully 
committed).152 
At that time, “much of their effective life will be behind them,” which 
necessitated a prudent management of one’s life in the present.153 The moral 
commitment was conceived of as a commitment of resources, of the ultimate 
“capital” that consisted in the person’s entire “life,” and vice versa. Situated on the 
same continuous of life and its evolution, “men” and “organizations” were to be 
governed and improved by the same means: if “business is human activity — it is 
life itself — business and art of livin0g,”154 then one could reasonably say that the 
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“best organization is one man.”155 This kind of reasoning allowed Doriot to extend 
his accounting metaphors to the realm of organizational life: “Is an organization an 
extension of that man or is it something else? Can there be a conception or feeling of 
an “organization” unless all members have the same goals, motives, conceptual 
schemes?”156 For Doriot, the answer was “no”: perhaps the very word “organization” 
pertained only to the military units, from which “there is no escape,” but precisely 
this latter condition distinguished them from the “free enterprise.” For the latter, the 
proper way of “governing oneself and others” would require an approach based on 
the recognition of the “power to do well” that comes with the “freedom of action.”157 
Because individuals and organizations were continuous, with the transition from 
the former to the latter occurring without any radical break or rupture, the methods 
of governing oneself — by getting rid of inefficient habits and “automating” the 
efficient ones, but above all by imagining oneself as a bundle of “assets and 
liabilities” — pertained equally to the governance of organizations and companies. 
Referring implicitly to William H. Whyte’s Organization Man (1956), Doriot 
suggested that perhaps “organization” as a “molding process” had to be discarded 
because it creates “organization problems even of organization man”158; a subtler 
approach, based on the “positive determination of assets and liabilities” was needed 
to govern the endless evolution of “men” and businesses. 
Conclusion 
In sum, Doriot’s teaching appears to be an extension of the case method 
philosophy into a series of particular techniques of the self, pertaining to both 
business management and the conduct of life more generally. The “philosophy of 
business and life” that his Manufacturing course lecture notes reveal was based on 
the three major ideas that run through the entire corpus of Doriot’s teaching 
documents. Martin Giraudeau demonstrated the origins of these ideas in Doriot’s 
allegiance with the Pragmatist movement in business education and his 
endorsement of the vitalist metaphysics.159 This chapter complements Giraudeau’s 
insights by offering evidence of how these influences were articulated in Doriot’s 
teaching. The problem of deciding — judging — stemmed from the necessity to 
anticipate the evolutionary trajectory of people and companies, determining the 
particular period of this evolution at the right time and the shape of the “curve” to 
be able to act upon it. With its emphasis on accounting metaphors, self-improvement 
was a means of making the “curve” — the “direction of evolution” visible and actable 
upon. The self-improvement techniques offered by Doriot were aimed at both 
representing the evolutionary tendencies and acting on them through the 
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acquisition (or abandonment) of habits. Based on an understanding of business and 
life as coextensive and continuous, they applied equally to the individuals who were 
primed to imagine themselves as bundles of assets and liabilities, as well as to 
groups and companies which could be managed in the same way. Likewise, the 
accelerating pace of evolution necessitated the application of the same approach to 
“governing oneself and others”: neither static “administration,” nor coercive 
“organization” were capable of anticipating the evolutionary changes in “men,” 
“ideas,” and “frames”; what was required instead was the development of a “sense 
of operation” facilitated by a variety of specific techniques. 
Throughout his teaching career, Doriot occupied a strategic position at 
Harvard Business School, preserving and extending its “broad executive” approach 
at the time when the very same problems of governance — deciding under 
conditions of limited information and uncertainty — were increasingly addressed 
by formal mathematical tools like systems analysis or operations research. In this 
way, his importance for the formation of venture capitalism is related not only to his 
own pioneering experiences in “organized venture capital,” but in the ability to 
articulate an “imaginary” — or a “spirit” — conducive for its project of 
capitalization.160 Put differently, for several generations of business leaders, Doriot 
offered a set of descriptions to be applied to economic actions to motivate and justify 
them. If Peter Drucker can be counted as a “prophet of post-Fordism,” Doriot may 
deserve the credentials of a “prophet of startups,” in many ways prefiguring the kind 
of vitalism that saturates contemporary business education and practices.161 By 
casting the problems of management in terms of an all-encompassing evolutionary 
process that could be made knowable and actionable through a set of “hybrid” 
accounting instruments, Doriot effectively offered a way of imagining and thinking 
about oneself and others as forms of capital — or, in other words, a way of 
“capitalizing” on the potentialities of individuals.162 Thus, his teaching career can 
indeed be seen as an articulation of an “imaginary” or “spirit” of venture capitalism 
before the more “fitting” organizational instruments were in place. In this 
perspective, his actual career in venture investing amounts to an experiment — 
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Chapter III. Foot Soldiers of Capitalism 
 
Let me emphasize once more that it was thanks to the spontaneous expansion of the 
economy, at the grass roots, that such business people were able to further their 
careers. They were carried along on the current. Even if there is a grain of truth in 
Schumpeter’s theory of the spirit of enterprise, empirical observation nine times out 
of ten shows that the innovator was borne along on a rising tide. 
Fernand Braudel, The Wheels of Commerce 
The careerist’s loyalty is rational and sincere. Capitalism works, especially for 
himself. The economic expansion and stability provided by corporate capitalism and 
bureaucratic states have been reflected in career development. 
Michael Mann, The Sources of Social Power 
 
Introduction 
In January 1955, the 75th-anniversary issue of Yale Daily News, the college 
newspaper of Yale University, published a paper entitled “Modern Venture 
Capitalism,” authored by John Hay Whitney, senior partner and founder of J.H. 
Whitney & Co. and a Yale graduate of the class of 1926. Later that year, the paper 
appeared in the Wall Street magazine, which introduced the author as a “well known 
experimental financier and philanthropist.”1 The paper opened with a cliché 
refutation of the Marxist argument about capitalism’s eventual demise under the 
weight of its endogenously generated contradictions. Whitney observed that a 
century has passed since Marx “tolled the bell for our capitalist economy,” and yet it 
continued to be “growing more robust all the time,” creating new enterprises, 
products and services, increasing the standard of living, and producing “new 
concepts of social responsibility.” Whitney further argued that the ultimate cause of 
this dynamism lay in the flexibility of the American economic system, enabling it to 
“bring the products of technological change so quickly to flower.” The challenge was 
to match it with similarly flexible financial arrangements: “the more complex the 
product and the less aware the world is of how much it is missing by not having it, 
the harder it will be for the originator to finance his brainchild. This is the area in 
which venture capital is needed.”2 
Whitney continued by explaining that while the concept of venture capital 
was not new, in its distinctively modern form that took shape after Industrial 
Revolution, the connotation of speculative recklessness conveyed by the words 
“venture capital” was eliminated: “nothing could be more distant from the operating 
approach of the modern venture capital organization.” The task of financing new 
industrial enterprises was beyond the interest of large corporations and financial 
institutions, concerned with “the careful husbanding of other people’s money,” but 
also beyond the reach of an individual investor engaged in small business financing, 
given that “the required sums are likely to be much larger, the investigation more 
intricate, and the degree of risk incalculably greater.” Thus, Whitney argued, modern 
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venture capital could exist only as “a full-time job for an organization.” The paper 
concluded with a summary description of a “handful of new venture capital 
organizations,” whose operation Whitney described as “experimental.” First, they 
were being run on a “hard-headed business basis,” without a trace of altruism or 
philanthropy. Second, they were staffed with “specialists in the techniques of 
modern industrial management, research and development, factory organization, 
production, marketing, and all the other aspects of successful commercial 
operation.” Third, the need for such experts was partly created by the excesses of 
taxation and regulation. And yet, Whitney concluded that “to suggest that the 
ultimate in diligence or in technical competence could guarantee a profitable 
outcome for every venture” would be foolish: “The investment of venture capital as 
practiced in these firms is still a test operation.”3 
By the time Whitney’s article was published, the idea of venture capital was 
indeed not new, at least in the financial centers of the East Coast, like New York and 
Boston. The first appearance of “venture capital,” in a sense roughly equivalent to 
Whitney’s — as well as current — is conventionally traced back to the testimony of 
Lammot Du Pont, given before the Senate Committee on Unemployment in 1938.4 
Du Pont complained about the lack of a special kind of investment capital, the one to 
be put to work “without definite assurance that the funds will produce, at the outset, 
income commensurate with the commitment.”5 At the time, the idea of “venture 
capital” was mobilized by American investment bankers in their virulent critique of 
the New Deal financial and tax regulations. In their public rhetoric, “venture capital” 
was roughly equivalent to any “risk capital,” from individual investments in common 
stock to the activity of company promoters. Since the 1930s through the aftermath 
of World War II, public appeals to “venture capital” were usually linked to a concern 
for the future of “private capitalism,” unconstrained by the regulatory agencies of 
the increasingly powerful interventionist government that emerged out of the Great 
Depression.6 What set Whitney’s vision of venture capital apart from this discourse 
was his strong sympathy to the post-war American capitalism — the “new 
capitalism” of professional management, organized financial markets, and 
cooperative labor unions. In an unpublished paper written in the same period as his 
Yale Daily News article, Whitney described this “new capitalism” as a unique 
American achievement of the post-war decade and worried about its ability to 
sustain the accumulated momentum and continue “making sweeping adaptations to 
new ideas and institutions.” American capitalism has survived an unprecedentedly 
severe depression and a world war, and its popular legitimacy was continuously 
backed by the rising standards of living. As different from the investment bankers in 
the 1930s, fearing that the very existence of “private capitalism” was under threat, 
Whitney’s concern was whether this “new capitalism” — what some of his more 
academic contemporaries would refer to as “organized capitalism,” — will be able 
to adapt to its own dynamism. It is in this context that Whitney conceived the proper 
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place for a “brand new institution,” the venture capital company “specifically 
organized to put expert help and risk capital to work in new enterprises.”7 It this 
modern sense, venture capital was a “test operation,” but, if successful, it could 
perform a function “of great usefulness both to business and to society.”8 In light of 
this vision, during the 1950s, Whitney repeatedly described himself in public as a 
“venture capital business” practitioner.9 
Whitney’s partners shared this thinking. In 1952, Fred Marinus van Eck, an 
associate at J.H. Whitney & Co. since 1950, argued that, despite its highly demanding 
nature, success was possible in venture capital investing, as judged by the criteria of 
“the free enterprise system, where the opportunity for profit is the justification for 
risking capital.”10 And yet, profit-making was only part of the original motivation 
that prompted Whitney to begin his venture capital operation in 1946. Three years 
after “Modern Venture Capitalism” appeared in print, Charles Wrede Petersmeyer, 
another partner of J.H. Whitney & Co., explained that, when Whitney came back from 
the war, “he decided he wanted to do something “worthwhile” with his funds. He felt 
he was in a position to take risks that others were not. He knew there would be new 
products, new processes, new companies that would grow as a result of the general 
stimulation of the economy in the post-war era.”11 Accordingly, Whitney divided his 
inherited fortune into income-generating investments, philanthropic activities, and 
venture capital, separating $10 million to establish J.H. Whitney & Co. as “a source 
of money” for “somebody with some good ideas that no bank will look at… somebody 
to build a better mousetrap.”12 Venture capital investing was supposed to be highly 
selective and restricted to the “worthwhile” projects — not necessarily “great 
money-makers,” but something the partners could be “proud of when it’s over,” and 
Whitney was “deadly serious about that.”13 According to one of the partners, Walter 
Curley, J.H. Whitney & Co. — and the East Coast venture capital science more 
generally, — was run by “patrician thinking,” only loosely coupled to the goal of 
making a return on investment commensurate with risk: 
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[J.H. Whitney] had a very big amount of certain things he never wanted to 
do because of their nature, and other things he thought he should do. But he 
always said, “Whatever we go into, we’re not going into this as 
philanthropy.” He said, “I try to do plenty of that on the side. We’re not 
giving any money away. We want to put it into things we can grow and make 
money, and when we do that, we can then put it into something else.” So 
that’s what we did. But it was run by patrician thinking. [...] Venture capital 
was this: You put your money into the venture; if you win and you make 
some money out of it, that money goes right into your pocket — your 
pocket. If you lose, you don’t get your money back — it’s gone.14 
Other pioneering venture capital organizations established by the heirs of old 
moneyed families operated on similar principles. For example, the investment 
policy of Laurance Rockefeller, who also began his venture investing in 1946, 
building on his pre-war experience of backing early aviation ventures, was 
conceived in terms of “sponsorship” of the aircraft industry as a means for 
“furthering the political, social and economic welfare of the United States and of the 
world community.”15 However, unlike Whitney, Rockefeller, a noted philanthropist, 
did not make any public commitments to put venture capital investing on a “hard-
headed business basis.” Doriot’s American Research and Development Corporation, 
the only venture capital firm not based on the family wealth, was likewise created 
as an attempt to couple pecuniary business activity with the “civic” purpose of 
supporting “constructive” ideas to foster the industrial development of New 
England.16 As a publicly-traded closed-end fund, ARD had to face the challenge head-
on: during the 1950s and the better part of the 1960s, Doriot struggled to convince 
the Wall Street that it was a profit-making business, rather than “a freak 
philanthropic enterprise dreamed up by a strange mélange of Harvard professors 
and State Street financiers.”17 Nevertheless, ARD’s first dividends payment — “a 
modest twenty-five cents a share,”18 — appeared only in 1954, and the corporation 
had to wait until 1960 to have its first public offering underwritten by a major 
investment bank, Lehman Brothers.19 In other words, Whitney’s characterization of 
venture capital as a “test operation” was well-timed: during the 1950s, its prospects 
as a commercial, profit-making activity were profoundly uncertain. The gap 
between Doriot’s and Whitney’s public pronouncements stressing organization, 
expertise and professionalism of the new venture capital firms, and their actual 
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operating philosophies, permeated by “patrician thinking” and “civic-mindedness,” 
remained wide open. 
For J.H. Whitney & Co., “patrician thinking” eventually proved to be 
incompatible with the “hard-headed business basis” of operation endorsed by 
Whitney’s article. In 1958, when Whitney temporarily abandoned the firm, having 
been appointed Ambassador to the UK, Petersmeyer openly admitted that, judged 
by the criterion of commensurability between risk and return, the firm’s “batting 
average has not been particularly outstanding in the so-called small investment 
field.”20 By that time, J.H. Whitney & Co. has been in operation for 12 years and had 
13 partners assisted by 20 supporting staff members, who carefully researched the 
incoming investment propositions. Nevertheless, the original idea of investing “only 
in new processes or new products” proved to be too ambitious even for a 
professional operation. Explaining that the firm had to broaden its investment policy 
to include “growth situations in growth industries” and refrain from investing in 
small-scale projects “still in the experimental or inventive stage” or in “somebody 
[who] comes in with an idea of a product he would like to make,” Petersmeyer 
suggested that venture capital was hardly “suitable for the investor who may not be 
prepared to lose all of his money.”21 While J.H. Whitney & Co. performed better than 
what could have been achieved by investing its original capital in a portfolio of listed 
securities, Petersmeyer attributed the differences to the few “early successes,” 
without which J.H. Whitney & Co. “may not have been nearly as venturesome, nor 
able to make the later major investments that have accounted for a large part of its 
growth.”22 
And yet, precisely during this uncertain period, an entire “formation” of 
future venture capitalists launched their careers. Unlike the founders of ARD, they 
were not acting out of a “civic spirit,” and unlike Whitney and Rockefeller, they did 
not feel themselves “in a position to take risk others were not.” Instead, they pursued 
opportunities for their own economic welfare and career advancement, some of 
which appeared as “measured risks,” while others were simply “obviously” 
attractive. During the 1950s, people like Reid Dennis, William Bowes, William 
Edwards, Arthur Rock, Donald Lucas, William Hambrecht, Charles Lea, and Peter 
Brooke discovered the opportunity for intermediation between the emerging 
technologies and pools of financial capital across the country. As different from the 
heirs of the old wealth, like Rockefellers and Whitney, who struggled to reconcile 
their concern for social responsibility with the task of generating a return on 
investment commensurate with risk, and unlike the well-connected military-
industrial elites, such as the founders of ARD and Draper, Gaither & Anderson, these 
people were coming from modest socio-economic backgrounds and began their 
professional lives by starting hierarchical careers in formal financial institutions. 
Occupying lower- and middle-level positions within these organizations, they 
participated in the intra-organizational divisions of labor and knowledge, acquiring 
categories and classificatory schemes that facilitated opportunity recognition. More 
specifically, these individuals found themselves favorably positioned between the 
emerging technology companies and the institutional pools of financial capital, 
pushing their careers into that direction. Based on their oral histories, this chapter 
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will follow these individuals’ careers through the major milestones, while at the 
same time, by way of a “middle-range contextualization,” attempting to reconstruct 
the social conditions of post-war America that enabled their development.23 
Generations and Social Trajectories 
Several broad-based demographic and social-structural changes in post-war 
America enabled and facilitated the careers of these people. Born between the Great 
Depression and the end of World War II, they began their professional lives during 
the post-war economic boom and were able to reap many of its benefits, including 
the expansion of higher education, the broad shift in the employment destinations 
from blue-collar to predominantly managerial and professional jobs, moderately 
low levels of labor market competition and increased pay-offs from higher 
education, jointly enabling remarkably fast and successful movements through such 
milestones of early adulthood as education and early career. In short, the dominant 
trend of the decade was economic progress “that ultimately — in the 1950s and 
1960s — shot millions of people into the ranks of the home-owning, high-
consuming, ever-better-educated middle classes.”24 
The passage of the Servicemen’s Readjustment Act of 1944, colloquially 
known as the GI Bill, has arguably been “the most significant development in the 
modern history of American education,” creating “the most expansive system of 
social provisioning in the history of the country,” rivaling the welfare projects of the 
New Deal.25 The Bill offered a range of social benefits for the returning servicemen, 
including low-interest farm, home, and business loans, unemployment benefits, as 
well as access to higher education and vocational training, which turned out to be 
the most popular part of the benefits package.26 Initially, the legislation offered 
payment for up to three years of instruction and additional financial support to 
cover room and board and attendant expenses. These benefits were used by 51% of 
the veterans who accounted for 49% of college enrollments in 1947.27 By 1956, 
when the original GI Bill expired, 7.8 million veterans had used its educational 
benefits, with some 2.2 million having attended college or graduate school, and 5.6 
million received vocational training in such fields as auto mechanics, electrical 
wiring, and construction.28 Moreover, as the ascendant global military superpower, 
since 1945, the US has effectively never demobilized, creating a massive standing 
peacetime military force.29 Thus, the GI Bill program was extended in 1952 to 
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accommodate the veterans of the Korean War, and in 1967 made permanently 
available for all honorably discharged servicemen who spent no less than six months 
in the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, Air Force and Coast Guard.30 Until the Vietnam 
War, for an entire generation of Americans, military service records provided an 
otherwise unavailable opportunity for social advancement.31 
More importantly, “what the war successfully accomplished, even before the 
GI Bill became law, was to bridge the gap between the general public and the 
university,” increasing educational attainment and turning higher education from “a 
rare milestone in American life” into an obligatory passage point on the way to non-
manual employment.32 Again, the benefits of the GI Bill were crucial for these 
developments: calculated on a monthly, rather than on a monetary basis, they eased 
the costs of education for the veterans, allowing them to choose from a variety of 
American colleges and universities, including the elite Ivy Leagues institutions, thus 
promoting an overall democratization of their admissions in the immediate post-
war years.33 As summarized by Mettler, the GI Bill opened the doors of the country’s 
top-tier academic institutions to many people previously denied this opportunity, 
including those coming from rural, working- and middle-class families, Catholic and 
Jewish religious backgrounds, as well as to the children of first-generation 
immigrants.34 The influx of the GIs into colleges and universities also “jolted faculty 
and administrators, who had to reach out beyond the predominantly upper-middle-
class young people whom they previously had served, to deal with older students, 
to offer married housing, to accelerate instruction, and to provide a range of more 
practical, career-oriented courses.”35 While Harvard, Yale, and Princeton had 
provided “the most prestigious academic ladder, training proportionately more 
leaders than any other undergraduate colleges in the United States” since their 
colonial beginnings, after World War II they had to “enter the talent search and offer 
more scholarship and financial aid,” as well as to “broaden and diversify their 
student body in order to maintain educational leadership,” allowing greater shares 
of immigrant and minority students to enter.36 In turn, the increased access to 
higher education both pushed the academic standards and promoted meritocracy, 
spurring the search for talent and ability. Cold War political and social landscape 
“produced a trend toward meritocracy of the intellectual elite and briefly aggravated 
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inequalities from the mid-1940s to the 1980s”.37 A telling illustration of these 
developments can be found in the words of John Kenneth Galbraith, who, speaking 
on the Harvard Class Day on June 11, 1975, was able to observe that “during his 
forty-one-year professional career at Harvard University… the greatest change for 
the better had been the conversion of its undergraduates from a slightly ludicrous 
aristocracy to a somewhat serious meritocracy.”38 
Increased educational attainment resulted in increased employment 
chances. On the one hand, the post-war economic boom witnessed an explosion of 
the corporate population, which grew at an average annual rate of 5.2% since 1950, 
“many times faster than the population of actual people.”39 On the other hand, as 
noted by Patterson, in the 1950s and 1960s, US employers competed fiercely for the 
few available young employees, driving up wages and accelerating promotions up 
the career ladder, so that “by the mid-1950s the average earnings of young men after 
a few years of graduation from college approached those of considerably older men,” 
creating a situation in which “as never before, a college degree literally paid off.”40 
As different from the three preceding generations, in which less than 25% of all men 
found careers as managers, officials, or in the professions, more than one-third of 
the male Americans born between 1928 and 1945 joined the new corporate 
organizations as managers or professionals, witnessing the “big jump” towards 
white-collar jobs that followed the turn-of-the-century transition from farms to 
blue-collar employment. At the same time, while most men began their careers 
immediately after school, most women found themselves employed in the “pink-
collar ghetto of clerical jobs,” or service occupations without much career 
prospects.41 Likewise, the socio-economic effects of the GI Bill and the expansion of 
higher education more generally, were highly unequal, with the benefits accruing 
primarily to white male Americans while worsening the existing class, race, and 
gender cleavages in the US society.42 
The “white-collar jump” accomplished by the post-war generation, marked a 
qualitative shift in the US social structure that can be described as the rise of the 
careerists. Of course, career employment as such was not new, having emerged in 
the 1870s with the increasing amount for clerical required by the bureaucratizing 
states and corporations, increasingly reliant on routinized collecting, storing, and 
recalling written records of the past and present activities, themselves contingent 
on discursive literacy. With the expansion of formal mass schooling, the clerical 
positions have become separated from more senior tasks, such as management, that, 
in addition to basic discursive literacy, required experience in “relating diverse 
pieces of information in an uncertain environment” and the skills “cultivated by 
modern secondary and tertiary education, either technical or searching for 
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relationships in a mass of empirical phenomena too large to memorize.”43 About 
1900, there emerged a gap between managerial positions and other specializations 
like clerical work and sales, and between the “mechanical” and “intellectual” grades 
in the civil service; the first business schools were created in the US roughly in the 
same period.44 After World War II, the expansion of secondary and tertiary 
education reinforced this separation, triggering a significant shift in the composition 
of the middle classes in the industrially developed countries. 
Michael Mann provides a useful synthesis of the sociological debate on 
middle classes, distinguishing between their three fractions: the “petite 
bourgeoisie,” owners of small, family businesses; the “careerists,” waged or salaried 
employees moving up the corporate and bureaucratic hierarchies; and 
“professionals,” “learned,” collectively organized occupations licensed by the state.45 
In other words, while different in terms of the relations of production, the middling 
groups are integrated by their shared “segmental middling participation in the 
hierarchies of capitalism and nation-state.”46 Despite the internal distances between 
the “top” and “bottom” positions within each fraction, they are bound together by 
“anticipatory socialization” and the prospects of hierarchical mobility, reflected by 
the concepts of merit and achieved status.47 Mann’s core argument states that 
“industrial capitalist society has had a middle class for about a hundred years,” 
although its composition changed over time.48 By 1900s, one group — independent 
artisans, vital during the First Industrial Revolution — was proletarianized; by the 
mid-twentieth century, the same process also encompassed the clerical, sales and 
some technical jobs without career prospects which “became filled by women 
recruited from manual jobs or from outside the workforce (as female participation 
in education and the formal labor market grew),” who did not subjectively 
experience it as proletarianization.49 In other words, throughout the twentieth 
century, the male-dominated middle class remained stable in its tripartite 
configuration. For example, the petite bourgeois remained firmly within the middle 
class, distancing itself from the working class after the proletarianization of artisans, 
declined only in relative proportions during the entire century, and unevenly across 
different sectors of the economy.50 
Careerists, the other middle-class fraction identified by Mann, is most 
relevant for the present context. Mann defines careerists as white-collar workers, 
non-manual workers, managers, civil servants, salesmen, higher technicians, and 
other people “employed within, but mobile through, the hierarchical organizations 
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of capitalist corporation and modern state bureaucracies” that distinguishes them 
from other classes and fractions. Most importantly, their “overall life chances are 
determined less by a single current job than by access to a career.”51 Mann rejects 
the notion of “managerial revolution” on the grounds that there is no significant 
difference in the goals and achievements of firms controlled by entrepreneurs and 
managers, supposedly oriented in different directions as a result of the separation 
of ownership and control. However, Mann’s analysis allows to introduce several 
tentative generalizations. First, while the separation of ownership and control in 
corporations happened before World War II, in the US, management has become an 
en masse occupation during the post-war economic boom, following the shifts in the 
occupational structure. Second, and related, the middle class as a general category 
has been present in the West since the Industrial Revolution but went through 
several qualitative changes in its composition. Thus, following Mann, the “careerist” 
ascendancy can be safely located in the post-war US and interpreted as one of the 
most available openings for a social rise at that time.52 
While the pioneering East Coast venture capital organizations endorsed the 
professionalization of management, their recruiting patterns remained relatively 
elite — in part because of their proximity to the prestigious educational institutions, 
like the Ivy League universities, and partly due to the character of the social 
networks in which the founders themselves were embedded. For example, the 
original team behind Laurance Rockefeller’s venture capital operations included 
Joseph Richardson Dilworth, a graduate of Yale University and Yale Law School, who 
served as a lawyer and an investment adviser of the Rockefeller family; Harper 
Woodward, a graduate of Harvard College and Harvard Law School who worked in 
Pentagon procurement during the war; Thaddeus Walkowicz, an MIT PhD who 
spent 11 years in the Air Force, achieving the rank of a lieutenant colonel; and 
Randolph Marston, a graduate of Lafayette College who had a career with Chase 
National Bank in New York before joining Rockefeller.53 Peter Crisp, the only new 
associate admitted during the first 15 years of Rockefeller’s venture capital 
operation, also possessed a similar social profile, being a Yale graduate and a 
Harvard MBA, and having spent three years of service as an Air Force intelligence 
officer. More importantly, Crisp considered joining the Rockefeller venture capital 
operation as an opportunity to pursue his long-standing interest in philanthropic 
activities.54 Similarly, at different stages of its history, J.H. Whitney & Co. counted 
high-ranking military officials, financiers, and politicians among its partners, while 
Doriot’s ARD likewise had to rely on the Harvard Business School talent pool, as well 
as the extended networks of “Boston civic-minded elite.”55 However, during the 
1950s, an entire “formation” of people with very different social origins began their 
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careers in venture capital investing. Thus, besides the visibly privileged path to 
venture capital — through elite boarding schools like Andover, Middlesex, and 
Hotchkiss, and college years in Yale, Princeton, or Harvard — there emerges a 
parallel story of a social rise from modest beginnings. The remainder of this chapter 
follows the trajectories of a group of such “careerists” through the significant 
milestones of their careers, and up to the point of their entry into venture capital 
business. 
Rising Tides 
Arthur Rock was born in 1926 in Rochester, New York, to a “very poor 
household.” His father was a Jewish immigrant from Russia, while his maternal 
grandparents, also Jewish, immigrated from Poland. The family owned a small candy 
store where Rock worked during his youth while attending a local public school. In 
his final high school year, Rock volunteered and spent one year in the US Army. 
When he completed the basic training program, however, the war already over. 
Having demobilized, Rock enrolled at Syracuse University on the GI Bill to study 
political science and finance.56 Without the Bill, which Rock describes as “fantastic,” 
the family would not be able to afford college.57 Upon graduation, after a one-year 
stint in the accounting department at the New York-based Vick Chemical Company, 
Rock went to Harvard Business School, having solicited a recommendation from the 
dean of the business school at Syracuse who was formally affiliated with Harvard. 
The business school experience was an opening for Rock. While the interaction with 
the fellow students coming from privileged backgrounds was partly intimidating, it 
helped Rock realize “what was possible”: “that there was another life! There’s Wall 
Street and stocks and bonds and being CEO of a company,” something he “really 
hadn’t experienced or thought of, or had no way of knowing about.”58 
Having learned about “another life” of trading pits and boardrooms, at 
Harvard Rock also acquired some of the social graces necessary for finding one’s 
way in this world: “the big contribution Harvard made to my life — the relationships 
and teaching me how to get along with all kinds of people. I didn’t know all of these 
things were possible before HBS. I just lived in a much smaller world until that 
time.”59 With a Harvard MBA at hand, and as a person “not uninterested in money, 
unlike many of his peers going to manufacturing or consulting companies, Rock 
opted for Wall Street. In 1951, he accepted the offer from New York investment firm 
Wertheim and Company, eventually moving to the investment bank Hayden, Stone 
as a security analyst. Working in the research department, Rock was responsible for 
analyzing the emerging scientific companies in the East Coast and Midwest, where 
Hayden, Stone conducted its operations. The work of junior security analysts 
included field trips, in which people like Rock would visit the companies, meet “the 
scientists” running them, and try “to figure out what they are about, and then writ[e] 
it up for stock recommendations”: 
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It got sent out to customers of the firm to see whether they would buy stock 
in those companies that I recommended. […] Trying to figure out whether 
the business is going to grow, if it’s going to be profitable, what the products 
are, what is their research going into, what kind of products, and I try to 
figure out whether they’re economically feasible and try to evaluate the 
management at all times.60 
Having developed a “natural affinity for technology-type deals” and “the 
people who were doing technology” whom he was finding “fascinating” and 
relatable, Rock started “doing quite a few small projects raising money for small 
technology companies,” so that by the late 1950s, he enjoyed a reputation of Hayden, 
Stone’s “science man.”61 In 1954, Herman Fialkov, by then the chief mechanical 
designer at the New York-based Radio Receptor Corporation, founded a new 
company, General Transistor, to manufacture germanium transistors and sell them 
to the defense contractor companies that procured the first digital computers for 
the US Army. Like Rock, four years his junior, Fialkov was a child of Jewish 
immigrants from Brooklyn and grew up on welfare during the Great Depression. He 
studied engineering at the City College of New York, served in the US Army Signal 
Corps during the war, and attended the Polytechnic University of New York on the 
GI Bill, graduating in 1951. Within two years since founding General Transistor, 
Fialkov and his colleagues made an employee buyout, and the company went public, 
with a representative of Hayden, Stone joining the board of directors.62 Soon after, 
General Transistor arranged a private offering, whereby Rock became the 
company’s “young contact person” at Hayden, Stone. 
The experience was “quite positive — everyone did well” so that, when 
shortly thereafter he learned the eight engineers working for Shockley 
Semiconductor in California, were asking for help in finding new employment, Rock, 
being “only peripherally” aware of William Shockley’s 1956 Nobel Prize in physics 
for inventing the silicon transistor, thought “that there was a possibility there.”63 
The letter was sent by Eugene Kleiner, an engineer at Shockley Semiconductor, 
whose father had an account with Hayden, Stone, operated by a colleague who knew 
that Rock was partial to the small scientific companies so that if anyone were 
interested in helping the eight engineers, it would be him. Rock went to his boss at 
Hayden, Stone, one of the firm’s partners, Alfred Coyle, suggesting that the 
proposition was worth a trip to California; Coyle agreed so much that they went 
together. Having met the scientists, Coyle and Rock suggested that instead of finding 
a new employment for the eight, they would help them start a new company, in 
which Hayden, Stone would acquire a stake. This proposition, according to Rock, 
was “extremely unusual.” 
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It was so unusual that the first thirty-five companies we went to couldn’t 
understand how it would work, how they would be able to set up a separate 
division in which the proprietors had a financial interest, how that would 
work with their present workforce, or how they would assimilate the whole 
thing. It was just beyond all their spheres of knowledge. […] My experience 
at General Transistor, certainly, gave me some confidence that what the 
seven of them wanted to do was highly doable. Silicon was a different 
medium, but it looked as though it had superior possibilities.64 
Because of the novelty of such an arrangement, Rock encountered significant 
difficulties in finding a financial backer for the new company. He approached 35 
corporations and was turned down by all of them, because they either feared the 
risks involved in the project, or were uninterested in the group’s expertise, having 
started their own research programs in silicon, or lacked the necessary experience 
for structuring such a deal outside of their field of business.65 Through a connection 
at Hayden, Stone, Rock was introduced to Sherman Fairchild, a wealthy 
entrepreneur and inventor, and a major stockholder of IBM Corporation, who 
agreed to finance the project.66 In 1957, the “Treacherous Eight,” as they became 
known thanks to Shockley’s angry phrase, formed Fairchild Semiconductor, a 
pioneering silicon transistor manufacturer and an iconic Silicon Valley company, 
launching the business careers of Gordon Moore and Robert Noyce. Like for them, 
for Rock, the experience was defining:  
I started coming out to California, to not only see what was going on there, 
but I got interested in other kinds of companies here and that then opened 
my eyes to what could be done then out here. And so a couple of years later 
I left Hayden, Stone and formed the Davis & Rock partnership.67 
The launch of Rock’s venture capital career is a particularly visible example 
of the “careerist” trajectory: having begun from modest circumstances, Rock went 
through the major milestones of the “careerist” biography, from the GI Bill to white-
collar employment on Wall Street, which enabled him to see the opportunities 
emerging in California. While Rock might have been unusually lucky, his path to 
venture capital is by no means unique. Moreover, at the end of the 1950s, the tide of 
innovation was rising not only in California. In many ways similar to that of Rock, 
the career of Charles Lea is a case in point. 
Charles Lea was born in 1927 in Richmond, Virginia, to a family of modest 
means, went to public schools, and after graduation in 1945, was immediately 
drafted, serving two years in the infantry in Guam and Korea. Returning to the US, 
he enrolled in Kenyon College in Ohio on the GI Bill, later transferring to Cornell 
University. Shortly before his graduation in 1952, Lea was recruited by the New 
York-based chemical conglomerate W.R. Grace, where he began in the mailroom but 
soon was noticed by the head of the statistical department. “Knowing the 
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vocabulary” from his Cornell training in economics, Lea spent the next six months 
as a corporate statistician, preparing the background data for the board meetings 
and working “ungodly” long hours, because of the slow pace of mechanical 
calculations and typing machines. When W.R. Grace decided to cut on its office 
expenses, the department was reorganized, forcing Lea to return to the labor 
market. Following the advice of his former boss, Lea approached John Kingsley, the 
general investment officer of the Phipps family, who at the time was in charge of 
managing a $200 million portfolio with the help of a small supporting staff. By a 
stroke of luck, it turned out that Lea and Kingsley were connected through a mutual 
acquaintance in Pittsburgh; as a result, Kingsley hired Lea as a securities analyst, 
right before his promotion to be the president of Bessemer Securities Corporation.68 
Bessemer Securities, or Bessemer Trust, was founded in 1907 by Henry 
Phipps, Jr. (1839-1930), the co-founder of Carnegie Steel.69 As the company’s 
second-largest stockholder, Phipps earned $48 for his share upon the company’s 
sale to the US Steel Corporation in 1901, and in 1907 set up the trust to manage the 
proceeds, choosing the name after the inventor of the revolutionary steel process. 
In 1911, Phipps transferred a total of $4 million in stock and bonds from Bessemer 
Investment Company in the name of his children, thus creating a family trust and 
urging the children to maintain control over the company and conserve the 
inherited wealth. By 1953, when Kingsley became president, the firm was not 
trading in stocks, managing a portfolio of long-term investments of the Phipps 
family members. As Kingsley’s assistant, Lea was initially responsible for overseeing 
various small holdings of the family members.70 Through this work and his 
closeness to Kingsley, the president, he became embedded in the East Coast financial 
elite, including the senior members of the Phipps family and New York investment 
banking community. Moreover, working at Bessemer was for Lea an opportunity to 
hone his analytical skills and develop an expertise of risk evaluation, as he gradually 
began to “get a feel, after a while, what I thought the risks were in terms of what we 
were doing; from my limited experience I could see that some things didn’t make 
any sense at all and some of them, relatively few, looked like they were pretty 
exciting opportunities.”71 As a younger associate, Lea’s responsibilities also included 
field trips, some of which exposed him to the small scientific companies emerging 
around the nation’s major scientific and technological hubs. Bessemer held 
convertible preferred stock in Farrington Manufacturing Company, a jewelry and 
eyeglass case manufacturer based in Needham, Massachusetts, that expanded into 
optical character recognition and electronics in the mid-1950s. Charged with 
overseeing this company, Lea had a chance to meet some of the scientists running 
the OCR business, as well as venture capitalists who were interested in it — in 
particular, William Elfers, Doriot’s right-hand man at the ARD Corporation. Having 
spent eight years at Bessemer, Lea acquired “an education and a half” and became 
well-connected, so that in 1961, upon Kingsley’s retirement, he was offered a 
partnership at a “small but prestigious firm,” F.S. Smithers, allowing him to “commit 
the firm to anything they cared to.” 
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While at Bessemer, Lea arranged a leveraged buyout of Acme Visible Records, 
a Virginia-based manufacturer of documents storage and retrieval equipment 
established in 1954, through which he met and “got very friendly with” Harold 
Geneen, then the senior vice-president of Raytheon, and David Margolis, Geneen’s 
“chief young lieutenant” and Raytheon’s assistant treasurer. Founded in 1922 by 
Vannevar Bush, Raytheon was a major US defense contractor, manufacturing 
weapons and military and commercial electronics. In 1959, Geneen became the CEO 
of International Telephone and Telegraph Corporation (ITT), and Margolis, 
following him, assumed the position of the ITT’s treasurer. Margolis introduced Lea 
to David Kosowsky, his first cousin, who graduated first in his class from the City 
College of New York in 1951 and earned a PhD in physics from MIT. In 1961, 
Kosowsky suggested Lea to start a company based on Kosowsky’s graduate work on 
piezoelectric sensor devices and crystal filters, in Needham, Massachusetts, where 
Lea made many connections through his involvement with Farrington 
Manufacturing company in the 1950s. 
So here I am this junior partner of Smithers on the back porch of this Jewish 
guy, who I’m very friendly with in Needham, Massachusetts. And Needham, 
as you may by now know, is one of my backyards, given that Farrington is 
right around the corner. So I go and raise the $750,000; and Dave raises 
parts from his little community; and I tap a couple of venture capital friends; 
and we get this company going.72 
Lea went on board of the newly established company, Damon Engineering. 
Being run by Kosowsky and his scientist colleagues specializing in electronics, the 
firm secured government contracts and quickly turned profitable.73  The company 
went public in 1968, underwritten by Lea’s former colleagues from F.S. Smithers and 
the investment syndicate Whyte, Weld and Company, who initially refused to pay a 
30 times price to earnings ratio demanded by Kosowsky. Damon Engineering’s 
shares were offered at 15, opened at 30, and went to 45 at the end of the IPO’s first 
day, launching Lea’s career in venture capital, where he shifted from the generic 
investment banking field.74 
Defiant Careerists 
Part of the funding for Damon Engineering came from Bessemer Securities, 
where Lea was succeeded by Peter A. Brooke, whose trajectory can be described as 
one of a “defiant patrician.” Born in 1929 in Worcester, Massachusetts, Brooke 
attended Fessenden grammar school and Phillips Exeter Academy, prestigious New 
England private schools, preparing for Harvard College, where he studied thereafter, 
from 1948 to 1952. In his final year at Exeter, Brooke attended Harvard’s 
commencement ceremonies and was deeply impressed by the speech delivered by 
General George C. Marshall on what would later become the Marshall Plan.75 In 
1953, Brooke went to the Business School and enrolled in Doriot’s Manufacturing 
course, which, however, he disliked, walking out of class in the middle of the lecture 
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and developing a strained relationship with Doriot after that. Having graduated 
from HBS, Brooke was commissioned to the US Army, joining the Army Audit Agency 
in Baltimore, but was quickly transferred to Boston. Through his auditing work, 
Brooke first became exposed to the technology companies that worked on the 
government military contracts, auditing Raytheon and Sylvania. In 1956, after 
demobilization, he joined the First National Bank of Boston via an introduction 
provided by his father-in-law. 
In the mid-1950s, First National “dominated the banking scene in New 
England” and controlled half of the region’s banking assets.76 At the bank, Brooke 
found himself bored, failing, and faced with a “bleak future.” Being the 13th largest 
bank in the country, First National concentrated on building a national profile and 
shunned the risks of funding regional technological companies spinning-off from 
MIT, which for Brooke, influenced as he was by the vision of the Marshall Plan, 
seemed an “obvious” way to industrial recovery. Six months before he became an 
officer with the bank, the credit department head told Brooke that he had a limited 
future at First National and should consider something else. Being not a “highly 
regarded” employee and growing increasingly dissatisfied with the hierarchical 
career prospects ahead of him, Brooke decided to turn his inspiration with the 
Marshall plan and the conviction that lending to technological companies was an 
“obvious” way to reanimate the war-torn economy of Massachusetts into an 
opportunity to advance his career at First National — by demonstrating that it 
would also be “the source of growth for the bank.”77 At the same time, he met two 
colleagues in the Western Division of the bank, who shared the vision of the region’s 
recovery through technology. Feeling that the idea needed some “intellectual 
underpinning,” Brooke wrote a paper suggesting that the bank could segregate 
about $20 million of its loan portfolio and lend to the new technology-based 
businesses in the area with no assets to secure as collateral, except their contract 
with the government.78 The argument worked, allowing Brooke to start “using the 
bank’s money like it was venture capital, because there were hardly any assets to 
secure. The only thing that we had to take as collateral were the contracts from these 
small companies that were supplying research to the federal government.”79 Once a 
company reached the lending limit, Brooke acted as an intermediary, relying in his 
banking connections, and brought it to the family pools of venture capital in New 
York — the Rockefeller brothers, J.H. Whitney & Co., and Bessemer Securities, 
building himself a reputation that would allow him to join the latter firm in 1961 to 
run their venture capital operation. However, it is important to note that Brooke’s 
strategy of getting access to the companies was mediated by the formal knowledge 
practices of the banking industry.  
I made a point of calling on virtually all of the companies in the technology 
area in the greater Boston area. I did that by accessing the SIC codes, the 
industrial codes of various companies in the electronics business, because 
that’s what it was: the electronics industry was the industry that was 
springing out of MIT and Harvard in late ’59 or ’60 when I was able to win 
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the account of Wang Laboratories for the bank [...] I had done a lot of 
research on the company that was available through Dunn and Bradstreet 
and also product literature. So I knew a little bit about it when I made those 
calls.80 
Thus, at the same time as Arthur Rock and Charles Lea were doing the 
fieldwork for Hayden, Stone and Bessemer Securities, seeing with their own eyes 
what perhaps was not as easily visible from the commanding heights of large 
investment firms, Brooke was likewise trying to establish a direct contact with 
technological companies and convince them to become First National’s clients by 
offering extremely favorable loan terms. In all three cases, however, the immediacy 
of direct observation was guided by the institutional practices of assembling and 
aggregating financial knowledge. If Rock, Lea, and Brooke were unusually 
perceptive, their ability to perceive was contingent on their embeddedness into the 
institutional divisions of labor and knowledge, and the proximity to the “rising tides” 
of technological innovation on which they capitalized resulted from their 
movements within organizational hierarchies. 
The career of Donald Lucas resembles a similar pattern. Born in 1928 in 
Upland, California, to a Catholic family operating a commercial ranch, Lucas went to 
a local public school and studied economics at Stanford thereafter, enrolling on an 
athletic scholarship. Having graduated in 1951, he went to Stanford Graduate School 
of Business, where he specialized in finance. Stanford served as an opening for Lucas 
to make connections in the regional financial elite. His roommate and fraternity 
brother was Bill Witter, the son of Dean Witter, who worked at his father’s firm; 
moreover, while at Stanford, Lucas had a chance to talk with Charles Blyth about a 
possible career on Wall Street, who refused to offer Lucas a job at his investment 
house and advised him to go to Wall Street instead.81 After earning his MBA, Lucas 
got a direct commission to the US Army, served in the Occupied Germany during the 
Korean War. Upon returning, Lucas was told that the Wall Street investment bank 
Smith Barney & Co. had the best training program, applied there, and was 
accepted.82 After the training, he began working for the senior partner, Charles 
Barney Harding, whose family owned a large share of the firm. At the corporate 
finance department, assisted by a secretary, Lucas assumed the role of a 
“statistician”: he was responsible for doing the “grunt labor” of preparing the data 
for sales pitches conducted by partners to get new business for the firm. The work 
was “not creative” and consisted of comparisons of different companies based on 
the statistical data on their earnings, sales growth, profitability, and similar metrics 
collected from the auditing and accounting reports. While with Smith Barney, he met 
the head of the firm’s Minneapolis office, Ken Joas, who brought to his attention the 
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newly created Control Data Corporation (CDC), a Minneapolis-based computer 
memory company that spun off from Sperry Rand Corporation in September 1957. 
At that time, not unlike Boston’s Route 128 and San Francisco Bay Area, Minnesota 
was emerging as a computing-centered industrial district.83 When Lucas attempted 
to introduce the company’s president, William Norris, to one of the senior partners 
of Smith Barney & Co., Charles W. Kennard, the latter replied that the firm was not 
interested in financing CDC. 
By that time, Lucas was getting increasingly dissatisfied with his position and 
the prospects in the firm. He enjoyed the reputation of one of the best corporate 
finance analysts, but the presence in the elite club of investment bankers “got him 
going.” During his time at Smith and Barney & Co., Lucas met William Barclay 
Harding, the brother of his boss, Charles B. Harding, who was an investment adviser 
of the Rockefeller family. Moreover, Lucas’s classmate from Stanford was working 
for William B. Harding, and Lucas had a chance to learn about the Rockefellers’ 
venture capital activities through him. Finally, Lucas “wanted to do more than 
comparisons,” and saw the opportunities created by financing such companies as 
CDC, even though he was not specifically following the developments in the 
computing field: 
But then what really got me going was the Control Data Corporation. And 
here was this guy [who] had worked for the Navy and secret aspects of the 
government to develop new computers. So I thought this was a hot deal, and 
of course it turned out to be a very hot deal. And I bought 1,000 shares. And 
it went up, a lot of money [...] Computers, by definition, they had a good 
market, and I.B.M. sold at a stratospheric price even then. So this was a new 
computer, and it worked for the government. This was good. [...] That was 
enough. And this fellow — he had led the development. It’s a simple story.84 
Two years later, Ken Joas, the head of Smith and Barney & Co.’s Minnesota 
office, brought to Lucas another deal, also connected with Sperry Rand 
Semiconductor: in May 1959, a group of eight engineers, led by Dr. Bernard J. 
Rothlein, left the semiconductor division of Sperry Rand based in New York and 
founded National Semiconductor in Danbury, Connecticut.85 Smith Barney & Co. 
refused to finance the startup, at which point Lucas decided to raise money 
privately, himself, still working for the firm.86 Capitalizing on his Stanford 
connections, Lucas raised money from William Witter and his own parents’ 
acquaintance from Minneapolis. Having arranged the financing, Lucas asked Smith 
and Barney & Co. if they would let him go on National Semiconductor’s board of 
directors. However, the firm refused, worrying about its reputation, and Lucas 
decided to quit, forsaking the possibility of a career rise, but equipped with 
investment banking experience and Wall Street connections. In late 1959, he 
accidentally met one of the firm’s investors, who told him about the formation of the 
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Draper, Gaither & Anderson in Palo Alto, California. Once again, he was helped by a 
connection developed at Smith Barney & Co.: during his time in the training 
program, Lucas met Jack Schumm, whose father was an investment adviser to H. 
Rowan Gaither, one of the founders of Draper, Gaither & Anderson, the first venture 
capital limited partnership on the West Coast. As summarized by Lucas himself, 
“who cares about connections; we just create connections.” After an interview with 
Gaither and General Anderson, Lucas joined the firm as a junior associate and the 
only person trained in finance. 
Draper, Gaither & Anderson was founded in 1959 by a trio of high ranking 
and well-connected members of the military-industrial elite of the East Coast — 
General William H. Draper, formerly a New York investment banker and the US 
Ambassador to NATO, General Frederick L. Anderson, the youngest Major General 
in the US Air Force, who worked with Draper in NATO after the war, and H. Rowan 
Gaither, a Californian lawyer and a powerful administrator of the Ford Foundation, 
who served as assistant director of the MIT Radiation Laboratory during the war, 
helped found the RAND Corporation and authored the Gaither Report, an influential 
Cold War policy document.87 Except for Lucas, the partners’ junior associates came 
from similarly well-connected backgrounds; moreover, the firm’s capital was 
provided by the Rockefeller family. However, while DG&A did indeed bring East 
Coast “funding and business practices, as well as strong military ties, into the service 
of western entrepreneurs,” this “transplantation” of networks did not happen in an 
empty environment.88 
Transplanted Networks 
Unlike in New York, where venture capital emerged after World War II as a 
“patrician” business, continuous with the tradition of patronage of the 
entrepreneurs and inventors by wealthy families, in California, the heirs of family 
fortunes also invested in new enterprises individually. One of them was Edward 
Hellman Heller, a multimillionaire scion of a local banking dynasty, who “inherited” 
the vice-presidency of Wells Fargo bank from his father after the World War I.89 
Having graduated from Harvard Law School in 1923, he worked at Wells Fargo, 
quitting in 1925 while retaining his directorship. Since then, Heller became a 
stockbroker with a San Francisco-based brokerage and investment firm 
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Schwabacher & Co., established in 1919, eventually joining the San Francisco Society 
of Security Analysts, founded in 1929. During World War II, Heller was consulting 
the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, where he met Ralph Flanders, one of the 
founders of American Research and Development Corporation and served on the 
War Surplus Property Board. After the war, Heller invested privately in aviation, 
radar, and radio ventures, like the East Coast old moneyed families of Rockefeller, 
Whitney, and Mellon. Another important source of informal venture capital on the 
Peninsula were brothers Joseph and Henry McMicking, the younger members of the 
McMicking de Ynchausti family that owned a major conglomerate company in the 
Philippines.90 Having served in the Air Force during the war, both worked in the 
financial industry of San Francisco and, like Heller, used their inherited wealth to 
invest privately in new business ventures, not necessarily technology based. 
However, unlike the “patrician” families of New York, they were acting like the 
“people who were willing to gamble,” rather than as socially responsible patrons.91 
Nevertheless, the take-off of venture capital in California was largely carried 
out by a different group of people, who, while coming from well-established local 
families with roots in the region stretching back to the late nineteenth century and 
listed on the San Francisco Social Register, moved along the “careerist” trajectory. 
While being employed in the local financial industry, these people organized into an 
informal network, calling themselves “The Group,” and operating in the interstices 
between formal organizations. William Bowes, Jr. (1926-2016) was born in San 
Francisco to a well-established family of educated professionals, attended a local 
public school with a “pipeline to Stanford,” where he enrolled in 1943 to study 
chemical engineering.92 A year after he was drafted and served in the US Army 
Infantry in the Philippines and Occupied Japan, returning to the university and 
switching to economics. In 1946, together with the returning servicemen enrolling 
to Stanford on the GI Bill, Bowes entered the largest freshmen class the university 
would have for the next 25 years, together with Reid Dennis, another member of 
“The Group.” Also a native Californian, Dennis came from a family of means, 
attended a prestigious private school Thatcher, and in 1944 was accepted to 
Stanford, but volunteered for the Navy, spending two years in the military as a radio 
technician and returning to the university to study electrical engineering. Having 
completed their undergraduate studies, Bowes went to Harvard Business School, 
attracted by its reputation, while Dennis, realizing his lack of abilities to be a 
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“creative engineer,” enrolled in the Stanford Graduate School of Business.93By the 
early 1950s, they began their careers in the local financial industry. 
Although Dennis was initially exposed to high technology investing through 
his family’s connection with Ampex Corporation, it was his career employment in 
the financial industry of San Francisco that allowed him to build on that. Having 
completed his business school degree, in 1952, Dennis was hired by Fireman’s Fund 
Insurance Company that was looking “to take somebody who knows something 
about engineering and teach him something about investments,” rather than vice 
versa. He began in the investment department as a security analyst trainee, working 
under Fred H. Merrill, an insurance professional and a member of the local security 
analysts’ society who became the company president in 1962.94 Like Arthur Rock, 
who was starting on Wall Street at the same time, Dennis became involved in the 
routine tasks of data collection via field trips: 
Security analysis in those days was quite different than what it later 
became. But nevertheless, he [Merrill] just wanted, whatever training I got, 
it was primarily field trips. At that time I would say more than almost 
anything else it was—we made an awful lot of investment decisions based 
on our appraisals of the management of these companies and whether we 
thought they were doing a good job as well as, of course, the markets for 
their products. You wanted to have good sales and so forth. But it wasn’t a 
really very formal training program. It was more or less on-the-job 
training.95 
Perceiving Dennis’s interest in small technological companies, Merrill 
allowed him to visit them during the regular business trips to the Fireman’s primary 
objects of interest — big industrial firms like General Electric, Westinghouse, or 
Radio Corporation of America. Merrill’s rationale was that, by “visiting the xyz 
company or the abc company,” Dennis would be able to learn about the factors that 
could potentially affect Fireman’s investments in the industrial companies. 
Moreover, Dennis had a competitive advantage of being the only person with an 
engineering background in San Francisco financial district, and soon he started 
receiving calls from brokerage houses and other financial organizations, asking him 
to consult them on the projects of technology companies that were approaching 
them in increasing numbers — “the guys with a black box.” Like Rock at Hayden, 
Stone, Dennis became Montgomery Street’s “science man.” 
A year after Dennis began his career at Fireman’s, Bowes returned to San 
Francisco from Harvard and took a job at the local investment bank Blyth & Co., “a 
small, high-quality investment banking firm” and a major client of Fireman’s Fund, 
starting at the trading desk and later becoming involved in mergers and initial public 
offerings. By the mid-1950s, Blyth & Co. rose to the status of a “premier investment 
banking firm up and down the [West] coast” and one of the nation’s top investment 
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banks, with 24 offices and 700 employees across the country, and pursued a more 
aggressive approach compared to its rival, focusing on unlisted securities and 
“special situations,” including the “space-age” and electronics companies in which 
Charles R. Blyth was personally interested, serving on the board of directors of 
Hewlett-Packard.96 Under his leadership, Blyth & Co. became one of the corporate 
sponsors of Stanford Research Institute, established in 1947.97 Through his work at 
Blyth & Co., Bowes had “opportunities to consult with all kinds of corporate people 
up and down the coast,” eventually becoming exposed to the local electronics 
industry and developing “close, but not intimate relationships” with the people 
running these companies: “Just as a part of looking for business for the firm, I was 
spending quite a bit of time in Silicon Valley, starting in about 1955 or so. [...] I got 
to know quite a few people that were in the companies,” and it “seemed like it was 
going to be interesting.”98 At the same time, being with Blyth & Co., Bowes became a 
member of the “little exclusive club” of local financiers, getting to know Heller and 
Joseph McMicking.99 In 1957, Paul M. Cook, a chemist trained at MIT working at the 
Stanford Research Institute (SRI), founded Raychem, a radiation chemistry 
company, as a spin-off from the SRI, together with James B. Meikle and Richard W. 
Muchmore. Bowes’ classmate from Harvard Business School took a job in the newly 
established startup, suggesting him to invest. Bowes went on Raychem’s board, 
which gave him “more reason to be down in the valley.”100 Moreover, it is likely that 
through Raychem, he met General Anderson, who, having moved to California after 
the war, was the second-largest investor of the company after Cook himself.101 By 
the time DG&A was established, Bowes had enough of a reputation and expertise to 
be invited to consult the partners on their technological investments, evaluate their 
portfolio, and report on performance, thereby becoming part of a transregional 
investment network. During the following two decades, while working at the bank, 
he assumed the role of an independent venture investor, intermediating between 
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the companies around Stanford University and the formal and informal pools of 
capital to which he had access through the Blyth & Co. network: finding the 
“situations worth doing” and “rounding up the money from various sources… in and 
out of an office here in the Bank of America building.”102 
In 1957, Bowes received a call from William Edwards, his friend from 
Stanford and Harvard, who had inherited considerable wealth from his father’s oil 
company and began to invest privately while working for Standard Oil of California. 
Edwards was looking for a broker; Bowes recommended his colleague from Blyth & 
Co., John Bryan. Like Edwards, Bryan was a graduate of Stanford and attended 
Harvard Business School while training for his service as a Navy supply officer. After 
the war, Bryan worked for the retail company established by his great-grandfather 
in 1886, Maxwell Hardware Company, ultimately becoming a CEO and eventually 
liquidating the firm. In the late 1950s, he joined Bowes at Blyth & Co.103 In 1959, 
Edwards quit Standard Oil and went to work for the local office of the New York 
money management firm, Lionel D. Edie, where he met Daniel J. MacGanney, Jr. Like 
the rest of “The Group” members, McGanney was a native Californian, a war veteran, 
and a Stanford graduate. In 1957 he opened the first West Coast office of Lionel D. 
Edie & Co., an investment consulting firm he directed until Merrill Lynch bought it 
in 1969. Like Heller and McMicking, in the 1950s, McGanney resided in Atherton, a 
wealthy elite incorporated town near Stanford University and the scientific 
companies like Raychem emerging around it.104 McGanney, Edwards, and Bryan 
joined Bowes and Dennis, and by the late 1950s, “The Group” got together. As 
summarized by Dennis, “we just knew each other. We were all about the same age; 
we all worked in the financial district.”105 
While “The Group” operated informally, it relied heavily on the connections 
the members developed in their capacity of employees working in the local financial 
institutions. A group member would receive a call from a broker approached by an 
entrepreneur, who would then be invited to meet “The Group” for lunch and explain 
the project. As full-time employees, “The Group” members had to meet on weekends 
or holidays and restrict their scope of attention to the proposals coming from the 
local entrepreneurs. After the pitch, the entrepreneur was asked to wait outside of 
the restaurant until “The Group” arrived at a collegial decision, which was then 
explained to the entrepreneur by one of the members.106 As affluent individuals, 
“The Group” could raise as much as $80,000 around the table, which was enough as 
a startup capital: it was possible to “start a company down here on the peninsula for 
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anywhere from $250,000 to $350,000.”107 During the next ten days, all five group 
members would raise the rest of the money by “going back to our offices” and calling 
“various hangers-on and camp-followers that worked in these brokerage firms,” but 
also the partners of the recently established Draper, Gaither & Anderson. By Dennis’ 
estimate, operating in this manner, over the period from the mid-1950s to mid-
1960s, they backed 25 “little companies down the peninsula,” 18 of which “were 
wildly successful,” “a couple” returned the amount invested, and only three resulted 
into “big losses,” creating a “very, very high success ratio” which “really made the 
venture capital business highly successful” and eventually prompted the members 
of “The Group” to engage into it full-time. While Dennis and Bowes stayed with their 
employers while investing informally until the 1970s, Bryan, Edwards, and 
McGanney formed separate organizations in the early 1960s. 
 
Conclusion 
By the end of the 1950s, the tides of innovation were rising not only in 
California. If “The Group” mediated between the emerging technological cluster 
centered around Stanford University and the financial institutions of San Francisco, 
people like Charles Lea and Peter Brooke assumed similar roles on the other side of 
the country, arranging financings for small technology companies around MIT On 
the other hand, Donald Lucas, before coming back to California to join Draper, 
Gaither & Anderson, became exposed to the nascent computer industry in 
Minnesota, while working at Smith and Barney, and Arthur Rock, in his capacity of a 
junior security analyst, was likewise following and visiting the small technological 
companies around New York and Midwest, thereby gaining the knowledge 
unavailable from the commanding heights of the capital market — by meeting and 
relating to the “scientists” running these firms. In the financial environment of the 
1950s, such exposure could mean an important competitive advantage. William 
Hambrecht provides perhaps the best summary of the history reconstructed in this 
chapter: 
it was very clear that Wall Street didn’t understand, really, what was 
happening. Nor did they particularly want to, because it was very small. 
These companies were half a dozen people getting together. Wall Street, 
particularly in the fifties, was quite conservative. The premium was always 
on the very large, established companies.108 
Like Rock and Lea, Hambrecht, born in 1935 in New York in a “typical middle-
class environment,” did not inherit any considerable wealth that would provide a 
route into venture capital investing. He studied at Princeton on a football 
scholarship and, shortly after graduation, took a job at a small investment firm 
owned by a friend’s uncle. Yet, crucially, the firm was based at Cape Canaveral, 
Florida, the Cape Canaveral Air Force Station location, one of the sites of 
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development of the missile program that, by 1957, when Hambrecht arrived there, 
“was the start of the technology world.”109 During the next three years, Hambrecht 
was engaged in the IPO and private placements work, building a small portfolio of 
digital computing startups and, like Dennis in San Francisco and Rock in New York, 
developing “a reputation, in theory, of understanding the early computer business”: 
I would be the first to admit I still don’t understand the science, but I did 
make some wonderful friendships and contacts in Florida with some of the 
early scientific people that had developed the whole missile program. [...] I 
met some really interesting people. Several of them became real mentors, 
almost through my whole life, and I was just very fortunate to be exposed 
to that kind of program and those kinds of people […] So it was probably 
inadvertent, but yes, I was there really to learn what the technology people 
were doing and then see if I could relate it to Wall Street and find them some 
money.110 
In short, the “careerist” route to venture capital was to a large extent 
“inadvertent,” as Hambrecht puts it: moving along the organizational hierarchies, 
they happened to be close to what Braudel describes as the “rising tides” of 
innovation. However, the process of opportunity recognition was not immediate but 
inscribed into the practices of knowledge generation and distribution and intra-
organizational divisions of labor, adopted by their employers — large financial 
institutions. While knowledge of, and friendship with, people — “technology people” 
— could have been sufficient for the individual forays into high-technology 
investing, such an approach could hardly become what Max Weber called 
“permanent capitalistic enterprise,” irreducible to a collection of of “purely 
occasional ventures” and “individual transactions.”111 Moreover, as the individual 
histories surveyed in this chapter suggest, for a “careerist” who, in the words of 
Petersmeyer, “may not be prepared to lose all of his money,” the ability to tap into 
institutional resources was crucial, creating a challenge of translating one’s 
conviction in the vitality and profitability of an investment into a small technological 
company around the corner into a proposition that would be intelligible for a 
financial institution. How “careerists” and others met this challenge is the topic 
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Chapter IV. Financial Singularities 
 
Our capitalist, we should not forget, stood at a certain level in social life and usually 
had before him the decisions, advice and wisdom of his peers. He judged things 
through this screen. 
Fernand Braudel, The Wheels of Commerce 
 
Introduction 
In 1950, Shelby Cullom Davis, head of the New York-based investment firm 
Shelby Cullom Davis & Company, specializing in insurance securities, published a 
paper “Our Mid-20th Century Capitalists” in The Analysts Journal, the primary 
printed publication of the aspiring profession of securities analysts, established two 
years earlier. Davis offered the readers an updated summary of the findings, which 
resulted from the study prepared by his firm for the Judiciary Committee of the US 
Senate and the Committee on Joint Economic Report of the 81st US Congress. 
Presented publicly for the first time, the study analyzed, in a case-by-case manner, 
the largest life insurance firms of the country, the “ruling mid-20th century 
capitalists,” as Davis put it. 
Though their size may be breathtaking compared with our “big money” 
investors of the ’20s, their market forays are far more cautious. Their 
“plunges” in the stock market are as remote as the plunging neckline. They 
are neither bulls nor bears on stocks. They are, however, bears on money. 
They have seen its value decline and decline as their bonds have risen and 
risen in value.1 
By 1949, 100 largest US life insurance companies had $43.6 billion in total 
assets and investing more than $2.5 million in real estate, mortgages, bonds, and 
stocks.2 Having reviewed the “Big Seven” companies with assets over $2 billion, 
Davis concluded that an imaginary “foreign correspondent,” unfamiliar with the 
ongoing changes in the US capital markets, might well wonder “who is holding the 
basket for whom — the life companies as our mid-20th century capitalists for the 
economy as a whole or the economy as a whole for our new ruling investor class.”3 
The growth of institutional investors, including insurance companies, 
pension funds, and mutual funds, was “perhaps the most significant development in 
the postwar period” of the American finance: these entities, having accumulated 
“enormous amounts of assets that had to be invested,” eventually became one of the 
central elements of the country’s financial system.4 In the early 1950s, these 
developments did not escape the eye of their perhaps most observant public — 
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financial analysts. In 1968, Armand G. Erpf, one of the leading voices of the Wall 
Street’s “knowledge industry,” looking at the changes of the previous two decades, 
observed that the emergence and “tremendous growth” of the pension funds created 
a “new kind of “abstract” ownership of common stocks,” acting on behalf of the 
anonymous masses of investors and beneficiaries, having concentrated the 
decision-making “in the hands of a relatively small number of managers” at the same 
time.5 At the start of the 1950s, however, these processes elicited occasional 
criticisms. In 1950, The Analysts Journal published an anonymous article, offering 
“some self-criticism of institutional investing.”6 The criticism was targeted at the 
decision-making procedures adopted by institutional investors, whose policies 
were determined by the elected investment committees empowered to closely 
supervise the individual transactions. For Menippus, this situation appeared 
“anomalous,” because 
An integral part of the business functioning of the institution, instead of 
being carried on by the presumably competent professional staff and 
officers, is being administered in detail by a part of the management which 
normally, in other respects, exercises only a supervision of general policies. 
[...] Where once it might reasonably have been assumed that a prudent man, 
familiar with business practices, would be competent to invest not only 
honestly but competently, large volumes of funds, only the former of these 
assumptions now appears valid.7 
Menippus suggested further that the increasing complexity of financial 
regulation and a “frighteningly dynamic economy” have jointly rendered 
investments “a professional field in which the business or professional man 
untrained in this line finds himself quite out of his depth. Often, he does not realize 
this and, if he did, would be embarrassed to disqualify himself from occupying such 
a position of prestige and power.”8 The increasing decoupling of the decision-
making authority from the skilled craft of “investment specialists” was potentially 
harmful, tending to encourage inaction and trigger preoccupation with “quality at 
any price” to the neglect of “value,” the emphasis on which was “basic to good 
investment results.”9 Nevertheless, Menippus hoped that the same decoupling 
process could inadvertently increase the professional status of “investment 
analysts,” whose competence, indispensable for the investment committees of large 
financial institutions, justified “their being treated more nearly on a parity with 
engineers, lawyers, and similar professional specialists than is currently the case.”10 
He concluded by suggesting that the committees, legally endowed with 
responsibility for setting the institutional investment policies’ broad objectives, 
should delegate their implementation to the “professional investment men” — 
portfolio managers, investment buyers, and security analysts. If institutional 
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investors did indeed replace the pre-war “big money” capitalists, it fell on the 
“professional investment men” to guide their “more cautious market forays,” 
navigating the markets on behalf of this “new ruling investor class.”11 
Menippus might have overestimated the opportunity for professionalization 
of investment analysis offered by the rise of institutional investing. However, he 
certainly spotted the emergence of an important pattern: the advent of the 
organized actors on the post-war American financial scene triggered an increasing 
bureaucratization of the financial industry, challenging “entrepreneurial and 
individualistic forms of competition based on personal and diffuse skills” that 
prevailed before the war.12 At the same time, by inscribing these diffused skills and 
financial knowledge into organizational hierarchies and divisions of labor, it created 
opportunities for the aspiring “careerists” at the bottom level of large financial 
institutions, like Reid Dennis, Arthur Rock and other characters of the previous 
chapter, to capitalize on their proximity to the emerging technological companies, 
too small to be legible from the commanding heights of the capital market. On the 
other hand, as career employees of the large financial institutions, people like 
Dennis and Rock had to adopt the categories of their employers to be able to tap into 
the capital of these “mid-20th century capitalists.” Acting on behalf of these 
organizations, they had to project organizational categories and classifications onto 
the people, technologies, and companies they found “in the field,” and, conversely, 
the opportunities they recognized had to be rendered intelligible for the 
organizations. During the 1950s and the better part of the 1960s, when “venture 
capital” as practiced by Doriot and Whitney struggled to gain acceptance as a profit-
making business in the East Coast, while being unknown in California, Dennis, Rock 
and others relied on a different set of categories, acting as an interface between 
organizational classifications and field observation. 
In 1960, having spent eight years as a security analyst and investment officer 
at the Fireman’s Fund Insurance Company while investing with “The Group” as a 
sideline activity, Reid Dennis managed to convince his boss, Fred H. Merrill, to let 
the fund invest in a privately held technological company, Recognition Equipment 
Corporation, that was developing a new optical character reader in Dallas, Texas. 
Dennis had to present the proposition to the Fireman’s investment committee, 
which consisted of the six members of the board of directors. As predicted by 
Menippus, only one of the six had some exposure to investing: A. Crawford Greene, 
a leading San Francisco attorney, who was “very close to one of the big banks in New 
York.”13 According to Dennis’ recollection, 
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He’d come down on the table, “Well, at the bank we’re doing this,” or that or 
something else. Well, by talking to the analysts at the lower levels in the 
bank, we would know damn well that the bank wasn’t doing that at all! But 
nevertheless, the investment committee was a gentleman’s club, and if they 
hadn’t heard of—if you presented something to them and they had never 
heard the name before [...] A company, a company name, and they had never 
heard the name of this company before, it by definition became what was 
called “a special situation.” And special situations were things that nobody 
knew anything about except maybe some of us at the lower level. And that 
is what eventually became known as venture capital […] exception to the 
standard practice, because here was this fancy investment committee and 
none of them knew anything about it other than what they got from the 
junior analysts who were sitting around the table.14 
Dennis’ experience illustrates the point. In the 1950s, the category of “special 
situations” was the immediate predecessor of “venture capital,” referring broadly to 
any exception to the standard practices of institutional investing. However, it is 
important to note that for Dennis, who acted in his capacity as a “junior analyst at 
the lower level,” “special situations” served as a means of rendering his field 
observations intelligible for his superiors at Fireman’s Fund. Having been 
authorized by his boss to visit small technology companies while on business trips 
for Fireman’s, by 1960, Dennis had accumulated considerable experience observing 
and analyzing these companies as potential — and, for “The Group,” also actual — 
investment outlets. However, to engage an organization in this type of investing, and 
to be able to tap into its capital, in effect syndicating the investment with his 
employer, Dennis had to rely on the classifications and categories that were 
understandable to the latter. 
This chapter continues the argument of the previous one, switching the gears 
from social history to archaeology of financial knowledge in order to attend to the 
intellectual underpinnings of early venture capital — as practiced by the “careerists” 
like Dennis and Rock, rather than “patricians” and elites like Whitney and Doriot. 
Much like modern finance more generally, venture capital “emanated from a 
disparate range of practices, theories, and agendas and only gradually coalesced… 
into an identifiable set of activities and intuitions.”15 This chapter explores one site 
of such emergence — namely, financial analysis — by following the category of 
“special situations,” which frequently occurs in the way early venture capitalists 
talked about themselves during the industry’s formative decades. Entering the Wall 
Street professional vocabulary after the Great Depression, it survived to this day, 
although now being devoid of the venture capital related connotations. This chapter 
attempts to show that in the 1950s and 1960s, its vagueness and residual character 
proved to be an asset for an emerging industry of venture capital investment, 
allowing its current association with high technology to emerge. More specifically, 
this chapter argues that the open and inclusive character of this category allowed 
finance professionals and early venture capitalists to make the new technologies of 
the time — namely, the fledgling electronics industry and the Space Age 
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technologies more generally — to become recognizable, or “legible,” for the 
institutional finance and formal stock market. 
Market Categories and Legibility 
Sociologists have recently argued that markets, like states, rely on specific 
forms and technologies of “vision” that allow to “make societies more legible,” e.g., 
by categorizing individuals into quantified credit scores that generate, rather than 
simply reproduce, social inequalities.16 Arguably, the analysis of such attempts to 
impose legibility can be extended beyond the later decades of the 19th century, 
when the credit scoring originated, and its focus expanded beyond the issues of 
access and closure.17 Market actors themselves rely upon, create and reinterpret 
categories of goods, assets, firms, and investment opportunities, thereby reducing 
uncertainty and creating the possibility for calculation.18 In financial markets, one 
group of actors is particularly powerful with regard to creation and 
(re)interpretation of market categories — financial analysts. Recent literature in the 
social studies of finance suggests that analysts can construct “calculative frames” 
and invent new categories that can redirect investment flows.19 Thus, it was argued 
that purposeful positioning of the notion of “emerging markets” as more stable and 
predictable than the rival category of “developing economies,” helped to attract the 
investors’ attention to the BRICS countries in the early 2000s.20 Arguably, in the 
decades before the increasing mathematization of finance spurred by the 
development of financial economics, analysts and their categories might have been 
even more consequential.21 
In the 1950s and 1960s, two competing branches of market research were 
the dominant form of the stock market expertise: conducted by “qualitative 
practitioners (chartists and fundamental analysts).”22 Technical analysis, or 
“chartism,” having emerged in the latter decades of the 19th century with the 
introduction of the stock ticker that allowed for aggregation of dynamic price data, 
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“concerned itself with price changes and trading volume.”23 Its more recent 
counterpart, the so-called fundamental analysis, whose emergence was facilitated 
by the requirement of disclosure of corporate information24 stipulated in the 
Securities and Exchange Acts of 1933-4, is characterized by a form of “essentialism,” 
emphasizing the necessity to look beyond the market price and investigate the 
“intrinsic value” of the stocks by a close analysis of the company.25 For a 
fundamentalist, “reading” the market by following quantitative changes in trading 
volume and prices does not make much sense, at least unless a thorough 
consideration of the underlying “fundamentals” had been conducted. In words 
ascribed to Bernard Baruch, nobody can know whether the stock market is high or 
low at any given time — in terms of price, a fundamentalist would add, but not in 
terms of value. Thus, “the role of the analyst is to determine an intrinsic value, and 
then, it is hoped to predict a future market price.”26 
Fundamental analysis also differed from its counterparts by virtue of having 
an indisputable classic — Benjamin Graham and David Dodd’s influential Security 
Analysis (1934), also known as the “Bible of the Wall Street,” which first codified the 
practice of security analysts.27 Since then, “security analysis” was roughly 
synonymous with fundamental analysis: “The study of past price action is what 
differentiates the market technician from the security analyst or fundamentalist. The 
latter is engaged in the analysis of various data concerning individual companies… 
earnings, dividends and finances along with products, prospects, changes in 
technology and so on.”28 As Brine and Poovey have argued, Graham and Dodd’s 
approach was self-consciously commonsensical, a practical art, rather than a 
systematic body of knowledge.29 Today it is also often described as a form of 
vocational expertise, almost by definition devoid of any trace of scientific 
exactitude.30 Indeed, Graham and Dodd themselves say as much in the preface to 
their famous volume: “investment by its very nature is an exact science,” but a field 
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similar to law and medicine, where “both individual skill (art) and chance are 
important,”31  showing that “while not a science, [security analysis] could be 
systematized and taught.”32 Conceiving their version of stock market expertise in 
the late 1920s, Graham and Dodd did not intend to challenge any competing, more 
“scientific” body of expertise, nonexistent at that time — even in economics more 
broadly.33 Hence, to view security analysis as a merely “pre-scientific” and purely 
descriptive stage in the linear development of modern financial theory is justified 
only with hindsight. The very persistence of Grahamian approach, now more often 
referred to as “value investing,” to this day, suggests that it should better be 
characterized as an instance of “immature science” that passed the “threshold of 
epistemologization,” but got stuck at the edge of “formalization.”34 
A Verbal Tradition 
Indeed, in the 1960s, many of its practitioners embraced the same ongoing 
developments that brought about quantitative finance.35 First, it was the ascendancy 
of “applied economics” and diffusion of the intellectual achievements of wartime 
intelligence and planning efforts into the academic realm that gained economic 
knowledge “increasing prestige and legitimacy within the academy and the business 
schools” during the 1950s.36 Second, scope and quality of economic and financial 
data gathered by corporate and governmental bureaucracies kept increasing, in part 
thanks to the introduction of new technological solutions. For example, in 1964, the 
introduction of the electronic stock ticker, or of computerized Electronic Systems 
Center, enabled production of the half-hourly index of all common stock listed in the 
New York Stock Exchange Big Board.37 Finally, the application of computer power 
to the calculative processes on the market was consequential not only for practice, 
but also for theory. MacKenzie observes that “by 1964, there was a sufficient body 
of work on the random character of stock-market prices to fill a 500-page collection 
of readings.”38 Still, two years later it was judged as “a view in conflict with views 
generally advanced by stock market theorist.”39 Moreover, analysts were 
appreciative of the latest developments in quantitative finance.40 A distinguished 
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member of the Institute of Chartered Financial Analysts wrote in a review of the 
recent work on the random character of stock prices: 
We believe that the central professional premises of financial analysis 
remain intact. […] for investors or speculators it is unimportant whether the 
traveling of stock prices towards the valuation area follows a path of chance 
or a systematic pattern. They are interested in practical results. They know 
that new opportunities are constantly created by the ceaseless stream of 
economic change. It offers a never ending flow for exercising the 
professional skills of competent financial analysts.41 
Thus, modern finance theory did not simply supplant security analysis, and 
stock market research more generally, as pre-scientific forms of expertise; instead, 
it changed the configuration of the epistemic field of finance, and even these changes 
were only beginning to be felt in the 1960s.42 Addressing the New York Society of 
Security Analysts in 1963, Benjamin Graham expressed confidence in the future of 
the profession and praised its growing numbers and influence: “Would it be an 
exaggeration to say that the greater part of security transactions today are based to 
some degree on work done by Financial Analysts?”43 By the end of the decade, the 
“Wall Street research industry” flourished, praising the availability of new data and 
the growing sophistication of security analysts, increasingly trained in business 
schools, and was planning for the adoption of the new analytical techniques to be 
introduced by computer power, hailed as “a virtual revolution in the mechanics of 
handling transactions.”44 In a paper on the “new American capitalism,” Armand G. 
Erpf, a partner with the New York-based brokerage firm, Carl M. Loeb, Rhoades & 
Co., wrote that “the American market… is broad, liquid, better documented than any 
other the world… and the economic data and statistics for the country as a whole 
are more precise and more up to date than those of any other economy.”45 
As noted by Knorr-Cetina, paradoxically, the security analysis profession is 
based not on the shortage, but on the abundance of information.46 At the end of the 
1960s, three decades after the New Deal disclosure regulation unleashed the stream 
of corporate information that could be studied, the analysts have found themselves 
amid a new “avalanche of printed numbers”: the proliferation of statistical studies 
of prices and records of earnings and dividends that provided “more information 
about securities markets than we have ever had before”.47 Lois Stone of Hayden, 
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Stone, Inc., wrote in 1968 that over the last 30 years “the giant financial publishing 
industry had achieved most of its growth,” coming “a long way from the time when 
corporate figures were the exclusive preserve of the “insiders.”48 Having their 
information-gathering activities “directed toward the whole… corporate and 
economic activity,” the research departments of major Wall Street firms operated in 
a manner “not unlike… Intelligence in a military organization.”49 With the US 
government emerging as “the greatest data-collector in history,” and having dozens 
of other sources of information at his disposal (including “market letters,” corporate 
reports, trade press outlets and specialized subscription services), the analyst was 
supposed to “skip more or less lightly from one source to another” to gain an insight 
into the agendas of the market opinion-makers and pick up some “leads” to 
commence a more serious study of a particular company, group of stocks, or 
“situation.”50 The study would then involve collecting information from all available 
sources, including publicly available data from the Wall Street’s “library without 
walls,” interviews with financial and operating executives of the company of 
interest, attending board meetings or special meetings organized by the corporate 
officials for security analysts, forging sufficient personal contact with relevant 
regulators and “the corporation itself” by visiting it in person.51 Combining his 
specialized knowledge of the industry and its economics, and applying “experience, 
insight, and flair,” the analyst must be able “to interpret the events as they occur” 
and reach the correct conclusions of the company’s capability and performance to 
make timely buy, hold or sell recommendations on their basis.52 The largest 
research departments of the 1960s produced from 20 to 30 publications in a single 
day, ranging from the lists of recommended securities, summaries, and background 
papers to institutional reports (studies) devoted to specific firms or industries and 
their summary versions for individual clients.53 
A desirable profile of a Wall Street analyst in the 1960s included a business 
school degree, along with a combination of analytical and sales-related skills, as well 
as a specialization in a particular industry that he had pursued long enough to 
establish a thorough familiarity with its “operations and economics: size of the 
market and traditional growth rate; prevailing profit margins in good years and bad; 
average return on invested capital; characteristic dividend payout; prospective 
growth in the years ahead,” as well as with the relevant political and regulatory 
context.54 Most important of all, however, was the analyst’s capacity of judgment. 
Even though the profession looked forward to the new kinds of economic expertise 
coming out of the business schools, new streams of data and new calculative tools 
to make sense of them, this form of financial knowledge envisioned its purpose in a 
way that sidelined these developments and saved some room for the implicit 
entrepreneurialism of security analysis mentioned above. This entrepreneurial 
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element is visible in the analysts’ cautious embrace of the computing power. As 
noted by Charles J. Rolo, a senior analyst and account executive at H. Hentz & Co.: 
Security analysis, though it is emulating the scientific method, is forced to 
concern itself in part with the human factor and with major imponderables 
and to make certain judgments which are necessarily subjective. After all, 
you cannot put a stock in a test tube. And the staggering capabilities of the 
computer, though they can be helpful to investors, still fall far short of 
clairvoyance.55 
In my view it is unlikely that the computer will displace the informed 
judgment of the trained analyst, partly because of the crucial problem, 
alluded to earlier, of evaluating the personal qualities of the management 
team.56 
In the late 1960s, computers were “coming into increasing use” in the 
research departments,57 connoting a clear association with the fields of science and 
engineering,58 even though their use was to a large extent confined to handling the 
record-keeping, dissemination of trading information and surveillance 
procedures.59 Though useful, computers have been conceived as helpful only with 
dealing with “quantitative stuff,”60 compiling comparative statistics and processing 
raw data, thus saving the analyst’s time for “low-grade moron work.”61 Thus, at best, 
computers would be most helpful for the technical analysis, forecasting trading 
volume and prices,62 but the analyst “cannot hope to be truly scientific because it is 
concerned with the qualitative as well as quantitative judgments, and it is forced to 
deal with portentous imponderables.”63 Hence the emphasis Maynard puts on what 
Knorr-Cetina calls “proxy ethnography”64 conducted by fundamental analysts: 
Most importantly, he [the analyst] must have earned the confidence of a 
wide range of persons in the industry or industries in which he specializes. 
He achieves this relationship by visits to corporate executives in their 
offices, by attendance at industry conventions, by participating in group 
industry tours, and the like. A close personal relationship of this kind is 
desirable for two reasons. First, it is the soundest method of gaining insight 
into the qualities of management, which, after all, are a force even more 
important than economics in the success or failure of businesses.65 
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Maynard’s second point related to the opportunities of getting timely inside 
notices enabled by a personal contact with the company representatives, useful for 
anticipating the daily price movements (the primary concern of the technical 
analyst); however, the qualities of the company management — not in terms of its 
corporate governance structure,66 but qua people — is the best proxy to the 
fundamental success or failure of businesses. “The security analyst is profoundly 
concerned with the human factor, a zone in which judgments must of necessity be 
highly subjective,” preventing his working hypotheses from becoming “scientific.”67 
The abundance of data did not make the qualified judgment obsolete but 
necessitated it. No analyst or investor can keep up with the “flood of research studies 
that are available,” often for free; hence what is valuable is the “research work” that 
justifies the high salaries of senior analysts and allows their clients to profit from 
timely recommendations: 
Because of the present-day size of institutional portfolios, a million-dollar 
shift from one stock to another is a fairly common occurrence… These 
research costs are still low in relation to the profit potential…The total 
amount of money spent on all these services, and on others less well known, 
must be tremendous, and nobody can say whether it is well spent or not. 
The right advice is worth a fortune on Wall Street, but there is no accepted 
measure of what is right and what is wrong.68 
Finding out the “intrinsic value” is a process of discovery, “a perception of the 
future values and potentialities not discounted in present market prices,”69 “this is 
the true function of entrepreneurship in every field — to deploy the artistic 
intuitions of the mind and knowledge gained from experience within a framework 
of hard fact.”70  The division of labor within research departments corresponded to 
this understanding of the essence and purposes of security research. Senior analysts 
were distinguished as capable of the right judgment, as well as of expressing it in 
compelling writing; junior analysts were supposed to do the routine communication 
and data processing work which can also be outsourced to econometricians, 
statisticians or experts on some particularly complex or novel industries (like drugs, 
electronics, or antitrust matters); junior analysts may also be charged “with the 
responsibility for following the smaller and less important companies in an 
industry.”71 
Notably, some of the leading analysts of the time described their profession 
as a species of literary career or journalism, emphasizing the editing and writing 
skills, creativity and imagination: “the research departments of the larger firms are, 
in effect, in the publishing business.”72 Similar to Graham, the “father” of security 
analysis, who resembled the image of a humanistic intellectual, rather than a 
narrowly professionalized expert, most of the contributors to the 1968 symposium 
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of “top-flight Wall Street professionals”73 were “financial men of letters,” with much 
of their career (and sometimes also education) devoted to publishing, writing 
columns, editing, journalism, and similar activities.74 A long enough experience of 
reading analytical publications — the Wall Street’s research industry’s main output 
— and trade press was considered a sufficient education in economics).75 Even 
though many research departments employed economists in charge of making 
forecasts “of the overall course of the economy” and doing econometric studies, “the 
most notable part of the output of a research department is not its statistical 
calculations and recapitulations of the record, but its appraisals of the future, that 
is, its forecasts” concerning specific stocks.76 The conventional wisdom held that 
formally trained economists are no better than anyone else in this respect; hence 
their training had no advantage.77 Adopting Mary Morgan’s distinction, security 
analysis of the time could be contrasted to quantitative finance as a “verbal 
tradition,”78 and in a quite literal sense, since the primary form of the analysts’ 
“insights” is verbal: 
Many people poke fun at Wall Street’ so-called guessing game and consider 
the whole business of research reports and market letters just a “come-on” 
aimed at the sucker public. Nothing could be further from the truth in the 
present-day environment. […] The old days when Wall Street research was 
largely consigned to low-paid statistical hacks are long since gone. The 
opinions of today’s leading industry specialists are not just market 
comment; they often are the stuff that makes markets. A well-researched 
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buy and sell recommendation… may well influence the price of a particular 
stock for months to come.79 
Arguably, during the 1950s and 1960s, it was this “verbal tradition” — with 
its emphasis on the importance of the qualitative judgment and the printed word, 
entrepreneurial operation and reliance on a loose, non-disciplinary skillset — that 
defined the stock market expertise, resisting the potentially destructive impact of 
the emerging quantitative, mathematical, academic body of financial knowledge. 
The challenge came from elsewhere. 
Investing in Scientific Revolution 
The 1950s-1960s period witnessed a renewed interest in the world of 
finance: the long “bull market” of 1954-1969 was the time when high-tech 
corporations began to jostle with the traditional “blue chips” of the Dow Jones, and 
“investment, Wall Street, the financial markets — in the 1960s, all these were once 
again interesting, even exciting.”80 Financial analysts found themselves at the 
intersection of the two major changes of the post-war American economy: on the 
one hand, the increasing recognition of the commercial possibilities of science and 
technology, on the other hand, a renewed interest in equity financing.81 With the 
priorities of national economic policy shifting from the stabilization of the economy 
towards “acceleration of economic progress” as one of its central goals, the dramatic 
increases of both federal and private R&D spending spurred a “research revolution” 
that caught the eye of some leading economists.82 At the same time, “long pent-up 
consumer demand and the development of new products by revolutionary 
technologies generated dreams of vast expansion for American business. In the 
1950s and 1960s, these forces… helped to push stock prices to unprecedented 
heights, and activity soared on the NYSE.”83 By 1953, it could be said that while 
common stock investing “was once considered synonymous with gambling,” it has 
become so respectable after the war that “the principal questions were not whether 
one should buy common stocks, but what and when to buy.”84 The authors of one of 
the first post-war studies of common stocks concluded that, provided the economy 
will grow and expand, “as we believe it will, common stocks may be expected to 
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continue the upward trend they have followed for fifty or more years,” having 
become “an integral part of our economic life.”85 
On the financial side of the economy, these developments pushed the “Wall 
Street firms and individual investors to discover the electronics industry in the mid-
1950s, which led to a speculative boom in electronics stocks and to the emergence 
of a new literature on high-tech investing,” including Investing in the Scientific 
Revolution by Arthur C. Merrill and Science and Technology Stocks: An Investor’s 
Guide by Grant Jeffery.86 When their books were published, both authors were 
finance professionals, and the books’ immediate audience consisted mostly of their 
peers; both books were reviewed by the Financial Analysts Journal.87 However, 
Merrill and Jeffery aspired to speak to a broader public, invoking the figure of the 
“small,” unprofessional, individual investor that had been forged in the regulatory 
debates of the turn of the century but lost much of its appeal since the crash of 
1929.88 Moreover, departing from the conventions of the genre of “investment 
guidebooks,” they focused less on how to profit in the stock market, offering broader 
speculations about the promises of the current scientific and technological 
developments instead.89 However, Merrill’s and Jeffery’s focus was primarily on the 
stock markets, and beyond the financial circles, both books were regarded as 
expressing “the market’s point of view” on the new technologies.90 Writing in the 
aftermath of the electronics boom that ended by 1962, in part, they wanted to 
address the resulting “excesses of skepticism.”91 
The significance of this emerging literature on high-technology investing is 
beyond a mere attempt to restore the investors’ confidence in one particular 
industry.92 To express “the market’s point of view” on the emerging technologies 
required a particular restructuring of the very categories used by the market — that 
is, by financial analysts who, as argued in the previous section, still dominated the 
field of financial market expertise. However, the new economic and investment 
environment demanded some change in their categories and tools. The essential 
features of Graham and Dodd’s approach were tainted by the disastrous experience 
of the 1920s. First, it emphasized the analysis of the company’s “fundamentals” — 
most importantly, the price to earnings ratio (P/E), subsuming “all the qualifying 
factors entering into the appraisal of common stocks — the whole gamut of security 
analysis, industry analysis, and evaluation,” and understood as a proxy to the firm’s 
“intrinsic value.”93 Second, it was also decisively risk-averse. The central task of the 
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analyst was to identify and buy undervalued securities ignored by the market — an 
explicit lesson from the 1920s speculation in “watered” (overvalued) stock — and 
hold them, waiting for the inevitable market “correction.”94 Such a strategy was 
considered more secure than a bet on the uncertain future growth: “it is manifest… 
that future changes are largely unpredictable, and that security analysis must 
ordinarily proceed on the assumption that the past record affords at least a rough 
guide to the future.”95 More importantly, Graham’s approach offered a way of 
treating asset classes and risk “before these concepts were placed on a statistical 
basis.”96 Their conception of risk was neither opposed to nor confused with 
uncertainty: “they did not think about risk in statistical terms… did not measure risk 
in relation to an asset class, an investor’s portfolio, or the market as a whole… risk 
had no statistical component,” it was “like loss, absolute… unsurmountable and 
inevitable.”97 Essentially, Graham and Dodd’s security analysis was a “vernacular” 
classification of assets (stocks and bonds), itself based on the fundamental 
distinction between an “investment” and “speculation”: for the former, the future “is 
essentially something to be guarded against,” while the latter “derives its basis and 
its justification from prospective developments that differ from past 
performance.”98 The analysis should be concerned “primarily with values which are 
supported by the facts and not those which depend largely upon expectations.”99 
In the midst of the electronics boom, many analysts felt that this classification 
was becoming increasingly obsolete — and Graham himself was among the first to 
acknowledge this. In 1958 he argued that the nature of the “speculative elements” 
of common stocks has changed: “in the past,” the latter were related to the company 
itself, “due to uncertainties, or fluctuating elements, or downright weaknesses in the 
industry, or the corporation’s individual set-up”; now these speculative elements 
have considerably diminished, opening the way for the “new speculation”: 
...a new and major element of speculation has been introduced into the 
common-stock arena from outside the companies. It comes from the 
attitude and viewpoint of the stock-buying public and their advisers-chiefly 
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us security analysts. This attitude may be described in a phrase: primary 
emphasis upon future expectations.100 
In Graham’s view, this new attention to future growth, necessarily based on 
uncertain assumptions, allowed to “justify… practically any value one wishes,” hence 
“hence at times the market may conceivably value the growth component at a 
strikingly low figure.”101 Other analysts concurred, arguing that the distinction 
between “value” and “growth” investing no longer made sense: by the end of the 
decade, the consensus opinion held that since the investor’s primary concern is the 
growing earning power, “whether that is represented in the dividend or retained 
earnings account makes no difference [...] income is a dollar bill, whether it comes 
in the form of a dividend check or appreciation and subsequent sale of all or a 
portion of a common stock holding.”102 Common stock investing simply was growth 
investing. The blurring lines between investment and speculation, income and 
growth, spurred a concern regarding the usefulness of the instruments of security 
analysis,103 most sharply in the field of science and technology investing, since the 
companies operating there “are by their very nature strongly oriented toward the 
future. It would hardly be an exaggeration to say that they must grow or perish.”104 
Hayden, Stone analysts summarized the challenge: 
As the perimeter of industrial technology is pushed further ahead by basic 
and applied research the investor and security analyst face problems that 
are temporarily unique and perhaps indeterminate of solution. Chief among 
these problems is the analysis of new product possibilities and the forecast 
of earning power that must be deduced from limited and even ephemeral 
data. The complexity of modern technology may, indeed, result in an 
intellectual barrier.105 
The barrier could be resolved in two ways. A securities firm could hire 
scientists in the consulting capacity, or “set up yardsticks to measure and define… 
the attraction of companies that are investments on the perimeter”; however, these 
yardsticks could no longer be based simply on “an attempt to project past 
performance.”106 At the 1960s Financial Analysts Convention, one distinguished 
member of the profession addressed his colleagues, stating that “applied science 
companies” are the fields “where the earnings multiple is subordinated to the 
gamble on the ultimate breakthrough and where it must be recognized that little 
institutional support can be expected for these shares whenever the market breaks”; 
it was, therefore, one of the duties of the analyst to “be an investment counsellor in 
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a broad sense, and advocate that the investor have his resources allocated in a full 
spectrum from solid equities to the spices of fine adventure in space and science.”107 
Somewhat less cautious than the members of the craft, Merrill launched an 
explicit attack on Grahamian principles of security analysis, arguing that they are 
obsolete in the time of “scientific revolution.” The Great Bull Market of 1920s has 
since 1929 become the familiar trope in the American discussions of “price, value, 
and valuation,”108 to which Merrill did not fail to appeal in constructing his narrative. 
The scientific progress of the day ensured, for Merrill, a solid base for the stock 
market expansion, contrary to the trading in watered stocks of the late 1920s. First, 
according to him, the established metrics used by “traditionally trained financial 
analysts,” such as price to earnings ratio, are no longer applicable, since in the case 
of “science companies,” “often there are no earnings, merely prospects… successful 
early investor is not buying current earnings and dividends, but processes and 
patents — not plants and equipment, but brains and exclusive positions in new 
industries of the future.”109 The centrality of the “science companies” and the 
“science investor” in the Cold War economy necessitate the development of “new 
tools for an old job” with an emphasis on the future instead of the past.110 
Qualitative security analysis.... is a method of selecting securities which 
places primary emphasis on the potential of the product, the quality of the 
people, and the promise of the future — rather than solely on a rummage 
through the record, a review of the ratios, and the study of the statistical 
past.111 
Finally, the universal applicability of new technologies (such as electronics) 
makes them difficult to classify and leads conventional industry categories to 
disintegrate: instead of a “stock market,” the investor is dealing with “the market of 
stocks.”112 Modern technology “is a synthesis of numerous powerful techniques”: for 
example, computer technology “serves all markets.”113 To make things worse, it is 
also not immediately clear which part of the new technology is innovative and which 
runs the risk of rapid obsolescence:  
A klystron and an X-ray tube are not T.V. tubes or radio tubes. On the other 
hand, are they fundamental departures? Will they result in a net addition to 
economic space in terms of new firms, markets, employment, and 
investment opportunities? Modern science has blurred any semblance of 
clairvoyance that we may have occasionally enjoyed in the analysis of 
standard industrial problems. Dependable statistical standards in the new 
fields simply do not exist.114 
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All these developments — the obsolescence of industry categories, merging 
of growth and value investing, inadequacy of P/E ratios and statistical record more 
generally, exacerbated in the case of science companies — warranted a new 
emphasis on the companies and their managers. “Management is of paramount 
importance,” some argued, being the bearer of the “intellectual premium” that 
conventional P/E analysis is incapable of capturing.115 When studying a science-
based company — especially of a “venture” type — the investor should “not become 
so mesmerized by its exciting products or processes that you fail to look carefully 
into the caliber of management.”116 In the same way as one cannot “put a stock into 
a test tube,” company management, too, “clearly, cannot be put into a test tube,”117 
hence the only feasible resort for a security analyst would be the ability to judge 
people.118  
Financial Singularities 
These developments, leading to a temporary disintegration of the central 
categories of security analysis — its “calculative frame” — were less destructive for 
its more marginal categories.119 In fact, the Grahamian framework had a mechanism 
of dealing with the singularity of unique companies and “situations” that defied 
established industry categories and measurements, as was the case with science and 
technology companies. A prolific writer, Graham repeatedly revised his categories 
and the corresponding “patterns” (by which the new issues of securities could be 
classified as, e.g., “true bonds,” even though the title of the issue failed to describe it 
“with accuracy”). Thus, in a 1946 article, he took stock of the market activity during 
1939-42 and summarized it in the concept of “special situations,” which, while 
distinct from speculation, did not “permit a clear-cut and final definition.”120 “A 
special situation in a broader sense” was defined as “one in which a particular 
development is counted upon to yield a satisfactory profit in the security even 
though the general market does not advance. In the narrow sense, you do not have 
a real “special situation” unless the particular development is already under way.”121 
Such “developments” were further broken down into “classes,” including arbitrages, 
reorganizations, cash payouts, litigation, public utility breakups, and the residual 
“Class F” for “everything we have not already classified.”122 Graham did not invent 
the term but tried to give it a more precise meaning; it was generally known in the 
financial community of the immediate post-war years.123 
Subsequently, Graham briefly returned to “special situations” in his 1949 
book The Intelligent Investor, where he emphasized their investment (non-
speculative) character, since “the purchase is always predicated on a thoroughgoing 
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analysis that promises a larger realization than the price paid” and the risk factors 
can be calculated and diversified away.124 Investment in “special situations” was 
included in the list of common stock operations advisable for an “enterprising 
investor,” along with buying in low markets and selling in high, choosing “growth 
stocks” and buying bargain issues.125 “Special situations” remained a catch-all 
category and included liquidations, inter-security arbitrages, hedges, existing in the 
blurred “area where no true distinction exists between bonds and common 
stocks.”126 “Over many years,” such investments could bring an annual return of 
“20% or better, with a minimum overall risk to those who knew their way around 
in this field.”127 Graham considered “special situations” a distinct “technical branch 
of investment” that required “a somewhat unusual mentality and equipment,” 
suitable for only a few of the “enterprising investors,” and did not discuss them in 
any further detail.128 In 1956, when he was called upon to provide expert testimony 
on the stock market study to the Congressional Banking and Currency Committee, 
he explained that special situations belonged to a subclass of undervalued securities, 
“which upon study is believed to have a probability of increasing in value for reasons 
not related to the movement of stock prices in general, but related to some 
development in the company’s affairs,” and whose identification was a matter of 
judgment and experience.129 In sum, “special situations” represented an alternative 
to Graham’s primary approach of constructing a diversified portfolio of undervalued 
investments and, although intrigued him, seemed “of considerably less significance” 
because of their rarity and short-term character: “activities along these lines hardly 
seem appropriate for a general and continuing portfolio strategy.”130 
The intrigue had to be explored by someone else. Just a year before the 
Congressional Committee hearings, Graham’s Wall Street colleague, Maurece 
Schiller of Newburger Loeb (Graham’s former firm), published a book on special 
situations, to be followed by a series of sequels.131 Schiller attempted to develop an 
investment strategy based on “special situations.” The imprecise meaning of the 
term aroused skepticism of the analysts, who referred to “special situations” as a 
“currently stylish term”132 or a “fetish catch phrase... often applied to any issue that, 
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in the opinion of the broker, will do “better than the market.””133 Schiller 
acknowledged that, but argued that “true” “special situations” could be found as a 
result of “extensive research into a particular investment, combined with the 
application of some good “common sense,” thus being perfectly compatible with the 
rationale of Grahamian security analysis.134 Schiller defined a “special situation” as 
an investment in stocks and bonds that “are in the process of reflecting “corporate 
action” which occurs within the administrative scope of the corporation rather than 
at the business level of the company.”135 The basic prerequisite for recognizing a 
“special situation” was to distinguish between the business and the administrative 
sides of a corporation — the investor is not interested in the actual production of 
goods and services, focusing instead on 
...the very existence of the company as distinguished from its products. Our 
corporate identity is responsible for the fundamental purpose of the 
corporation being in business. It is concerned with the finances that 
represent the money invested in the company, i.e., the capital structure. 
This part of the corporation also directs the policies effecting the nature of 
the company and administration of the corporation’s functions as a unit.136 
Schiller argued that such a focus allowed the investment to be “free” from the 
influence of the prevailing economic conditions and the stock market trend. Here 
Schiller was not original, following in the footsteps of other analysts: for some time 
“special situations” have been considered as the “flee from the “bear or bull market” 
approach to security purchases,”137 a way for sophisticated investors to make 
money during the times when “the owning of stocks may be out of favor.”138 It was 
the “corporate action,” not the market “level,” that produced the profit potential; the 
profits could be realized upon its completion. Because the “corporate action” is self-
liquidating in nature (hence all “special situations” are to an extent analogous to 
liquidations),139 dividend policy was largely irrelevant, since it implied a continued 
existence of the company; the self-liquidating character of investments also freed 
the investor from the uncertainty as to the timing of purchasing and selling.140 
Initially, Schiller proposed four requirements for a situation to be considered 
“special”: “a specific “corporate action” is in existence; the security is undervalued; 
the investment must be calculable; the security should be at a minimum risk level”; 
a combination of these elements in one security indicates a “special situation.”141 
This definition was then repeated in the subsequent treatments of the issue.142 
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What positively distinguished “special situations” from “ordinary 
investments” were “romance” or “windfall”: “the glamour that the investor obtains 
without costs. It is an added attraction, unique in “special situations,” in that it can 
have but one effect, and that is beneficial, whereas in the conventional investment 
or speculation the romance may be a decisive and costly element in the 
investment.”143 Clarifying these rosy metaphors later, Schiller referred to 
“unexpected additional values which frequently come to light in special situations” 
and “unexpected profit, hidden asset, culmination of latent values and the 
realization of great hopes and expectations,” pointing to the somewhat blurred 
status “special situations,” occupying the space between Grahamian alternatives of 
investment and speculation (although Graham acknowledged that no clear-cut 
distinction can be made).144 The main difference between a “special situation” and 
speculation was outlined as follows: 
A “special situation” showing a capital gain of 10% on an annual basis 
should have a probability of nine to one in favor of success. While the 
percentage gain could be considerably higher in numerous instances, the 
risk probability should not increase in the same ratio. Should that occur, 
then the situation would be a speculation rather than a “special situation” 
investment.145 
This distinction, as well as much of the other material unrelated to specific 
cases, would appear unchanged in his later volumes.146 Importantly, Schiller 
insisted on the public availability of information necessary to recognize a “special 
situation”: a focus on the “corporate action” did not imply access to restricted 
information; the investor was supposed to study trade press, company publications, 
and S.E.C. reports and obtain information from the company representatives: 
“special situations investments by their very nature eliminate guesswork… all 
information one needs can be obtained [...] the clues are there”147; “by definition, all 
information about them is publicly available.”148 Hence “the windfall factor would 
come into being as a result of a study of the case” and “the very act of recognizing a 
profit opportunity is the act of creating a special situation investment.”149 
In the 1964 sequel, Schiller sharpened the focus, defining “special situations” 
as “securities influenced by unusual specific circumstances” for capital appreciation 
and using the term interchangeably with “corporate actions.”150 Schiller The 
essential requirements remained the same — independence from the market 
trends, minimal risk, undervaluation, and availability of information; however, the 
investment purpose was now explicitly defined as capital gains. The list of categories 
of “special situations” now also included “Unique Action Situations,” defined, 
predictably, as “the presence of corporate action combined with uniqueness,” 
denoting rarity or dynamic management. The category included companies 
changing their “traditional arena of operations,” developing unique relationships, 
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e.g., with the local authorities, or diversifying as a result of the management ability 
to grasp “new ideas.”151 
However, the category of “Unique Action” situations was somewhat deviant 
within Schiller’s framework: these situations were “unusual,” unrelated to the core 
principle of the proposed classification: for “Unique Action” situations, “corporate 
action is not necessarily the catalyst. However, in its creation, some form of 
corporate action probably has taken place at an earlier time.”152 Unique Action 
situations included such cases as common stock issued by governmental 
organizations (like Federal National Mortgage Association), corporate bonds with 
protective provisions, tax ruling establishing new corporate structures, “something 
new in the concept of a business,” “New Era companies,” industrial development 
bonds, among other things: “Unique Action situations would not be numerous in any 
one aspect of singularity. In some respects, they are rather like a “lone wolf” 
ventures, making it necessary to follow the analysis of each circumstance in the 
“unique status.”153 In other words, these investments were true financial 
singularities: thus, the “New era products” included “innumerable developments of 
recent years” and compelled the investor to look “for the exceptional symbolized by 
oneness”; Unique Action categories are “singular… each unusual stock has unusual 
characteristics,” thus “no typical trading methods are applicable, since each Unique 
Situation is by nature a singular circumstance. Basic principles of prudent investing 
would obtain.”154 Again, unlike “special situations” more generally, the termination 
of which was a foreseeable in the short term, “if the Unique Action ultimately 
terminates in the distant future, it would be prudent to let the investment incubate,” 
rather than selling immediately upon the completion of the “corporate action.”155 
A subcategory within Unique Action situation was “Space Age Situations,” the 
arena of “promise of developing Unique Situations rising from products and ways of 
doing things that have not yet been contemplated,” companies whose products 
result from research and development and which are “born with dramatic growth 
prospects.”156 These cases included the scientific industries: electronics, nucleonics, 
chemicals, drugs, high energy fuels, semiconductors, electrical machinery, data 
processing, infrared, communications, and materials. For such situations, in 
addition to the “incubation” period of the investment, Schiller suggested the tactics 
of the early entry (“Entering a situation at an early point in development offers the 
investor greatest profit potentials (and of course attendant risks)”) and 
diversification of holdings “at the early and usually low price stage” that “offers 
potential of dynamic development. Not all companies would be equally successful; 
nor would it be possible to predict the category with the greatest development.”157 
Finally, for a Space Age situation, the management ability was crucial: “The 
management of a Space Age Company, like the company itself, may be young and 
unproven, but in matured and successful situations extreme capability is 
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conspicuous. However, the capitalization of a company can be most revealing in 
respect to the character of controlling management.”158 
In his final analysis of the “special situations” investments, Schiller reiterated 
the basic definitions, but again changed the classification, adding a new group of 
situations labeled “internal development.”159 Now “special situations” included 
“new technological developments,” such as computers or space technology.160 
Science companies did not exhaust, but firmly belonged to the range of possible 
“special situations,” being included in the definition as members of the “internal 
development” class: “corporate existence in the fields of science and advanced 
technology is in itself a qualification for special situation interest.”161 More 
generally, “internal developments” were characterized by “something beyond 
routine growth” in the sense of “unexpected development” or “participation in a 
branch of industry that in itself is something special,” with “capital gains potential 
not directly dependent upon movements of the general securities market.”162 
Capital gains in this category were expected to develop in response to the successful 
development of the company’s “special feature”: products with markets broader 
than initially foreseen, or belonging to the “advanced scientific and technological 
developments,” being deeply involved in research and development.163 In line with 
his previous treatment of the Space Age Situations, Schiller suggested that the most 
critical factors in dealing with such cases are the fact that “time for development 
may be protracted” and “breakthroughs in discoveries can have an explosive impact 
on securities.”164 Here, while large companies do most of industrial research, 
smaller companies engaged in “a specific area of scientific/technological 
development” may offer greater capital gains and “more dynamic benefits.”165 The 
list of scientific fields reproduced the 1964 version, with the addition of drug and 
water pollution. Repeating his advice for diversification of holdings, Schiller insisted 
that the primary object of analysis in the case of “internal development” situations 
should be the very “special feature” that defines such a company, and that “personal 
contact is the best way” of getting the information necessary for the analysis.166 
“Special situations” deviated from Graham’s approach from the very 
beginning, since “No historical record of the stock will help in evaluating it for 
merger or dissolution.”167 In a 1955 paper on technical analysis, the author 
proposed a method of analyzing the price movements patterns, noting that it was, 
however, incapable of reflecting special situations.168 While he explored the area at 
the margins of fundamental analysis, Schiller remained firmly within its framework, 
perhaps even pushing some of its aspects further to the extreme. He shared Graham 
and Dodd’s emphasis on extensive research and the “absolute” conception of risk; 
however, the latter’s focus on the “intrinsic value,” temporary diverging from the 
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market price, still defined the analysis in relation to the market, since the 
fundamental value of the company could be realized once the market “corrected” 
itself. On the contrary, Schiller suggested a more radical form of “fundamentalism,” 
emphasizing a complete independence of “special situations” from the general 
market trend: “the idea of establishing a complete transaction comprised of a 
purchase and sale which contained an existing profit… was radically different from 
the familiar purchase and the ensuing wait and hope for a profit to develop.”169 
Moreover, such a shift in emphasis allowed Schiller to virtually ignore the 
principle of going concern — his “special situations” focused on changes in the very 
“existence” of the corporation, disregarding dividend policy and other 
considerations pertaining for a long-term holding of the stock in favor of short-term, 
foreseeable profits realizable upon completion of a “corporate action.” If Graham 
and Dodd’s Security Analysis was indeed concerned with “security” in the singular 
— treating it as a bundle of rights and liabilities in the context of a specific 
company,170 its financial position, and timing of the issues of its securities, — Schiller 
first elevated the capital structure as the crucial concern, since it defined the 
possibilities for the desired “corporate action,” taking into account the operational 
context (science and technology) of the company, and subsequently devoted great 
lengths to the “unique” and “singular” situations. Over the decade since his first book 
on “special situations” was published, Schiller kept his list expanding, adding new 
residual, open categories that explicitly deviated from the general principles of 
classification he tried to establish (“Unique Situations,” “Space Age Situations,” 
“internal development group”), leaving the analyst with little more than a family 
resemblance between the various types of the special “investment media.” However, 
these very inconsistencies proved vital during the period when Grahamian 
analytical categories and instruments were misled by the market’s reaction to the 
new technologies. The openness of “special situations” and the residual character of 
this category allowed analysts like Schiller considerable flexibility of interpretation 
at the same time as the core of Graham and Dodd’s security analysis — the search 
for undervalued stocks through the analysis of the past record of the firms — was 
increasingly coming under attack from writers like Merrill and Jeffery. 
Conclusion 
On April 23, 1946, the New York Times reported that the Rockefeller siblings 
had formed a limited partnership in January of that year, with the purpose to “find, 
investigate and finance new, productive and constructive businesses and projects” 
to make permanent or long-term investments and manage and supervise” such 
investments. By the time of reporting, “it was learned that the partnership had 
investigated various “special situations” but had not yet made investment of its 
funds.”171 Eighteen years later, William Elfers, a former associate of Georges F. 
Doriot, the “father of venture capital” at American Research and Development 
Corporation, submitted a proposal to Sherman Fairchild to invest in Greylock, an 
investment firm newly created in Boston: “It is suggested that a partnership… be 
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formed for the purpose of investing in special situations and ventures.”172  In the 
years to come, Greylock would become one of the most famous venture capital firms, 
endowed with a reputation of the ARD’s spinoff.  
Something happened between 1946 and 1964. The gradual disintegration of 
the “calculative frame”173 of Grahamian security analysis helped to create a niche for 
venture capital investments in their modern form — professional, diversified, 
focused on capital gains from high-tech investment174 — offered opportunities for 
some of the early venture capitalists to begin to build a professional identity. As 
Berlin observes, in the 1950s and 1960s, many venture capitalists were coming into 
the nascent industry from financial, rather than technological, backgrounds.175 
Arthur Rock, Charles Lea, Reid Dennis, Peter Bancroft, William Bowes, William 
Draper were trained or had a career as either securities or investment analysts; 
throughout the 1950s, they worked for investment companies and funds on Wall 
Street or elsewhere, performing the standard tasks of fundamental analysts, 
including the company visits. Thus, on the one hand, they had an opportunity to gain 
first-hand experience with young science companies, and on the other hand, they 
were able to draw on the existing vocabularies and categories to make sense of their 
engagements. Here, the open and flexible category of “special situations” appears to 
have found its vocation. 
Before Reid Dennis managed to engage Fireman’s Fund into investing in 
technological ventures in 1960, he spent eight years doing fieldwork — visiting 
small high-tech companies on behalf of the fund, and learning what they were doing; 
at the same time, Wall Street securities analysts, like Arthur Rock and Charles Lea, 
following the precepts of security analysis and the internal division of labor between 
the senior and junior analysts, were also visiting the emerging science companies 
across the country.176 Draper, Gaither & Anderson, the first independent limited 
partnership V.C. firm on the West Coast, founded in 1959, adopted a similar 
language, describing their business as “special situations”177: “just looking for 
special situations, that was what it was called,”178 and if it was high tech, it wasn’t 
called that way: 
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[...] it was technology. It was people with a new idea. It was often called 
special situations. General Anderson, when he talked about our 
investments, he’d talk about special situations. Venture capital became 
more and more the common term as we progressed.”179 
In 1966, upon the death of General Anderson, the partnership was dissolved, 
falling short of bankruptcy by a small margin.180 In the same year, Schiller published 
his final treatment of “special situations,” and the term appeared on the pages of 
Financial Analysts Journal together with “venture capital,” among the “less 
conventional practices” of creating “probabilities of a good investment 
performance”: “Approaches such as especially emphasizing turn-arounds, 
liquidations, “values,” small special situations, or venture capital equivalents, can be 
used to good advantage if the investor is properly equipped emotionally and 
analytically.”181 
In the early 1960s, writers like Merrill and Jeffery argued that misleading P/E 
values of the electronics companies — and scientific companies more generally — 
did not mean a return to the 1920s speculation, but that they reflected genuine 
potential inside the science companies that required “new tools for the old job.” At 
the same time, analysts like Schiller — as well as young security analysts in charge 
of following the small “science companies,” like Arthur Rock — exploited the 
flexibility and the residual character of “special situations” at the margins of more 
established ways of making sense of financial markets. Schiller’s emphasis on 
independence from the market trend allowed to focus on the science and technology 
companies, while the more conventional analysts were perplexed by the market 
moves; expanding the temporal horizon of a “special situation” investment 
(“incubation period”), he nevertheless kept the ultimate “exit” for capital gains in 
sight, thus prefiguring later venture capital practices; his non-probabilistic 
principles of diversification were also adopted in the early days of venture capital 
when the performance benchmarks were nonexistent, and venture capitalists had 
to rely on “heuristics,” rather than statistics182; finally, the blurred boundary 
between investment and speculation — the possibility of realizing “great hopes” 
combined with the foreseeability of risks — suggested that an investment in a 
science company could be something more than a gamble. 
In other words, before the term “venture capital” was widely publicized, 
practices akin to its contemporary forms were emerging “interstitially” at the 
margins of corporate hierarchies, guided by the search procedures and categories 
borrowed from the field of security analysis, whose standards of practice were 
increasingly questioned.183 “Special situations” thus, on the one hand, made the new 
“science companies” legible for the stock market; on the other hand, being 
embedded in an established professional repertoire, allowed early venture 
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capitalists to make sense of their investments and legitimize their sometimes 
exceptional character. It might have been much more difficult for something like 
contemporary venture capital to emerge at the time when the random-walk 
perspective on financial markets was gradually rising to prominence, without the 
emphasis on research and heuristics, independence from the market trends and the 
possibility of “breakthroughs” impacting the value of securities characteristic of 
“special situations” investment. On the other hand, the emerging shifts in the 
analytical focus from companies to people (“management”) left some room for 
qualitative (and qualified) judgment. Like stocks, people cannot be “put into a test 
tube”; however, at the close of the 1960s, new techniques for developing a “people-
based” heuristics started to emerge in the investment circles of Boston and Midwest, 
and a new concern with nurturing the “right” people — turning engineers to 
entrepreneurs — started gradually becoming visible. These developments are the 





Chapter V. Turning Engineers into Entrepreneurs 
 
The progressive advance of this industrial system towards an all-inclusive 
mechanical balance of interlocking processes appears to be approaching a critical 
pass, beyond which it will no longer be practicable to leave its control in the hands of 
business men working at cross purposes for private gain, or to entrust its continued 
administration to others than suitably trained technological experts, production 
engineers without a commercial interest. 
Thorstein Veblen, Engineers and the Price System 
 
Introduction 
In August 1955, The Analysts Journal published a paper on “Security Analysis 
in a Science-Oriented Society,” an early example of the analysts’ increasing 
reflexivity regarding the status and, more importantly, the tools and techniques of 
their craft, that ensued since the mid-1950s and peaked towards the middle of the 
next decade, with the publication of Merrill’s Investing in the Scientific Revolution 
and other similar titles.1 The author of the piece, in a characteristic mixture of 
“spontaneous sociology” and practitioner’s reflections, argued that “our society has 
reached a point where it may now best be considered as a science-oriented society.”2 
The crucial feature of this new social order, according to Morgner, consisted in the 
scale of “scientific discovery and practical invention,” no longer practiced by 
“hundreds of widely scattered men guided by simple curiosity and unappreciated 
by the rest of society”: instead, “the number of people engaged in science and 
practical research has increased to over a million, if we include the members of 
scientifically trained professions like medicine.”3 With the “advances in knowledge… 
now increasingly planned,” he argued, it became vitally important to create and 
preserve a “social organization” conducive for the making, developing, and utilizing 
the “basic additions to knowledge.”4 For a security analyst, the advent of the 
“science-oriented society” necessitated a broadening of the conventional procedure 
of securities valuation: in addition to looking for “growth stocks,” the analyst now 
was responsible for “a more thorough investigation of the research activities of 
businesses,” “some evaluation of the character and quality of the research work 
done by firms,” especially pure research “for its own sake.”5 Towards the end of the 
1950s, American security analysts were becoming increasingly conscious of the 
necessity to attend to such matters by gaining first-hand knowledge of the 
companies beyond their hitherto accepted “calculative frame” centered on the price-
to-earnings multiples, and thus blurring the vital distinction between an overvalued 
company whose stock was heavily “watered,” and a promising “scientific company” 
whose research and development effort in the future would lead to commercial 
results worth any price in the present. Writing in 1955, Morgner anticipated much 
of this argumentation, but also went one step further, suggesting that “it is also very 
 
1-A. Morgner, “Security Analysis in a Science-Oriented Society,” The Analysts Journal 11, no. 
4 (1955): 59–61. 
2-Morgner, “Security Analysis in a Science-Oriented Society,” 59. 
3-Morgner, “Security Analysis in a Science-Oriented Society,” 59. 
4-Morgner, “Security Analysis in a Science-Oriented Society,” 59. 




important to know something about the morale of a research department,” 
elaborating on this thesis as follows: 
Significant creative work is a delicate flower that blooms only in an 
atmosphere that is most difficult to create. Genuine interest in the problem 
at hand, respect for one’s fellow research associates, recognition for 
accomplishment, and the all-important feeling of being a part of creative 
organization are vital to an environment in which the creative mind can 
flourish. To date, universities have been far, far more successful than 
business in creating such environments. A wise business management will 
be concerned with these problems and may well seek the aid of social 
scientists in making studies of the conditions productive of effective 
research.6 
One year after Morgner’s paper appeared in The Analysts Journal, in 
September 1956, Harper Woodward, an associate of Laurance Rockefeller’s venture 
capital organization, gave a talk before the Tenth Annual Conference on 
Administration of Research, a practical discipline — or, rather, an “immature 
science,” in this respect not dissimilar to security analysis itself, — centrally 
concerned with creating and maintaining environments in which “creative work” 
could flourish.7 Woodward, a graduate of Harvard College, where he served as a 
secretary to James B. Conant, and Harvard Law School, worked in Pentagon 
procurement during the war and joined Laurance Rockefeller in 1946.8 Addressing 
the audience of research administrators in 1956, he was making a case for venture 
capital as a niche source of research funding, complementary to the established 
federal and corporate alternatives, building on his experience as an associate at 
Rockefeller’s venture capital operation, which by then included a half-dozen 
projects in airborne instrumentation, aviation, and nuclear technologies.9 
Conceding that venture capital funding is no more than “a mere drop” in the sea of 
the federal investments in research, he suggested that it was more truthful to the 
“rather basic American heritage” of independent enterprise: 
This, stated simply, is the concept that the individual or group of individuals 
who think they have new and pioneering concepts that they want to develop 
and exploit (in the best sense of the word) will have a fair chance of 
achieving their objective without being “sold down the river” in the 
process.10 
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Echoing Vannevar Bush’s (1945) metaphor of “science, the endless frontier,” 
Woodward compared the “individual with pioneering concepts” to a twentieth-
century analog of Daniel Boone, the American folk hero-frontiersman, and offered a 
generalization about the relevant type of the person: “he is a type of individualist 
who is occasionally not quite as good as he thinks, but who is far too restless to be 
content as part of a large corporation’s happy, but sometimes over-administered 
family of R&D people.”11 Woodward also mentioned such qualities as optimism, 
salesmanship, and creative talent, warning that, although this “should not be 
construed as a criticism of the large corporation,” the “slow tortoise,” “the turtle 
soup is not for those who like rabbit stew”: “Hence, the need for recognition of the 
brilliant, individualistic person, who wants to do something on his own, who wants 
to be a proprietor, and who wants to “leave his mark” on the product or result of his 
effort.”12 “The American tradition of opportunity” invoked by Woodward was 
immediately coupled with a more specific set of aspirations and desires of the 
“creative people,” by whom he meant “scientists and engineers.” These people 
wanted, in Woodward’s view, “the logic and facts — rather than the “power of 
ownership” — [to] dominate corporate decisions,” and for a reason: “Some creative 
people, like boys or girls in different school environments, are more effective and 
more creative in an environment that is partially of their own creation,” rather than 
“in one into which they are compelled.”13 Woodward’s larger point was to suggest 
that this set of aspirations can, and should, be realized in practice. Addressing 
research administrators, he argued that, with the non-dominating and helpful 
presence of a venture capitalist, scientists and engineers are quite capable of 
running successful businesses based on their research and development work: 
There are people who believe that any company in which the creative 
people own even a substantial minority interest is headed for trouble. We 
have not found this to be true. In one of our most successful electronics 
ventures, the original technical group holds about 40% of the equity.14 
Despite the contemporary prejudice, an engineer can make a good executive, 
argued Woodward, citing the experience of Laurance Rockefeller venture capital 
operation: only two out of eight engineers-founders retired because of their failure 
“to retain the confidence of the company directors that they were qualified to act as 
chief executives,” only to be succeeded by other engineers.15 Therefore, what was 
needed was a certain process of nurturing the “creative people” to become proper 
businesspersons without compromising their sense of independence. To reconcile 
these two needs, Woodward suggested a financial solution — namely, the 
ownership incentives “native” to the small business with its “sense of 
proprietorship”: 
To the people with whom we have worked in the past ten years, it has been 
a real and strong stimulus. It has meant an opportunity, by stock option 
plans or otherwise, for the management of these companies to have a 
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substantial share and stake in the ownership, growth, and appreciation of 
value of the business for which they are so largely responsible.16 
Woodward was cautious enough not to launch a fully-fledged criticism of the 
large corporation, suggesting, instead, that small size was more conducive for 
innovation because it allowed more freedom and independence for the “creative 
people” capable of producing new ideas, products, or services. He argued that the 
small firm does not compete but complements the large one by being more effective 
at innovation, thereby also creating a niche for venture capital investing. However, 
Woodward also added that “new ventures need not always grow by the bootstrap 
method”: 
Many creative people, dedicated to independence and going-it-on-their-
own, find it desirable with growth and success to re-appraise their own 
positions. They find that, although the sort of independence they wanted 
may have been the best climate for early growth, it may at some point be 
desirable to grow stronger faster, either by joining another group of 
comparable size or by becoming part of a much larger company.17 
Thus, “the idea of growth by merger or affiliation is not at all inconsistent 
with the concept of promoting small, independent development groups,” Woodward 
concluded. He envisioned a symbiotic relationship between the world of corporate 
giants and venture capital-backed small innovative companies, perhaps formed 
through what would a decade later be called “spin-offs,” by a team of “creative 
specialists” leaving a larger organization. Venture capitalists’ role in this scheme 
was to re-socialize the “creative people,” turning them into the proper businessmen 
by offering financial and managerial incentives that would fulfill their sense of 
independence and bring them back to the corporate world. 
Woodward’s arguments paralleled the thinking of securities analysts 
surveyed in the previous chapter. Witnessing the electronics boom of the late 1950s, 
they developed the notion of “management” understood as the key variable in 
evaluating small companies based on advanced science and technology. In so doing, 
they somewhat deviated from, and somewhat extended the precepts of conventional 
security analysis, codified by such practitioners as Benjamin Graham and others, as 
the “human factor” was rapidly acquiring the central importance in evaluating 
companies. Thus, the room for a new body of knowledge concerned with “people” 
was created or, rather, emerged spontaneously as the analysts struggled to repair 
their accepted cognitive architecture, –fundamental security analysis centered 
around the price-to-earnings ratio, — applying marginal strategies like “special 
situations” investing, previously outflanked to the fringes of their conceptual 
apparatus. Moreover, in the immediate aftermath of the boom, some of the early 
venture capitalists, like Woodward and Arthur Rock, joined forces with the “fortune-
tellers” like Arthur Merrill and Grant Jeffery, arguing that investing in what they 
called the “scientific revolution” was more than a speculation — there was indeed a 
fundamental economic dynamic behind the fancy stock market moves. During the 
latter half of the 1950s and the early 1960s, they were traveling across the US and 
addressing different audiences, from electronic manufacturers to business schools’ 
alumni societies, in an attempt to clarify the meaning of venture capital investing as 
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they practiced it, and to legitimize these activities by drawing a boundary between 
speculating in science and technology stocks, and the calculated bets on the “long 
shots” they were advocating. Engaging in this “boundary work,” they were offering 
some tentative generalizations about the kind of people who ran the “scientific 
companies,” thus joining a broader intellectual movement to forge a new “positivity” 
for the knowledge of “management.”18 Following the developments in security 
analysis, they were moving the notion of “management” from a residual that 
remains after all the formal metrics have been (unsatisfactorily) analyzed to a 
category with some positive content. 
The Problem of Research Administration 
Sharing his observations on “technically creative people” at a conference of 
research administrators, Woodward was literally speaking the latter’s language. The 
problem of research administration, or research management, emerged in the 
immediate aftermath of World War II, with researchers and government officials 
becoming increasingly concerned with the changing “social organization” of 
research activity, as Morgner put it in his paper on the “science-oriented society.” 
The wartime growth of government-sponsored research, continued after the war 
and transformed into “self-conscious promot[ion], not just of technological change 
but of perpetual technological revolution” after the USSR’s launch of the Sputnik 
satellite in 1957, spurred a growing recognition of its increasingly collective, 
“teamwork,” character, as well of the managerial challenges resulting therefrom, 
both by the researchers in social and natural sciences, and by research 
administrators, who were often recruited from the ranks of the former.19 The initial 
articulation of the problem of research management followed from President 
Truman’s Executive Order of October 1947, commissioning a survey of 
administrative procedures in government agencies, by the time absorbing over a 
half of the national $1,160 million research and development budget.20 Directed by 
John R. Steelman, Chairman of the President’s Scientific Board, the study yielded a 
three-volume report and a strong argument for a coordinated national science 
policy.21 One volume of the report, favorably received by the research community, 
was specifically devoted to the issue of research administration, acknowledging 
that, “by the nature of things,” scientists must be “much less subject to the usual 
controls and regulations” of administrative character, and have the opportunities 
for “interesting and valuable work,” professional recognition, and freedom, as far as 
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possible, from nonscientific work. Accordingly, research administrators’ key task 
was to “provide a favorable climate in which the scientific staff can work.”22 
The reflections on the administrative problems of research in the late 1940s 
were primarily driven by the government officials themselves (the 
“administrators”). They revolved around the issues of managing large 
(governmental) organizations employing scientists and engineers, the latter’s 
motivation, professional status, individualism, and creativity as potential obstacles 
in the management of such an organization, as well as the broader problem of 
coordination of the national scientific effort. In the words of a research 
administrator from the Department of Agriculture, the managerial challenge was to 
deal with “highly specialized personnel who, by their training and experience, are 
inclined to be more individualistic in their thinking than most members of society,” 
and hence critical of “the supposed limited opportunities for advancement, even for 
brilliant and original research workers, and the lack of freedom in choosing projects 
to be undertaken.”23 Similar issues were reported in relation to the employment of 
scientists in the War and the Navy Departments: “petty, but irritating 
discrimination” regarding budgetary allowances for travel and accommodation, the 
fact that top-level scientists are forbidden to sign the research reports over their 
signatures, thus being devoid of professional recognition, salary levels evaluation in 
terms of administrative, rather than scientific, responsibilities, and the “more basic 
problem” of “the supervision of the work of highly competent scientists by officers 
who do not have a full understanding of the work for which they are responsible.”24 
Thus, it was argued that research administrators should make “every effort… to 
insure that the working conditions are appropriate to research. These mean 
freedom in performance of research and freedom to publish and to exchange 
information with colleagues.”25 Social scientists occasionally contributed to this 
thinking, reflecting on their experience of working in the military agencies during 
the war: wartime research effort was recognized as distinct in its interdisciplinarity, 
group character (as opposed to the individual work), and the organizational 
environment in which it took place — “practically the empirical polar type of 
bureaucratic social organization. All the definitive characteristics of bureaucracy 
reach an especially high level of development in a modern Army, and in the 
Department, which has official jurisdiction over the Army.”26 Such an experience 
opened up new possibilities and new challenges, it was argued: firstly, “team 
research is feasible and productive to a degree which would not have been generally 
acknowledged as possible in many academic circles a few years ago,” that is, before 
the war; however, it also “introduces important new problems of organization, 
motivation, and of research standards and ultimate purposes.”27 
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These reflections, framed in terms of the tension between bureaucracy and 
teamwork on the one hand, and the researchers’ creativity and individualism on the 
other hand, also appealed to research administrators from private institutions, 
thereby spurring a recognition that the challenge of managing “creative workers” 
employed in public bureaucracies was rather similar to that encountered by the 
administrators of corporate research laboratories and industrial research 
organizations. Similar to the 1940s’ argument that wartime research effort put the 
scientist into a new, impersonal and bureaucratic, organizational environment, thus 
marking a departure from the previous, artisanal and individualistic regime of work 
based on the smooth face-to-face communication, private industrial research was 
recognized as “mainly teamwork, whereas academic research is individualistic.”28 
One contributor to the debate on the pages of The Scientific Monthly was Raymond 
Stevens, vice president of Arthur D. Little: speaking as someone who “has been 
engaged in industrial research since 1920,” he argued that as a “creative worker” 
similar to the type usually found in the arts and philosophy, “the researcher in 
science will fall under many of the general rules for [this] type. He presents, 
however, a problem peculiar to the management of a research organization or to the 
executive of the research department of a company.”29 And, just like the 
governmental research administrators before them,30 managers of the private 
research laboratories began to recognize the “less tangible” aspects of management 
of the “creative people,” inviting management consultants and psychologists to help 
overcome the challenges of this process: “A good research man seems to need 
energy, drive, and an urge to create something not currently existing or to develop 
or improve existing things. Our experience tells us he also needs to “get along.”31  
By the mid-1950s, these reflections, resulting from the wartime experience 
of large-scale, organized research, as well as from the Federal Government’s data-
gathering efforts under the framework of a “national accounting for R&D,”32 turned 
increasingly specialized and sophisticated, while at the same time bifurcating 
intellectually. In his history of the “industrial scientist” as a form of life, Steven 
Shapin has documented the dynamics of different discourses that laid competing 
truth-claims over the condition of industrial research workers employed by the 
large US corporations.33 The intellectual underpinning of the academic commentary 
“from the Ivory Tower,” according to Shapin, was the structural-functionalist 
tradition in sociology, stressing the (allegedly unsurmountable) differences 
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between the institutional values of academic and industrial cultures. Because of the 
Cold War era-anxieties of the university-based social scientists and humanists, 
especially their concern with the autonomy of science, this “Ivory Tower 
commentary” tended to focus on the “unhappy industrial scientists” and “in large 
part (not wholly) deduced its objects from theory,” neglecting the empirical data, 
more faithfully communicated by the “Shop-Floor commentary” of R&D managers 
in charge of corporate research laboratories.34 Committed neither to theory-
building, nor to the idea of institutional value differences between industry and 
academia, the latter had a firmer empirical grip over industrial science as a form of 
life, observing, against the predictions of academic theorists, that “newly recruited 
academic scientists became too quickly and too totally accepting of the values and 
research agendas of what they took to be corporate, as opposed to academic, 
culture.”35 More generally, in contrast to “the academic commentary on research 
management, shop-floor writing displayed no interest whatever in making points of 
general sociological interest, in using passages of research management as “case-
studies” for any other purpose than coming to some more-or-less robust findings 
about recurrent problems in and about the industrial laboratory.”36 
However, the intellectual bifurcation documented by Shapin and marked by 
the roughly contemporaneous founding of the two commentaries’ major publication 
venues — Administrative Science Quarterly (ASQ) by the Graduate School of 
Business and Public Administration at Cornell University in 1956, and Research 
Management (RM) by the Industrial Research Institute, Inc. in 1958, — did not 
prevent intellectual exchanges between the more systematic and theory-driven 
academic discourse, and the more ad-hoc and practice-oriented reflections of 
corporate research administrators.37 Despite the differences in emphasis and 
orientation, both “Ivory Tower” and “Shop-Floor” commentaries shared several 
important assumptions regarding the nature of the scientific work and the 
organizational settings most conducive for it, inherited from the post-war 
problematization of research administration, as well as from the longer cultural 
history of the “men of science.”38 Thus, while the academics’ suspicions of the 
potentially corruptive influences of industrial research culture on the virtues of 
science, as well as their emphasis on the values split between the university and the 
corporation might have been exaggerated, to some degree, research management 
discourse was permeable for the academic concerns and, conversely, in some 
instances, academic sociologists and management scholars seem to have voiced 
succinctly the issues research administrators were grappling with on the shop floor. 
For the present purposes at least, it is important to stress continuities and mutual 
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influences, rather than differences, between the discourses of academics from 
universities and business schools, and practicing research managers, as expressed 
in their leading trade publication, Research Management (RM). 
Research Management magazine was founded in 1958 by the Industrial 
Research Institute, Inc. (IRI). Based in Arlington, Virginia, the IRI was established in 
1938 as the National Industrial Research Laboratories Institute by the Industrial 
Research Division of the National Research Council in order to expand the analytical 
effort devoted to the problems of research and development and technological 
innovation that began during World War I and became an independent non-profit 
organization in 1945.39 Following the 1957 Fall Meeting of the IRI Board, the Quo 
Vadis Committee established earlier that year recommended to organize a series of 
conferences on research administration issues. These conferences were supposed 
to serve as a means of systematic collection, reporting and disseminating of the “up-
to-date, diversified, and multilevel fund of information related to all the areas, 
phases, and processes of research administration” possessed by IRI membership, 
and were based on the study group approach.40 In 1958, the topic of research 
administration loomed large across industrial and governmental research 
communities, provoking an “intense interest” rooted in research administrators’ 
“pressing daily problems.”41 The IRI assumed leadership in the industrialists’ debate 
of these issues. In a 1959 contribution, Vice President of Research at the US 
Industrial Chemicals Company wrote that “this subject of research administration, 
as you know, is one of the cornerstones of the Industrial Research Institute.”42 The 
study groups gathered from the late 1950s through the 1970s, discussing various 
issues of importance for the corporate research managers, and becoming 
increasingly receptive to the academic inputs from the mid-1960s onwards. 
However, even at the time of its founding, RM contributors, representing research 
managers and directors from various industries, defined their managerial problems 
in a way not dissimilar to how it was framed in the academic debates. 
Organizing Creativity 
Two such debates were particularly relevant for the thinking of research 
administrators in the late 1950s and the early 1960s. On the one hand, sociologists 
and political scientists, especially those committed to the project of creating a 
general theory of administration and administrative behavior, tended to view 
research administration as a particular case within this more general framework.43 
Thus, the third issue of the ASQ was entirely devoted to the challenges of research 
administration, addressing such issues “teamwork and creativity in research,” based 
on the assumption that “traditional methods of administration are frequently 
inappropriate when applied to a scientific enterprise”44; arguing for the 
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improvement of communications between researchers and administrators as a way 
to address recurrent problems of managing a “research corporation”45; and 
suggesting that the scientists employed in a governmental medical research 
organization “tend to perform more acceptably” when given the opportunity to 
work closely with colleagues coming from a variety of backgrounds, as well as when 
“supervisors provide frequent stimulation combined with autonomy of action.”46 
These tensions between research creativity and its organizational 
environment were articulated in a slightly different manner in the discussions of 
industrial relations and management scholars, who focused on the condition of the 
“professional employee” in industrial organizations.47 Relying on psychological 
projective tests and standardized attitude surveys, these studies focused on the 
generalized figure of the “professional,” often explicitly modeled on the scientists 
and engineers working in industrial research laboratories.48 However, different 
from the sociological inquiries, industrial relations scholars argued that the 
increasing importance of the work of “professionals” and “technical specialists” in 
the industry necessitated changes in organizational and societal hierarchies, 
drawing on the humanistic traditions of management thought of Elton Mayo and 
Mary Follett.49 
With the growing importance of technical activities in industry, one might 
expect that engineers and other professional employees would find 
considerable satisfaction in their work. Under such circumstances it would 
seem that the technical “brains” of the nation would derive more than 
average satisfaction from their key position in society. The evidence, 
however, appears to be quite to the contrary. The technical experts, 
engineers, and other professionals in industry seem to be far more 
frustrated than satisfied.50 
In turn, these observations from the shop floor of industrial research 
laboratories fed back into the mainstream of managerial theorizing.51 For the 
practicing research managers who participated in the IRI Study Groups and 
contributed to RM, the theoretical concepts of “creativity” and “professionalism” 
were also valuable, at least as a means of framing their operational problems. On the 
one hand, they shared the idea of the rising importance of industrial research which, 
having moved from the “old engineering department,” became an independent 
activity within the structure of the firm, increasingly approaching academic 
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research in terms of its fundamentality.52 On the other hand, the management of 
researchers — variously referred to as “creative specialists,” “technical people,” 
“scientific personnel,” and “professionals”53 — had to be conducted in light of the 
recognition of their “creativity” and professional status. 
In turn, this concern with “creativity” spilled over into such mundane aspects 
of management, as allocation of free time, performance appraisal and salary 
administration, conceived of as a process of finding “the optimum means of 
stimulating, recognizing, and rewarding the creative and productive effort.”54 More 
generally, “creativity” had to be encouraged and promoted, as well as sustained 
against the “organizational pressures,”55 while the researchers had to be afforded 
the opportunity for growth of their “technical ability” by means of creating a 
“favorable growth environment.”56 These concerns are also visible in the topics 
discussed by the IRI study groups. Coordinated by James A. Bralley, Director of 
Chemical Research at A.E. Staley Manufacturing Company, the groups began to meet 
regularly at the IRI offices in New York since February 1959. The first meeting was 
devoted to the discussion of psychological, organizational, and fiscal factors, “which 
appear to influence a creative environment.”57 With creativity and the environment 
necessary to spur and sustain it being the central items on the agenda, the members 
of the IRI also discussed “job status” as an element of the reward system, as well as 
selection and placement of “research personnel.”58 In other words, while less 
interested in the grand theoretical concerns,59 research administrators adopted the 
language of “creativity” elaborated by the academics and used it to frame the 
problems of hiring, selection, and performance appraisal of “research personnel,” as 
well of managing the laboratory labor process. 
One of the most urgent problems faced by research managers concerned the 
promotion of the “outstanding scientists.” In RM’s third issue, it was succinctly 
analyzed by Herbert A. Shepard, who framed it in terms of the “dual hierarchy” 
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problem.60 Shepard was a prominent figure in both the academic and the 
practitioners’ discussions of research management. An MIT-trained scholar of 
industrial relations, he began his career as a student of democratic control in labor 
unions,61 gradually becoming engaged in the sociological debate on the 
university/industry culture clash, as well as in the managerial discussion of 
“professional employees” and their mixed fortunes in industrial organizations.62 
Shepard’s argument on the “dual hierarchy” was explicitly framed in the managerial 
idiom and based on his previous work on the division of authority between 
“superiors and subordinates in research” that appeared in the special issue of The 
Journal of Business devoted to the “human aspects of management.”63 In his RM 
paper, Shepard argued that the growth of industrial laboratories leads to the 
development of a “managerial class” that is hierarchically differentiated from the 
scientists and engineers, and yet is responsible for controlling their work: 
Since its responsibility entails control over the activities of scientists and 
engineers, it is logical that technical competence be one criterion for entry 
into the class. However, entering the managerial class removes the technical 
man from direct participation in technical work, and he comes to devote 
himself to many matters not recognized as technical. When a good scientist 
is made a manager, a good scientist is lost. Yet, promotion to management 
is the reward for competence in scientific work. Hence, the laboratory 
becomes a school for making nonscientists of its scientists.64 
Shepard went on to review the two most popular techniques adopted by 
research managers to solve the problem, concluding that neither was satisfactory. 
Thus, introducing the position of the technical director would likely result in new 
challenges, including the necessity to select the people on the basis of unquantifiable 
“leadership skills” to become technical directors; a more severe hindrance, however, 
was that even the most qualified technical director would be “inevitably inferior to 
the combined resources of his scientific staff” to be efficient.65 The “dual hierarchy” 
was another such technique, based on the creation of two parallel career ladders for 
the promotion of “technical men”: scientists and engineers reluctant to be promoted 
to managerial positions could move up the “technical ladder,” rather than joining the 
ranks of research administrators. Because of the value of research freedom 
inscribed in the “scientific mythology,” Shepard argued, the introduction of the 
“technical ladder” was likely to produce unintended effects: being seen as a reward, 
rather than opportunity, it would hinder further professional development of a 
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“technical man” after promotion; worse, it could become a “shelf” position or “a 
proof of inadequacy.” More generally, the “dual hierarchy” approach was 
undesirable due to its ambiguity with respect to the self-image of the scientists and 
engineers: “the technical ladder “is usually reserved for competent and brilliant 
scientists who are regarded as lacking in managerial potential. In our society, 
leadership skills and leadership positions are highly valued. The technical ladder 
incumbent is only half a man.”66 
Shepard’s analysis was very much in accord with the concerns expressed by 
other contributors to RM in the late 1950s and the early 1960s. For example, in 
1959, the Personnel Director of Bell Labs argued that “professional ladders” for 
“nonsupervisory engineers and scientists,” providing them with status symbols and 
financial rewards parallel to those of their colleagues climbing the “administrative 
ladder,” would constitute “a broad system of classifying people engaged in creative 
engineering and science” and have “many advantages over a system which divides 
such people into a series of named vertical merit or performance cells.”67 While such 
a system created an alternative to the “paradoxical” reward system based on 
administrative promotion to supervisory roles which counted little for the “creative 
specialists,” the companies were judged to be overemphasizing the equivalence of 
the two ladders, creating further disruptions and “undue attention to the “status 
symbols.””68 Likewise, at least some “research people,” although not frequently 
heard in the trade publication of their superiors, voiced a concern with the problem 
of promotion and a desire to keep their identity of “creative specialists,” rather than 
managers or salespeople.69 Another worry was the allowance for free time: although 
required for “creative work,” it was viewed as “time off” which “cannot be properly 
charged to an appropriate, profitable account” by the management, especially those 
removed from research.70 Further, it was “observed that present-day performance 
evaluations, for the most part, are arbitrary, inadequate, and unreliable, resulting in 
“market value” appraisals” inappropriate for “technical personnel.”71 Grappling 
with these challenges, research administrators gradually became engaged in 
informal theorizing about scientists and engineers as a kind of people, endorsing 
parts of the academic vocabulary: as different from the rest of the organization, 
“technical men” were thought of as “intrinsically highly intelligent and logical” and 
perhaps “more self-conscious about their intelligence,” having “more regard for 
thought per se.”72 Hence, they tend to “forget that better mousetraps do fail to 
generate wide paths to the laboratory unless they are sold” and, consequently, must 
be trained to become “research salesmen” to communicate effectively with the 
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management,73 which would be otherwise concerned with “return-on-investment 
and other such things calculated to warm the cockles of the technologically 
uneducated business man’s heart.”74 
However, beyond the superficial similarity, Shepard was skeptical about 
what he called the “scientific mythology,” arguing for the need to acknowledge the 
power relationships obtained in the laboratories despite the reluctance of “research 
people” to admit their existence. Accordingly, Shepard framed the challenge of 
research management in terms of the shifts in organizational power: because of the 
industry’s increasing dependence on research and technological innovation as 
instruments of competition, power within firms increasingly accrues “to those who 
possess the skills most needed for survival and growth,” passing from 
manufacturing to sales and, finally, to research and development.75 The problem, 
then, lay in the predominance of what he called the “staff-line organizational 
ideology,” “a tribute to the preeminence of manufacturing” that obscured the 
realities of research-intensive industrial development by considering R&D a mere 
advisory service. However, the attempts to indoctrinate research administrators in 
the human relations management theory, supposedly more appropriate for 
managing “creative specialists,” were met with the latter’s resistance: “ironically,” 
as Shepard put it, scientists and engineers seemed to prefer “traditional 
management” by which he meant the Taylorist doctrine of scientific management, 
which was “at odds with scientific ideals at almost any point.”76 The irony lied in the 
fact that this model of research administration turned out to be more agreeable for 
the scientists and engineers who, according to Shepard, disregarded the 
“humanistic” emphasis on interpersonal relations and small group dynamics as 
incompatible with the image of a lonely scientist: “reverence for an organizational 
myth combined with acceptance of an alien organizational structure.”77 
Nevertheless, the root cause of the problem was not the “new management 
theory” as such, but the contradictory situation in which the concerns about the 
meaning of professionalism, scientific freedom, creativity and adequacy of 
promotion and rewards systems were expressed “without questioning the 
traditional structure of authority, responsibility, and supervision.”78 In short, the 
managerial problems of corporate research laboratories did not question the 
validity of human relations management but presented “dramatic evidence” against 
its opposite: “bureaucratic methods of adaptation to a changing environment.”79 Not 
coincidentally, by the end of the 1960s, Shepard was among those social scientists 
who introduced the critique of industrial bureaucracies to research management 
discourse. 
“People are everything” 
When Woodward was speaking to research administrators in 1956, arguing 
that venture capital could be a source of funding for some “creative people,” not 
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quite happy in the large corporation’s “sometimes over-administered family of R&D 
people,” he was much less radical than Shepard, cautiously avoiding a full-fledged 
critique of industrial bureaucracy. While endorsing the idea of “creativity,” 
Woodward nevertheless suggested, referring to his experience with Laurance 
Rockefeller’s venture capital operation, that “an engineer can make a good 
executive.”80 Still, being no more than a “mere drop” in the stream of the federal and 
corporate “R&D dollars,” venture capital was hardly an obvious option even for such 
special characters to whom Woodward referred as the “twentieth-century Daniel 
Boone.” 
By the end of the 1950s, however, the attractiveness of the kind of investing 
Woodward advocated in 1956 significantly increased as a result of the speculative 
boom in electronics stocks that erupted between 1959 and 1962.81 In October 1962, 
in the immediate aftermath of the boom, Woodward appeared before the Harvard 
Business School Club of Atlanta with an address called “Venture Capital in a New 
Climate.” He argued that the “dramatic de-glamourization” of the stocks of the 
“glamour companies” at the start of the 1960s, despite the market’s tumultuous 
moves, signaled that venture capital business was not “a mere house of cards.”82 
Instead, it was based on “what had been clearly identified as the third great 
revolution of mankind, the scientific revolution”83, rivaling the previous two — the 
agricultural and the industrial — during and after World War II. For Woodward, like 
for securities analysts and corporate research administrators, this “scientific 
revolution” most immediately referred to the commercialization of the wartime 
technologies like nuclear energy, electronics, jet propulsion, and the like, 
representing a real opportunity that did not shatter after the electronics boom burst. 
Gesturing towards Doriot’s American Research & Development as a notable 
exception, Woodward suggested that before 1950 there was little interest in risky 
ventures on the part of the investment banking community. However, as the decade 
was coming to a close, “the capital shortage… became a capital glut”: 
Wall Street began to show more interest in some of the ventures that had 
been privately financed in the ’46 to ’50 period and were beginning to look 
attractive for further growth. Small public holdings in some of these 
companies developed. Over-the-counter markets began, and the great boom 
was slowly taking form. As the general market moved up, people turned more 
and more to the special situation, glamour type investment, many of which 
had been exclusively the realm of specialized venture capital investing. Price-
earnings ratios began to move up from 5 to 1, to 10, 20, 30, 50, 100 and finally, 
of course, to infinity.84 
The boom made the investing public interested in “placing unjustifiable high 
values on many of these securities,” while the “disclosures of company business 
prospects and reported financial data seemed only to whet the appetite of the 
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investor for more of the same at higher prices.”85 After the electronics bubble burst 
and the abundance of capital to finance “anything that sounded glamorous on almost 
any terms” dried up, Woodward observed that “the outlook for venture capital in 
many ways has never been better.”86 If there was anyone to blame, it was the 
speculative investors’ inflated hope: in the words of a contemporary observer, there 
was “a wave of hyperenthusiasm for science-based shares in 1960-1961, followed 
by disillusion in 1962-1963 — disillusion not with the companies’ performance, but 
with the investors’ own hopes.”87 Speaking as an experienced practitioner of 
venture capital investing, Woodward suggested that patience proved to be the key 
to survival in the speculative boom. The specialized investors — instead of “venture 
capitalists,” Woodward used the phrase “scientific-management group” — were 
able to assume the noble posture of ignoring the market moves, focusing instead on 
the constructive task of building companies. 
…founders and managers of ventures that have been through the last two 
years are happily worrying less about the day-to-day or month-to-month 
market movements of their stock and sensibly focusing their attention on the 
continuing growth and development of their business in technical 
competence and management skills. The management of a successful growth 
business need not worry about stock prices. This will take care of itself in 
time.88 
Woodward did not speak explicitly about the right ways of managing the kind 
of people who run these “venture companies,” although he alluded to the 
importance of stock ownership as a motivational tool in small business, and also 
spoke unfavorably about “a new group of scientist-engineers become capitalists — 
investment and market experts,” who “shifted too much interest to the Wall Street 
Journal from the technical journal.”89 Besides his reconstruction of the events that 
created a new climate for venture capital, and brief mentions of the importance of 
management and technical skill, Woodward’s discussion paralleled the thinking of 
the security analysis profession, perhaps most strikingly in his appeal to the 
metaphor of infinity. Behind the superficial infinity of price-earnings ratios, there 
was a real infinity of technological progress: “If our assumptions are right, the new 
technology barrel is far from empty — in fact, never will be,” so that the blue chips 
of 1975 will include “many of the yet unidentified glamour and growth stocks of the 
50’s and the 60’s.”90 
One of the security analysis practitioners who participated in the 
professional discussion about the importance of management in the evaluation of 
“scientific” companies was Arthur Rock, who co-authored the 1958 paper in The 
Analysts Journal, suggestively titled “Some Considerations of the Infinite.”91 Written 
while he was still affiliated with Hayden, Stone, the paper advanced a critique of the 
excessive reliance on the formal “yardsticks” in evaluating “scientific companies.” 
By 1958, Rock was keenly aware of this subject matter, having participated in the 
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launching of General Transistor Corporation and Fairchild Semiconductor. 
Becoming a frequent visitor to California, eventually, Rock met Thomas Davis, Jr., a 
lawyer and vice-president of the Kern County Land company, with whom they 
formed a venture capital limited partnership in 1961. Moreover, between 1957 and 
1961, Rock participated in the founding of several other electronics, computer and 
semiconductor companies in the San Francisco Bay Area, including Watkins-
Johnson Company, Leventhol Electronic Products, Vidar Systems Corporation and, 
most notably, Teledyne, Inc. and Scientific Data Systems.92 
In 1962, Rock appeared before his alma mater’s alumni society, the Harvard 
Business School Club in San-Francisco, in his new capacity of a venture capitalist, to 
give a talk in which he reinforced the points made in the 1958 paper. Rock started 
out saying that an investor “gotta have faith” in the prospects of the economy and 
the particular industry of interest; however, moving to the more tangible 
“yardsticks” valuable in this business, he began to talk about management: “The 
single most important factor in the long run for any company is, of course, 
management; however, I believe that in the applied science industry this is 
especially true.”93 For Rock, the applied science industry was characterized by 
“generally higher” ratios of stock prices to book values, and he referred to the 
concept coined in the 1958 paper to illustrate this, talking about “the intellectual 
book value” (“intellectual premium” in the original paper). Price-to-earnings ratio 
was dismissed as “another ratio that is of little help for the analyst” in such a fast-
moving industry as “applied science”: 
Earnings that are here today may be gone tomorrow and so I would rather 
pay an almost infinite price-earnings ratio or even a price-loss ratio for a 
company that has a research and development program that could lead to 
something, than a low price-earnings ratio for a company with no future. 
Again the emphasis is on management and its ability to run an R&D program, 
because certainly I am not equipped to go into the laboratory and decide 
whether the work being done is liable to give forth profitable sales.94 
Here, having moved on from the management as an essential but intangible 
variable in the long-run fate of any business, and referring to his experience as a 
security analyst that suggested a new importance to “management” that no ratio 
was able to capture, Rock formulated the key heuristic that guided his investment 
activity — almost 50 years later he reckoned that: “I’m not a scientist, so I don’t 
understand all of the science they’re talking about, so I’ve got to decide on some 
method of making evaluations, so it occurred to me that I’d do that based on 
people.”95 Rock’s partner, Thomas V. Davis, Jr., expressed this heuristic strategy even 
more forcefully: in 1966, speaking before the Western Electronic Manufacturers 
Association in Palo Alto on “how to pick winners” in the electronics industry, Davis 
formulated it as “The Principle” consisting of four words: “back the right people”: 
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People are everything. People make products; products don’t make people. 
People direct machines; machines do not yet direct people, although under 
the direction of people they can assist people in selecting directions. 
Machines can be made to practically identical to one another. Each person 
is, on the other hand, unique. This is fundamental to my philosophy of 
investment. Another fundamental for me is that only a tine percentage of 
people possess the managerial and motivational capabilities to build truly 
extraordinary growth companies.96 
And yet, it was not merely “people” in the abstract; like Woodward and 
security analysts before him, Rock attempted to characterize the people who run 
companies engaged in the applied science industry. First of all, “The management of 
these companies are generally quite young, and inexperienced, and thus you have 
no record to judge them by. Some of the more successful companies are started by 
people who are fresh out of school either as students or professors.”97 The second 
important consideration was “proper motivation.” Referring to the contemporary 
best-sellers on stock market investing, You Only Have to Get Rich Once by Walter 
Gutman,98 an art critic and security analyst of Grahamian generation, Rock 
suggested that, unlike the people Gutman was writing about, “entrepreneurs in the 
applied science industry” did in fact “like the process of getting rich,” not only its 
result: 
It is also important to find properly motivated management and by properly 
motivated I do not mean “get rich quick.” Entrepreneurs in this industry are 
less motivated by material wealth than any place I know. They seem to 
enjoy the intellectual stimulation of doing a good job and money is only the 
way to keep score.99 
This characterization was plainly both descriptive, derived from Rock’s 
personal experience with the science companies, and normative, cast in terms of the 
“proper motivation” required to succeed in this business — a distant parallel to 
Woodward’s dissatisfaction with the scientists-engineers-turned-capitalists, too 
quickly abandoning their native ethos for the greedy ways of the Wall Street sharks. 
Finally, Rock suggested a further ingredient for a promising management “team”: 
since the “applied science” industry is moving too fast, they ought to be able to 
develop products that would survive the pace of technological progress. Hence the 
emphasis should be not on the specific technical skills and knowledge, but on 
something less tangible: 
You can’t buy the present in this industry, but rather you have to ask 
yourself, is the management who produced this product which is now 
selling well at a profit capable of producing the new products which will be 
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required tomorrow? Incidentally, it is quite easy to check out products by 
calling on contacts at either the competition or customers.100 
Thus, the infinite potential of the scientific revolution ultimately depended 
on the potential of the people, each of them unique and, as the security analysts 
would later say, not fit to be put into a test tube. In Rock’s formulation, this meant 
that the venture capital business was much more analysis-intensive than 
conventional forms of investment.101 However, this analysis would center on people 
— or rather the kinds of people — that run scientific companies. Rock’s most 
important positive contribution to this nascent knowledge of people concerned 
“proper motivation.” In his analysis, it referred loosely to the scientists and 
engineers’ relative disinterestedness in the material wealth and quick enrichment, 
combined with a sense of independence unfulfilled within the bureaucratic 
hierarchies of corporate research laboratories. In his 1962 speech, Rock expressed 
this conjuncture as follows: 
Since book value in conventional terms is not a necessity to build a better 
mousetrap, properly motivated engineers and scientists will continue to 
leave the companies they work for to form their own companies and some 
of them will be highly successful. It is our job to help the ones who have the 
potential of being successful to realize their goals.102 
Having participated in the founding — and funding — of Fairchild 
Semiconductor, Teledyne, and Scientific Data Systems, by 1962, Rock could offer the 
audience some tentative generalizations regarding these processes. In the address 
to the Harvard Business School Club of San Francisco, he linked his observations on 
the “proper motivation” and non-pecuniary interest of the scientists and engineers 
with the desire to leave their employers to start-up on their own. Within five years 
since the founding of Fairchild Semiconductor (1957), the trend took shape, so that 
Rock could refer to the possibility that it would continue. And yet, when he was 
referring to the “properly motivated scientists and engineers” leaving their 
companies to start-up on their own as “entrepreneurs,” Rock was making a rather 
risky conjecture. As evidenced by his own experience with Fairchild Semiconductor, 
such a trajectory was still “extremely unusual” for the scientists and engineers.103 
Moreover, by the early 1960s, there was no proper description for this kind of 
action.104 
Besides, the term “entrepreneur,” to which Rock alluded, was also moving. 
Having been introduced to the American economic thought at the turn of the 
twentieth century, after the seminal contributions of Frank H. Knight (1921) and 
Joseph A. Schumpeter (1934) and the post-war consolidation of the neoclassical 
paradigm, it vanished from the mainstream economic theorizing, being relegated to 
the field of economic and business history.105 In the everyday language it could refer 
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to the “entrepreneurs” in the top management of the big business, as well as to the 
owners of the corner grocery store, but there was no established tradition, except 
metaphorically, of speaking about “entrepreneurs” in the “applied science industry,” 
also a term of recent coinage.106 In the early 1960s, however, entrepreneurship 
reemerged in a different context, as a topic of psychological and sociological 
research, exemplified by such works as The Achieving Society (1961) by David 
McClelland and The Enterprising Man (1964) by Orvis Collins and David Moore.107 
Instead of theorizing in terms of the generic “entrepreneurial function,” these 
studies focused on the “actually existing entrepreneurs,” analyzing their 
psychological traits, motivations, and personal biographies, and stressed the 
psychological “desire for independence,”108 as well as the “need for achievement” 
arising from the environmental influences.109 Although the idea of looking at the 
psychology of the entrepreneur was not new, having been anticipated by the more 
practically-oriented genre of “entrepreneurial guidebooks” published by the US 
Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce and the Small Business Administration 
since 1945,110 the studies by Collins and Moore and McClelland yielded a series of 
testable hypotheses that could be explored on the basis of different data. In 1965, 
shortly after Rock offered his on the characteristics of “entrepreneurs in the applied 
science industry,” Harvard Business Review published a paper on the “profile of a 
successful R&D entrepreneur.”111 Based on the findings of the author’s study 
conducted as an MIT Sloan Fellow, the paper analyzed a random sample of 22 
executives of the “R&D companies,” that is, companies “based on a new technology,” 
in terms of the psychological theories of entrepreneurship developed by McClelland 
and Collins and Moore.112 
For Schrage, the crucial issue was whether some “three physicists leaving 
their positions with a large corporation or leading university to establish their own 
company” should run the company themselves or instead hire a professional 
business manager. In other words, the key question was: “what qualities should the 
man chosen possess to maximize the chance of being successful?” Addressing this 
issue, Schrage hypothesized that the “R&D entrepreneur” should be capable of 
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perceiving the relevant environment “veridically,” “recognizing people, things, or 
situations as they truthfully are, rather than attributing to them qualities which are 
the products of one’s emotions or imagination.”113 Having conducted a series of tests 
measuring the personality traits of the “R&D entrepreneurs” in his sample, Schrage 
concluded that “the most successful individual is high in achievement motivation, 
low in power motivation, and high in awareness of self, the market, and his 
employees.”114 Moreover, as different from the received image of the “perfect 
entrepreneur” codified by McClelland, Collins, and Moore, Schrage observed that 
“today’s R&D success” did not require aggressive independence and insensitiveness 
to other people’s feelings; on the contrary, the heads of the R&D companies in the 
sample expressed “a very human quality,” readily admitted “to their weaknesses, to 
uncertainty about their work, to many things they have failed to do,” and displayed 
curiosity “about science and its progress, about business affairs, about people.”115 
The HBR editors warned the readers that these results were surprising and counter-
intuitive.116 Unlike the “enterprising men” described by the psychology of the 
entrepreneur, the “R&D entrepreneur” was resembling the kind of character Rock 
and Woodward referred to — “veridically” perceptive, acutely aware of himself and 
his weaknesses, and relatively uninterested in “getting rich quick.” By articulating 
the profile of the “R&D entrepreneur” in terms of the established genre of 
entrepreneurial psychology, Schrage’s paper contributed to a description of this 
emerging human kind. However, like the observations offered by Rock, Davis and 
Woodward, it applied only to those “creative people” who did actually become 
“applied science entrepreneurs,” thus lacking in generality to be appealing for, and 
applied to, a wider audience. The “people-based” heuristics derived from ad hoc 
observations of early venture capitalists, having been linked to the more formal 
discourse of entrepreneurial psychology, had to be accommodated by these “people” 
themselves. 
From “Creativity” to “Productivity” 
From the mid-1960s onwards, the discourse of research administration 
underwent a shift in emphasis, while at the same time becoming more open to the 
inputs from its academic counterpart. By 1963, the RM contributors became 
increasingly concerned with “productivity” of scientists and engineers — almost as 
much as with their “creativity” and the environment most conducive to it. 
Accordingly, “productivity” accompanies “creativity” in the discussions of the 
motivation of the “technical people” and the particular approaches needed to make 
them “more productive and creative.”117 Scientists and engineers, or simply 
“professional people,” are still regarded as a unique management challenge; the 
management techniques that applied to them are still held to be different from the 
ones to be used in more conventional business environments; the “work climate” is 
still of paramount importance; however, the concern with “maximum research 
productivity” becomes much more pronounced and visible: 
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Managing scientists and engineers in a research and development 
laboratory presents problems unique to the industrial management field. 
Professional people hired into applied or basic research must be selected, 
and their performance is judged by criteria different from those used in 
selecting and evaluating production or sales personnel. Also, the work 
climate required for maximum research productivity is different from that 
in the rest of an industrial complex.118  
At the same time, research administrators become increasingly more 
conscious of the financial costs of extensive research and development and 
decreasing returns from the application of “creativity techniques,” especially in the 
field of basic research that is inherently difficult to control in terms of return on 
invested capital.119 One contributor warned about the “danger of being run down by 
our research and development programs,” stating that “a point of indigestion in 
research and development work” has been reached: unlike “in the old days,” under 
conditions of its declining productivity, R&D work could no longer be considered “a 
leisurely sort of thing.”120 As different from the wartime and immediate post-war 
years, when “many companies rushed to establish or to expand research and 
development programs,” by the mid-1960s it was considered difficult to assume that 
science is “self-directing with a rigor and accuracy and productivity not normally 
observed in other human affairs.”121 Accordingly, the IRI Study Groups began to put 
more emphasis on the issues of the cost control in research and development, rather 
than on creating and sustaining an environment conducive for “creativity,” inviting 
contributions from the accounting profession, as well as financial controllers and 
“risk-capital investment advisors.”122 These issues, amplified by an increasing 
interest from the external publics,123 made research administrators appreciative of 
the latest developments of the social sciences of organization and management, 
including, notably, a stream of contributions by the scholars from the recently 
established (1964) Sloan School of Management at MIT.124 In turn, this new 
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openness to the social sciences’ contributions triggered an intellectual bifurcation 
that becomes visible towards the mid-1960s. Thus, in 1965, Jay W. Forrester, 
Professor of Industrial Management at MIT, attended the Spring IRI conference in 
Florida, and addressed the audience with the following statement: 
I find that the area of professional motivation, the exercise of self-discipline 
by research people, and the efficiency of the research process are among 
your greatest concerns. Because of your sensitivity to the growing 
inefficiency in research, you have acknowledged being under pressure from 
top management, directors, and stockholders who wonder if today’s 
research is producing results keeping with the cost. [...] How many of you 
feel that motivation of the research men and instilling self-discipline to 
accomplish the most from the available resources is one of your paramount 
concerns and responsibilities?125 
The group reacted to Forrester’s question by showing overwhelming 
approval (80% per sent showed hands).126 On the one hand, some research 
administrators called for more attention to the findings of behavioral research, 
arguing that stringent financial controls and overall formalization were at odds with 
the nature of “creative” R&D work, while some of their colleagues were increasingly 
looking to the methods and tools of post-war “management science” and operations 
research as promising solutions for the “financial difficulties” of R&D. As 
summarized by one of the participants of this controversy: 
Some advanced thinkers are testing the idea of using professional managers 
to manage research while the less radical are trying to convert research 
scientists to managers. Trailing behind is a long and vocal group who still 
maintain that all the research scientist needs is an administrator to help him 
with the paper work.127 
“Management is on the prowl! It is searching for a better return on its 
research and development investment. R&D costs are continually rising, yet 
profitability seems to be decreasing.”128 For some research administrators, the 
growing inefficiency of research was seen as a result of the use of “historical or rule 
of thumb procedures in budgeting and planning”: “in many instances, funds are 
appropriated on a lump-sum basis, and even in those cases where the appropriation 
is by projects, no attempt is made to support the requests by detailed estimates of 
the various expense items to be incurred on each project.”129 Instead of ad hoc 
procedures and historical conventions, some contributors suggested more 
“scientific” approaches to research management, to be applied by the hired 
professional managers possessing the required skills: 
Fads, fancies, and experimentation are “big business” in American industry 
today! […] Today the emphasis is being placed on evaluation, monitoring, 
scheduling, and control… one common approach is often referred to as the 
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Integrated Management Information System (IMIS), and the Program 
Evaluation Review Technique (PERT) stands out as one of its major 
techniques… represents an important facet of modern systems 
management.130 
In other words, during the 1960s RM was increasingly becoming an arena of 
the largely implicit polemic between competing schools of management thought, in 
some respects going back to the earlier controversy between the Taylorist doctrine 
of “scientific management” and the “human relations” school of Mayo and Follett.131 
As different from the promoters of the more systematic and “scientific” approaches 
to research management, a vocal group of research administrators argued for 
“better integration of the informal with the formal organization”: “the processes of 
internal administration — planning and control, in particular, have tended to 
reinforce bureaucratic patterns. Increasing formalism plus the conflicting ethos of 
its researchers provide an organizational climate unfavorable for maximum 
effectiveness in R&D.”132 Other authors sympathizing with behavioralist approaches 
argued that too great an emphasis on cost effectiveness in R&D administration 
frequently results in failures,133 which could, however, be foreseen by applying 
organization theory.134 In matters of performance appraisal, instead of endorsing 
the “machine age mentality” of the advocates of PERT techniques who “equated men 
to machines,” it was argued, research managers of the “science age” had to be able 
to judge the “potential” of the individual and “facilitate” it, rather than blindly follow 
performance measurement procedures that originated in the non-creative parts of 
the organization.135  
Finally, the idea of bringing professional managers to be in charge of the R&D 
laboratories, rather than promoting researchers to become managers, received a 
mixed reaction,136 triggering the reemergence of the old problem of “developing 
managers out of creative specialists,” long recognized as “more difficult than 
development of managerial personnel from those engaged in the older activities 
such as manufacturing and finance.”137 “Most research directors are scientists-
turned-administrators, and such men usually do not find the dual role an easy one 
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to resolve… highly educated and intelligent scientists frequently generate more 
loyalty to their professions than to their employers.”138 In other words, research 
administrators’ increasing receptiveness to the competing school of management 
and organization theory allowed to reframe the perennial “dual hierarchy” problem 
in terms of the opposition between “management science” and “machine-age” 
bureaucracy on the one hand, and the renewed emphasis on researchers’ 
“creativity,” this time backed by a variety of behavioral approaches to organization. 
This conjuncture allowed the idea of entrepreneurship to be introduced in the 
research management discourse by the end of the 1960s. 
The “Ideal Entrepreneur” 
The controversy between research administrators who promoted 
“management science” and their colleagues who argued in favor of the “behavioral” 
approaches was not settled in the 1960s. However, by making them more open to 
the social scientists’ inputs, it created an opening for the emerging critique of 
industrial bureaucracy that was being forged by the US management consultants 
and social scientists from the mid-1960s onwards. This critique, to some extent 
engaging with the classic writings of Schumpeter and Weber, was largely based on 
the empirical analyses of corporate research laboratories and, more importantly, of 
the “professional employee,” often also modeled on the scientists and engineers 
working in industrial research.139 While Shepard was instrumental in translating 
some of its arguments into the discourse of professional research administrators, its 
most vocal academic proponents were Warren G. Bennis, an organization and 
leadership scholar and the chairman of the Organization Studies Department at MIT, 
and the political scientist Victor A. Thompson.140 Being rooted in the “humanistic” 
tradition of management thought, this critique assumed particularly virulent forms 
in its reaction to the diffusion of the wartime mathematical approaches to 
management in the American corporate world.141 Having established an ideal type 
of the large corporation as a kind of Weberian rational bureaucracy, Thompson and 
his followers interpreted the management science of the 1960s as the return of 
Taylorism in a new form, referring in particular to the “Whiz Kids,” a group of Air 
Force operations researchers who joined Ford Motors after the war and attracted 
publicity for implementing sophisticated management control systems.142 For 
Thompson, however, a large bureaucratic organization facilitated by the expertise 
of this “new elite” was positioned as a singularly discouraging environment for 
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scientific and technological innovation — as well as innovation in general. Referring 
to the Whiz Kids, and Robert S. McNamara in particular, Thompson called them 
“econologicians”: “They are econological rather than sociological. To them, the 
scientific study of administration must end up as the scientific administration of 
things, including people.”143 
Thompson wrote extensively on the topic of “bureaucracy and innovation,” 
elevating the contrast between a rationally managed bureaucracy with its 
focus on efficiency, control, and hierarchy, and the less hierarchic and 
controlled organizational environments conducive for innovation, by which 
he almost invariably meant “individual creativity.”144 
Bureaucracy was not “bad,” having established a good record in handling the 
tasks involving “machine-like predictability and cost reduction”; it was just not 
optimal for other kinds of tasks, such as innovation, and it was innovation that 
America needed, in Thompson’s view, at the end of the difficult decade of the 1960s. 
In a 1968 paper published in Trans-action and thus aimed at the concerned public 
beyond his fellow academics, and echoing the similar rhetorical tropes appearing in 
Research Management at the same time, Thompson launched a fully-fledged attack 
on scientific management and its harmful influence on the decision-making 
processes in business and government: 
Today there is a resurgence of the scientific-management mystique. This 
mystique sees the firm as a system based entirely upon economic 
rationality. The model posits a single, overriding goal for the organization 
and requires managers to spend their time constantly canvassing all 
available choices, adopting those that add more to the firm’s goal than they 
cost and discarding any that cost more than they add. This model requires 
a totally hierarchical organization. It tries to avoid human vagaries by 
mechanizing and programming every possible activity and attempts to 
eliminate all overlap or duplication as a waste of resources.145 
From Thompson’s point of view, as different from the Progressive era, when 
the implementation of Taylorism was kept in check by labor militancy, in the post-
war American capitalism nothing could stop the influence of the various Whiz Kids 
who, in their attempts to eliminate “slack” and “overlaps” in activities, were 
effectively killing any possibility to innovate.146 In a less academic context of the 
Personnel journal, a trade magazine of the American Management Association, 
Robert Kirk Mueller, a management consultant with Arthur D. Little, cast this 
opposition in terms of the contrast between the two kinds of managers — the 
“traditionalists” and the “scientists,” the latter being Thompson’s 
“econologicians.”147 Defining scientific management as “quantified common sense,” 
a purposeful invention of the “calculus of decision,” mainly based on the techniques 
of operations research, Mueller, like Thompson and Shepard, argued that these tools 
were inappropriate for innovation — a largely nonrational process and, by 
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definition, not well defined by the past experience.148 In other words, in so far as 
modern bureaucracy was coupled with scientific management, it was destined to fail 
at innovation — that is, at exploiting internally occurring inventions. 
“Econologicians” had their interests vested in preserving corporate hierarchy and 
centralization, with their tools geared to enforce top-down control throughout the 
organization.149 Likewise, Shepard argued that an “innovation-resisting” 
organization “is not resistant to innovations issuing from the top of its authority 
structure,”150 expanding on his 1950s’ conclusion that the attempts to restructure 
industrial research organizations following the principles of “human relations” 
management failed, because they left unchallenged the traditional, bureaucratic 
“structure of authority, responsibility, and supervision.”151 Instead of a directed, 
top-down reform, “innovation-resisting” organizations had to be transformed into 
“innovation-producing” ones by means of the “personal and interpersonal 
reeducation” aimed at developing the qualities of the “ideal innovator” in the “good 
soldiers” of formal hierarchical order, namely: independence, autonomy, and 
willingness to take risks.152 For the “ideal innovator,” argued Shepard, the “risk of 
not innovating” was far greater than the risk of job insecurity.153 
Thus, by the end of the 1960s, social scientists like Shepard, Bennis, and 
Thompson developed an elaborate critique of bureaucracy, in many ways 
prefiguring what Boltanski and Chiapello described as the “new spirit of capitalism” 
in the 1990s.154 Theorizing innovation and the role of the “innovator” within 
organizations, these scholars were generalizing from observations of the work of 
corporate research laboratories, while their emphasis on the increasing role of 
science, technology, and innovation in the societal evolution echoed an earlier 
generation of similar theories of the “new class.”155 By the end of the 1960s, for 
Thompson and Shepard, the very possibility of “bureaucratic innovation” was 
increasingly seen as an oxymoron.156 At the same time, the argument completed a 
full circle: being primarily based on the empirical studies of corporate research 
management, the critique of bureaucracy and management science was brought 
back to the practitioners’ discourse, particularly through the writings of Shepard. 
In 1967, the IRI held a symposium on “What Needs Improvement in R&D,” 
inviting management consultants and investment advisors to speak.157 Notably, 
however, the contribution from the member of their own profession stressed not 
financial controls or decision analysis, but “zest” and “audacity” of the “American 
entrepreneur,” possessing the “traits that have spelled individuality in the midst of 
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155-King and Szelényi, Theories of the New Class : Intellectuals and Power; Block and Keller, 
“Where Do Innovations Come from? Transformations in the US Economy, 1970–2006.” 
156-Charles C. Arcand, “Bureaucratic Innovation,” CHEMTECH, December 1975 (1975): 710–
14. 
157-E. D. Reeves, “What Needs Improving At R&D–The Consultant’s Viewpoint,” Research 
Management 10, no. 1 (1967): 33–40; George B. Palmer, “What Needs Improving at R&D–The 




creeping standardization and rigid organizational structure.”158 The author of the 
address, William F. May, himself a chemical engineer by training, worked his way up 
from laboratory technician to the CEO of the American Can Company, having been 
affiliated with it for 30 years by the time of his address.159 Voicing the “chief 
executive viewpoint” on what needed improvement in R&D, May argued that “the 
individual entrepreneur” is “fast becoming extinct”: 
The rapid growth of organized laboratories is displacing the individual 
scientist and inventor: the Einsteins, the Edisons, and the Carruthers. The 
resulting mass application of segmented brain power and creative talent to 
R&D has not always brought forth the ultimate in creativity. In some cases 
it proved to be a deterrent to breaching the scientific barrier of given 
projects.160 
No longer an attribute of the “research men” in general, “creativity” was now 
primarily a trait of the “individualistic, inventive, “entrepreneurial” scientist,” rather 
than of his “educated, technically capable, conforming” colleagues.161 May referred 
to the “entrepreneurial scientist” largely metaphorically, endowing this figure with 
the qualities that Shepard previously identified as constitutive elements of the 
“scientific mythology”: this creative non-conformist was “sometimes abrasive in his 
association with others and... distasteful to his more organized colleagues”; “he is 
generally a total loss as an administrator”; and yet, “his positive contributions to the 
project far outweigh the negative factors.”162 However, even as a metaphor, the 
“entrepreneurial scientist” exemplified the major traits of the “creative specialist” 
from the debates of the late 1950s: creative, unsociable, and individualistic person 
incapable of becoming a manager or administrator. 
A year later, Shepard, in his contribution to the IRI Symposium devoted to 
“Research on Research,” made the decisive step of rendering the metaphor of 
“entrepreneurial scientist” literal. Drawing on Schrage’s 1965 study of the “R&D 
entrepreneurs,” he argued that “the successful R&D entrepreneur’s awareness of his 
own anxiety as a source of distortion, and his openness to and curiosity about 
himself, other people, and the rest of the relevant environment” make his profile 
“strikingly similar to the set of motivations of the “ideal” scientist.”163 Elaborating 
on this conclusion, Shepard mobilized the findings from his own previous research, 
as well as the anti-bureaucratic arguments developed by his co-authors Bennis and 
Thompson: instead of searching “for more inventions like dual ladders or campus-
like environments to make the mechanistic structure more bearable,” a research 
manager had to become a “manager of innovation,” which was increasingly 
replacing “R&D.”164 Moreover, Shepard suggested that “bureaucratic, mechanistic 
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organizations and practices” were unfit for the emerging “organic” era, drawing on 
the familiar contrast between the organic and the mechanic realms — an 
“entrepreneurial” metaphor par excellence.165 Stressing Schrage’s finding about the 
R&D entrepreneur’s moderate need for power, Shepard argued that the “skills of 
being a docile subordinate or a controlling superior,” native for a bureaucratic 
setting, were becoming increasingly obsolete.166 Instead, the “increasing complexity 
of our technology and society” required the qualities he previously identified with 
the “innovation-producing organization”: “autonomous interdependence,” 
“innovative spirit” and “learning capacity.”167  
Following Shepard and others, the discussion on the pages of RM increasingly 
turned to entrepreneurship towards the end of the 1960s. The job of the “modern 
research manager” was identified with “business orientation, a commitment to 
communications and entrepreneurial concepts.”168 The “creative specialist” of the 
1950s was now referred to as a “scientifically oriented individual,” characterized by 
his “prize [of] his independence and self-sufficiency” and unwelcome attitude to 
“any inquiry into his activities or a discussion of these activities.”169 Like any other 
“innovator,” he was presented as a “rugged individualist committed to the worth of 
his idea and is dedicated to its success,” ready to 
prove its utility if there is a way to do so… the innovator whose idea is 
technically based… is a man who is intelligent, usually possessing a 
technical education, but not necessarily to the graduate degree level. He is 
creative but is much more interested in getting things done than in scholarly 
achievement. He has great knowledge about his area of special interest and 
a healthy imagination.170 
The IRI Study Group “Motivation, Incentives, and Rewards for R&D 
Personnel” that met in New York in January 1969 arrived at similar conclusions: a 
typical well-motivated “technical man” was described as “an enthusiastic achiever 
oriented toward specific goals and objectives. He is relatively independent in his 
thinking and his work. He has a desire to accomplish and tends to be persistent 
without being stubborn. He has curiosity with vision.”171 The participants of the 
discussion expressed a feeling that “motivation theory” no longer applied to the 
young generation of “technical men” with their strong desire for self-determination, 
responsibility and recognition, as well as the joy of the “work itself”: “individual 
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participation in his goal setting and evaluating is a key to successful 
management.”172 
On the other hand, students of innovation, coming, inter alia, from the 
recently organized research program at the MIT Sloan School of Management, were 
increasingly suggesting that innovation process — the “translation of science and 
technology into use” — was a “personally based technical process.”173 The 
recognition of the similarities between the “ideal scientist” and the “ideal 
entrepreneur” allowed to see the empirical studies of technology transfer and 
innovation management in a new light: the “human problems” of research 
management could now be recast in terms of personality traits of the innovators, 
incompatible with the bureaucratic structure of large centralized organizations.174 
Moreover, this recognition implied the presence of “internal entrepreneurs” within 
the corporate R&D laboratories.175 
At the same time, as the academic and managerial critique of industrial 
bureaucracy was reaching wider audiences, the representatives of its very object — 
large electronics corporations, largely living off the defense contracting, including 
the Radio Corporation of America (RCA), Lockheed, and IBM — were increasingly 
turning their attention to the notion of entrepreneurship. In 1968, the IEEE 
Transactions on Engineering Management, a professional publication of electrical 
engineers, held a symposium on “The Venture Activities in the Large 
Corporation.”176 The contributors raised the same problem that preoccupied 
research managers during the late 1950s and much of the 1960s: how to reconcile 
the “business face of the corporation” with the “face of high scientific endeavor,” 
embodied by “creative scientists and development people, all of whom must 
understand their roles and the major objectives, as well as the general trends 
affecting the corporation.”177 Even in the presence of a decentralized and diversified 
corporate structure only “the most minor innovations” could be implemented, it was 
argued, and for precisely the reason as suggested by Thompson, Mueller, and 
Shepard: 
The division manager… will not tolerate any risk of disturbing his present 
business… The good division manager has different characteristics from the 
entrepreneurial innovator. In other words, the fellow who is running a 
division today and is running it well is quite often not the man who took the 
risks of establishing it in the beginning.178 
In other words, like research managers before them, engineers in the 
electronics companies, increasingly conscious about the limitations of centralized 
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organizational forms, began to look for entrepreneurs within their ranks, thus 
encountering almost the same problem of “knowing the people” as the one that 
confronted security analysts and early venture capitalists: the entrepreneurs had to 
be “picked out” and given “opportunities to develop,” even though some 
contributors insisted that the “real entrepreneurial manager is born.”179 Thus, by 
the beginning of the 1970s, the task of “picking out” the entrepreneurs was 
redefined as the one of recognizing the “latent entrepreneur,” that “special 
combination of management and engineering talents,” held “captive” or “buried” 
within his parent organization.180 Likewise, anticipating the later notion of 
“intrapreneuring,”181 the editors of RM, in their introduction to the paper by 
Roberts, commented that since “major innovations are often the developments of 
individuals who are imbued with extraordinary entrepreneurial spirit,” “to 
capitalize on such entrepreneurial instincts… demands special insights, recognition 
of individual characteristics, and derivative managerial action.”182  
This conclusion was a culmination of several intellectual developments that 
have been occurring since the electronics stock market boom of the late 1950s, 
prompting security analysts to look “beyond” their formal valuation devices and 
thus creating a room for the knowledge of “the people” running new “scientific 
companies.” Early venture capitalists, like Woodward, Davis, and Rock, offering their 
tentative generalizations from the experience of working with these people, 
provided this knowledge with some positive content, stressing “proper motivation” 
and “creativity.” However, the key discursive shift that made possible the translation 
of “creativity” of scientists and engineers working in the corporate R & D 
laboratories into their latent propensity for entrepreneurship occurred within 
research administrators’ discourse. Becoming increasingly open to the inputs from 
the social sciences by the mid-1960s, this discourse created an opening for the 
academic critiques of industrial bureaucracy, as well as for the emerging psychology 
of the entrepreneur, resulting in the recognition of the identity between the “ideal 
scientist” and the “ideal entrepreneur” in terms of their psychological profile, and 
the corresponding realization of the possibility of being a “latent entrepreneur.” 
Once the latent presence of this kind of character was recognized, the question 
turned increasingly technical, becoming concerned with how to help a new firm’s 
birth. 
Conclusion 
In May 1969, Boston College School of Management organized a two-day 
symposium called “New Business: The Art of Joining Innovative Technology, 
Management, and Capital,” supported by the US Department of Commerce’s Office 
of State Technical Services, devoted to the management of technology transfer, and 
the six New England Technical Services Agencies.183 Attracting more than 250 
businessmen, financiers, entrepreneurs and “technical men,” the event featured 
contributions from some of the key actors of the region’s emerging venture capital 
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scene, including venture capitalists Charles Waite, Peter Brooke, and Charles Lea; 
David Kosowsky, a physicist-turned-entrepreneur and president of Damon 
Engineering Corporation, founded in 1961 and backed by Lea and Brooke; Peter 
Rossmassler, vice-president of Hayden, Stone, representing the investment banking 
community; Edward B. Roberts, a professor at the MIT Sloan School of Management 
specializing in the analysis of technical entrepreneurship; and, finally, Georges F. 
Doriot, featuring as a distinguished expert on “entrepreneurial development.” 
Albert J. Kelly, Dean of the Boston College School of Management and the symposium 
chairman, explained the meeting’s purpose: 
The purpose of our meeting was to take a look at all the elements and levels 
of the technological management process, from the lawyer to the financier 
to the entrepreneur. Venture capital and emerging technology business 
ventures have certain elements of a black art to them. Even the people 
deeply involved will tell you they do not understand all the ingredients 
themselves. […] The purpose was to search for common threads and 
patterns of success.184 
This symposium was emblematic in several ways. On the one hand, it was the 
first public meeting organized with the explicit purpose of promoting venture 
capital in a non-instrumental way: by accumulating and sharing the available 
knowledge about this “black art,” rather than lobbying or creating an industry 
organization. On the other hand, it positioned venture capital as an important part 
of a broader process of “technological management,” ascribing it a definite economic 
function. Most importantly, however, for the first time, it connected venture capital 
investing with the recently codified category of “technical entrepreneurship,” 
solidifying the connection between the early venture capitalists’ informal heuristics 
centered on “people” and the challenge of managing young technological 
enterprises. Thus, Peter Rossmassler, in his luncheon address devoted to Hayden, 
Stone’s experience with providing investment banking services to Teledyne, Inc. and 
Scientific Data Systems, both of which had been backed by Arthur Rock at an earlier 
stage in their development, described his selection criteria as follows: “What does 
the banker look for in selecting the companies that he will bet his money and his 
reputation on? It can be summed up in one word: people.”185 The contributions of 
Peter Brooke and Charles Waite, as well as other participants, fully endorsed this 
emphasis, not to mention Doriot’s traditional emphasis on the importance of “men” 
and their “ideas,” inseparable from each other.186 However, as different from the 
heuristic generalizations deployed by Rock, Woodward and other early venture 
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capitalists, by 1969 the “people,” previously referred to as “creative,” “technically 
trained,” “properly motivated” or “veridically perceptive,” were clearly recognized 
as a distinct category or, rather, as a human kind.187 In the presentation of Edward 
B. Roberts, whose 1968 paper introduced the readership of RM to the notion of 
“internal entrepreneurship,” this kind of person was referred to as “scientifically 
trained entrepreneur,” “technological businessman,” or simply “technical 
entrepreneur.”188 Roberts began his speech with a sarcastic remark that the 
symposium “pounds a nail in the coffin of Galbraith’s idea,” referring to John K. 
Galbraith’s argument about the death of entrepreneurship: 
The age of entrepreneurship is not dead. It is now. In fact, I suspect that over 
the next several years this period will become identified in American 
industrial life as an important period for the growth and re-birth of 
entrepreneurship, particularly in the technical area. I suspect that with the 
passage of time we are going to look back at the rebels on the university 
campus and identify them as part of the entrepreneurial spirit of today.189 
In Roberts’ analysis, the “technical entrepreneur” was defined rather narrow, 
as the “man who starts a technical company.”190 In his description of the latter’s 
personal characteristics, Roberts reiterated some of the earlier findings of Schrage’s 
(1965) study of the successful “R&D entrepreneurs,” citing, in particular, the high 
need for achievement and the moderate need for power.191 More importantly, 
however, Roberts made a point on the relationship between the “technical 
entrepreneur” and the venture capitalist that could not have been stated with equal 
force and clarity at the beginning of the decade: 
The good venture capitalist is the one who seeks and is willing to bet on 
good venture capital opportunities. Young technical entrepreneurs, who 
have the motivation and the general managerial outlook and orientation, are 
a good bet. Indeed, the role of venture capitalist is to provide something 
very venturesome where the risk taken by the investor is high, and the 
rewards are appropriate.192 
No longer a “special situation,” or a “worthwhile” expenditure of a wealthy 
“patrician,” venture capital was now clearly defined as a bet on people — yet, unlike 
in the informal heuristics of Arthur Rock or Harper Woodward, or indeed their 
“patrician” predecessors, it was not simply “people” one knew and trusted 
personally, but rather a specific kind of person, described in terms of the well-
established tradition of psychological research. The psychological portrait of the 
“technical entrepreneur” inherited some of the traits of its predecessor, the figure 
“creative scientist” forged in the research management discourse of the 1950s. From 
1969 onwards, it began to circulate in the more practically-oriented literature — 
sourcebooks on how to obtain venture capital that contained the information on the 
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personality traits of the prospective seeker of capital.193 Nevertheless, at the turn of 
the 1960s, when the symposium on “New Venture Management” gathered at Boston 
College, the crucial transformation was already completed: venture capital, defined 
as the “people business,”194 acquired a very specific target audience — “technical 
entrepreneurs.” As this chapter attempted to show, “technical entrepreneurs” were 
a novel human kind that emerged during the 1960s through a complex chain of 
translations and mediations: from the “creative people” running “scientific 
companies,” to the equation of “scientific creativity” with entrepreneurship, and, 
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Venture capitalism first emerged as a project of capitalization focused on 
“people.” Most influentially, it has been articulated by Georges F. Doriot, a 
pioneering venture capitalist and a teacher at Harvard Business School, the only 
early VC who could combine these two capacities, developing his business 
philosophy in and out of the classroom. Doriot’s “imaginary” was based on a vitalist 
metaphysics and used evolutionary metaphors to anticipate the future of the 
combinations of “men” and “ideas.”1 In class, this teaching was operationalized 
through a series of techniques of the self that focused on the practice of self-
improvement and required students to imagine themselves as bundles of assets and 
liabilities reflecting the changes in their “potentialities.” 2 
The first venture capital organizations were founded in the aftermath of 
World War II in New York and Boston by the heirs of the wealthy family dynasties 
acting out of a sense of social responsibility, as well as influential administrators of 
the post-war military-industrial complex, concerned with regional economic 
recovery. However, neither were immediately recognized as profit-making business 
enterprises capable of reproducing capital. During the first decade and a half of their 
existence, pioneering venture capital organizations struggled to distinguish 
themselves from speculative gambling, on the one hand, and from non-pecuniary, 
philanthropic pursuit, on the other hand. During this period of uncertainty that 
lasted until the end of the 1950s, a different group of people discovered investing in 
young technological companies while working as career employees in formal 
financial institutions. These “careerists” did not inherit considerable wealth and 
could not exercise a “patrician” approach characteristic of the pioneering VC 
organizations capable of tolerating total losses in at least some of their investments. 
On the contrary, the “careerists” became exposed to intermediation opportunities 
between the emerging technology companies and institutional pools of financial 
capital while moving along the organizational hierarchies. In order to pursue these 
opportunities, they had to adopt some of the categories of institutional finance, like 
“special situations,” to make these opportunities intelligible for the providers of 
capital. When “venture capital” meant an elite and exclusive business practice, these 
people categorized it under the name of “special situations.” 
Between 1959 and 1962, the US stock markets witnessed a speculative boom 
in the shares of companies engaged in research and development effort for the 
federal government, especially the so-called “electronics” companies. This event 
posed a novel cognitive challenge for the aspiring profession of securities analysis, 
whose “calculative frame” appeared increasingly deficient and incapable of 
accounting for the small technological companies without a long statistical history 
to judge their value. As “investments” became increasingly indistinguishable from 
“speculation,” the categorical apparatus of security analysis underwent a significant 
transformation, making previously marginal, residual categories like “special 
situations” increasingly central to making sense of financial markets. During the 
electronics boom, the residual category of “special situations” became the proxy for 
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a young, technologically based company, assuming the role of an early equivalent of 
“venture capital.” Because of the unique character of each “special situations,” 
moreover, investing in them put a premium on the practice of field trips, which stood 
relatively low in the division of labor of security analysis profession. As security 
analysts struggled to determine whether the electronics boom had a basis in 
economic fundamentals — in particular, in the ongoing “scientific” or “research 
revolution,” — they increasingly required a new set of heuristics to judge the 
“special situations” companies. In turn, this created a new emphasis on first-hand 
knowledge of the “management” of these “scientific companies.” 
In the aftermath of the electronic boom, venture capitalists and others 
deployed a set of heuristics to render the knowledge of “management” positive, 
moving it from a residual category of securities analysis to the central factor in 
valuation and capitalization of companies. In so doing, they drew on the discourse 
of research administration that emerged in the aftermath of World War II as a 
practical reflection of the challenges of managing large-scale research institutions, 
first governmental wartime laboratories, and then corporate R&D divisions. Natural 
and social scientists reflected on their experience of “teamwork” during the war, 
conceptualizing organized research settings as “bureaucratic.” The rise of 
administrative science in the mid-1950s rendered public and private bureaucracies 
equivalent as proxies for any large-scale organization, thus opening the way for a 
reflection on the conditions of scientific work in large corporations. During the 
1960s, research managers debated the ways and approaches of increasing the 
creativity and productivity of the scientists and engineers employed in the corporate 
R&D laboratories, as well as approaches to promoting and rewarding these “creative 
specialists.” By the end of the decade, amidst mounting concerns about declining 
R&D profitability, research managers increasingly recognized the impossibility of 
turning scientists and engineers into administrators and turned to social scientists 
for help. Researchers trained in human relations brought into research management 
discourse the emerging critique of industrial bureaucracy and, by the end of the 
1960s, concluded that the psychological traits of “creative specialists,” scientists and 
engineers, were identical to the psychological profile of the “ideal entrepreneur.” 
This recognition led to the emergence of the notion of the “latent entrepreneur,” 
“buried” within the parent organization without access to capital for starting-up an 
independent business, thereby translating the managerial problem of corporate 
R&D into the problem of venture finance. This conclusion allowed scientists and 
engineers to be included within the ranks of (potential) “technical entrepreneurs” 
who, just like many other members of the “achieving society,” needed financial and 
managerial assistance to effect the transition to the world of private enterprise. 
Defining themselves as being “in the people business,” venture capitalists have 
found their professional niche in mediating this process — turning engineers into 







Appendix. Patricians and Engineers: A Prosopography of the Early US 
Venture Capitalists, 1952-1970 
Chapter III suggested that “careerists” played an important role in the 
emergence of venture capital as a form of investing: without much concern for the 
social responsibility of business or any other similarly noble pursuits, their 
trajectory into what eventually became venture capital was contingent on their 
employment in formal financial institutions, as well as “careerist” socialization that 
generally discourages risk-taking, as implied by Mann.1 The “careerist” route into 
venture capital was enabled by the “rising tides” of innovation that created 
opportunities to mediate between the emerging technological companies and the 
established institutional pools of financial capital. Characteristically, most of these 
“careerists” entered venture capital business from non-technological backgrounds, 
which was in fact typical of all early venture capitalists in the US.2 Nevertheless, by 
the mid-1960s the “social origins” of American venture capitalists shifted in the 
opposite direction. 
By the late 1960s, venture capital community became more diverse, 
attracting people with technical or engineering, rather than financial, background. 
If in 1952 Reid Dennis was virtually the only person in San Francisco financial 
industry who had an engineering degree, the rise of Silicon Valley’s semiconductor 
cluster created a “different formation” of venture capitalists, to adopt Donald 
Valentine’s term.3 Paul Wythes, having graduated from Princeton with a mechanical 
engineering degree, and with an MBA from Stanford, began his career in “scientific 
sales,” first at Honeywell, and later at Beckman Instruments, the major electronics 
companies. Through a business school connection, he became involved with the 
establishment of the venture capital arm of Sutter Hill, a Californian real estate 
company, in 1964, where he was joined by William Draper.4 Thomas Perkins, being 
the first member of his family to have a college education, studied engineering at 
MIT and with Doriot at Harvard Business School, going to work for Hewlett-Packard 
thereafter, through which he established ties with the venture capital community, 
and launched Kleiner and Perkins limited partnership in 1972, together with Eugene 
Kleiner, one of the founders of Fairchild Semiconductor.5 Gibson Myers, an 
engineering graduate of Dartmouth College and a Stanford MBA, worked in the 
division led by Perkins at Hewlett-Packard, joining the newly established venture 
capital firm Mayfield via a Stanford connection in 1969.6 Likewise, Donald 
Valentine’s venture capital career was launched by his experience in marketing at 
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Sylvania, Fairchild Semiconductor, and then National Semiconductor, leading to the 
formation of Sequoia Capital in 1972.7 J. Burgess Jamieson, after graduating from 
MIT with a degree in electrical engineering in 1952, worked in Grumman Aircraft 
Corporation and Honeywell, assuming a project engineer position in the Cambridge-
based Adage, Inc., backed by American Research and Development Corporation, 
through which he met Doriot and William Elfers. Leaving Adage in 1963, Jamieson 
managed the development of the world’s first 16-bit minicomputer at the 
Massachusetts-based Computer Control Company until 1968, when he became a 
general manager and participated in the private venture capital pool of the 
company’s top officers. Shifting towards more venture-capital oriented career, in 
1974 Jamieson co-founded Institutional Venture Associates.8 Burton McMurtry, 
having received his PhD in electrical engineering from Stanford, began his career at 
the Mountain View-based research laboratory of Sylvania; through his meeting with 
Jack Melchor, a physics PhD who also worked at Sylvania before McMurtry, and 
backed several technology companies in California in the mid-1950s through the 
late 1960s. In 1974, together with Reid Dennis, McMurtry founded Intuitional 
Venture Associates.9 
At the same time, from the late 1960s onwards, Wall Street became 
interested in computing and high technology more generally, creating an opening 
for people with scientific backgrounds to become consultants and intermediaries 
between emerging technologies and financial markets. Thus, James Swartz, having 
studied engineering at Harvard and industrial administration at Carnegie Mellon, 
after a brief stint in consulting, joined the newly organized venture capital firm Data 
Science Ventures at Princeton, founded by a Princeton PhD chemical engineer 
Morton Collins, in 1968.10 Family-based venture capital organizations also began 
searching for specialized expertise: thus, Venrock, a venture capital firm established 
in 1969 by the Rockefeller family, hired Anthony Evnin, an MIT PhD in chemistry, to 
explore biotechnology field;11 in 1972, Charles Lea, then at White, Wield & Co., hired 
James Blair, an engineering PhD graduate of the University of Pennsylvania, after his 
brief stint as a security analyst at F.S. Smithers, to oversee the firm’s technology 
investments.12 
Nevertheless, several partly overlapping “formations” of early American VCs 
are discernible, whose trajectories, while partly overlapping (e.g., at the key 
 
7-Donald T. Valentine, “Early Bay Area Venture Capitalists: Shaping the Economic and 
Business Landscape,” an oral history conducted by Sally Smith Hughes in 2009 (Regional Oral History 
Office, The Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley, 2010). 
8-J. Burgess Jamieson, “Bay Area Venture Capitalists: Shaping the Business and Economic 
Landscape,” conducted by Sally Smith Hughes in 2009 (Regional Oral History Office, The Bancroft 
Library, University of California, Berkeley, 2010). 
9-Burton J. McMurtry, “Early Bay Area Venture Capitalists: Shaping the Economic and 
Business Landscape,” an oral history conducted by Sally Smith Hughes in 2009 (Regional Oral History 
Office, The Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley, 2009). 
10-James R. Swartz, “Venture Capital Greats: A Conversation with James R. Swartz,” interview 
conducted and edited by Mauree Jane Perry, July 19, 2006 (National Venture Capital Association, 
Arlington, Virginia, 2009). 
11-Anthony B. Evnin, “Venture Capital Greats: A Conversation with Anthony B. Evnin,” 
interview conducted by Carole Kolker, June 30, 2009 (New York City, National Venture Capital 
Association, Arlington, Virginia, 2009). 
12-James C. Blair, “Venture Capital Greats: A Conversation with James C. Blair,” interview 





institutions like Harvard Business School or the first VC organizations), are 
nevertheless distinct. These trajectories are summarized in the Table below. Based 
on the oral histories and additional biographical sources, it presents a stylized 
prosopography of early US venture capitalists, built around the temporal axis — 
namely, the date or the period of the first exposure to or the transition to venture 
capital. The table includes 34 individuals who did not participate in the founding of 
the first venture capital organizations after World War II but were drawn into VC 
investing by some other route, between the early 1950s and the early 1970s, i.e. 
roughly covering the historical period of this thesis. The Table reads as follows: 
• Name: identifies the individual and refers to the corresponding oral history 
listed in the Primary Sources; 
• Family Background: provides some stylized facts about the individual’s 
social location at birth, operationalized, so far as possible, in a conventional 
sociological way with reference to father’s occupation; 
• School: provides additional stylized facts concerning the individual’s social 
location; 
• Education: higher education (university, college, business school), level 
attained, specialization/subject; 
• Military Service: war experience and military career; 
• Career Before VC: this column contains information about the individual’s 
affiliation/position immediately prior to or contemporaneous with his first 
exposure/transition to VC; 
• Entry Time: exact year or period of time during which the individual was 
exposed to/began transition into VC; 
• VC Entry: specific episodes and/or organizational affiliation of the individual 
at the time of transition; 
• Later Career: later career in the VC, if applicable; 
• Category: CAR — “careerists”; EL — “elites”; ENG — “engineers.” 
Categories in the Table are stylized generalizations of the typical paths to 
venture capital between the early 1950s and the early 1970s. The “careerist” profile 
is described in the Chapter II: this category refers to those VCs whose careers were 
launched through their work in formal financial institutions, who did not possess 
any considerable hereditary wealth, and, for the most part, did not have a 
background in technology or engineering. “Engineers” include those VCs whose 
careers were launched through their participation in the founding or operation of 
technology-intensive businesses, or whose transition into VC was contingent on 
their expertise in science, technology, or engineering. “Elites” include VCs coming 
from the established backgrounds comparable to those of the founders of J.H. 
Whitney & Co., or at least belonging to the same social circles. On the other hand, for 
the purposes of simplicity, this same category also includes those VCs whose careers 
started with one of the original VC firms: J.H. Whitney & Co., American Research & 
Development Corp., Draper, Gaither & Anderson. The data on 34 individuals 
presented in the Table is obviously limited in so far as it is not a statistical sample, 
but a prosopography constructed by “snowballing” on the basis of the oral history 
interviews. Moreover, with a few exceptions, it does not include a potentially large 
group of VCs who began their careers after the passage of the Small Business 




it does afford a few insights into the evolution of the VC investing during the relevant 
period. 
Firstly, as noted above, by the mid-1960s, the presence of the “careerists” 
becomes somewhat less visible, as more people with engineering/scientific 
backgrounds are being drawn into the business (Paul Wythes, Bruce Everett, James 
Swartz, Richard Petritz). Secondly, the original VC organizations experience a 
generational change and admit new, unrelated partners (Peter Crisp, John Shane, 
Charles Waite). Thirdly, another group of VCs begin their careers as a result of 
extensive operational experience in the established technological companies, some 
of them backed by the VCs of the previous generation (e.g., Fairchild Semiconductor 
or National Semiconductor). Today’s famous VCs Thomas Perkins and Donald 
Valentine belong to the latter category. 
Finally, the Table provides some stylized illustrations to the claims and the 




Table 1. Patricians and Careerists: A Stylized Prosopography of Early US Venture Capitalists 
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